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In: Contemporary political theory
Political philosophy seems both impossible to do and impossible to avoid. Impossible to do, because we cannot agree on a single set of political principles. Impossible to avoid, because we're always living with some kind of political system, and thus some set of principles. So, if we can't do the philosophy, but can't escape the politics, what are we to do? Jonathan Floyd argues that the answer lies in political philosophy's deepest methodological commitments. First, he shows how political philosophy is practiced as a kind of 'thinking about thinking'. Second, he unpicks the different types of thought we think about, such as considered judgements, or intuitive responses to moral dilemmas, and assesses whether any are fit for purpose. Third, he offers an alternative approach - 'normative behaviourism' - which holds that rather than studying our thinking, we should study our behaviour. Perhaps, just sometimes, actions speak louder than thoughts
In: Political studies review, Band 21, Heft 3, S. 490-500
ISSN: 1478-9302
Normative behaviourism says that the measure of political principles is how we respond to them in practice, not how they appear to us in theory, but is that a sustainable distinction? Does normative behaviourism end up relying on mentalism, or even utilitarianism? Does it assume too much of the data we either have now or could ever have? Does it bind us to the status quo or presume the end of history? All these are plausible worries, though perhaps not fatal ones, provided one remembers at least two things: first, that we judge this approach by comparing it to the alternatives; second, that we keep on experimenting, both in politics and philosophy alike, including with normative behaviourism itself.
In: Political theory: an international journal of political philosophy, Band 51, Heft 1, S. 86-105
ISSN: 1552-7476
This essay is part of a special issue celebrating 50 years of Political Theory. The ambition of the editors was to mark this half century not with a retrospective but with a confabulation of futures. Contributors were asked: What will political theory look and sound like in the next century and beyond? What claims might political theorists or their descendants be making in ten, twenty-five, fifty, a hundred years' time? How might they vindicate those claims in their future contexts? How will the consistent concerns of political theorists evolve into the questions critical for people decades or centuries from now? What new problems will engage the political theorists (or their rough equivalents) of the future? What forms might those take? What follows is one of the many confabulations published in response to these queries.
In: Critical review of international social and political philosophy: CRISPP, Band 26, Heft 3, S. 356-375
ISSN: 1743-8772
In: Floyd , J 2022 , ' Political Philosophy's Methodological Moment and the Rise of Public Political Philosophy ' , Society , vol. 59 , no. 2 , pp. 129-139 . https://doi.org/10.1007/s12115-022-00710-2
Political philosophy is having a methodological moment. Driven by long-standing frustrations at the fragmentation of our field, as well as recent urges to become more engaged with the 'real' world, there is now a boom in debates concerning the 'true' nature of our vocation. Yet how can this new work avoid simply recycling old rivalries under new labels? The key is to turn all this so-called methodological interest into a genuinely new programme of 'methodology', defined here as the careful identification and evaluation of all the different methods of reasoning available to us as political philosophers. This programme would clarify, for the first time, all the many ways in which we might argue with one another, thus making us less likely to talk past each another, and more likely to work fruitfully together.
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In: Floyd , J 2020 , ' Normative behaviourism as a solution to four problems in realism and non-ideal theory ' , Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy , vol. 23 , no. 2 , pp. 137-162 . https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2018.1501538
This article advances the case for 'normative behaviourism' – a new way of doing political philosophy that tries to turn facts about observable patterns of behaviour, as produced by different political systems, into grounds for specific political principles. This approach is applied to four distinct problems at the heart of the ideal/non-ideal theory and moralism/realism debates: (1) How to distinguish good from bad idealisations; (2) how to rank options of variable feasibility, cost, and danger; (3) how to distinguish legitimate acceptance of a given political system from acceptance based on coercion or false consciousness; and (4) how to translate abstract principles into concrete institutions. Objections against the general viability of normative behaviourism, and against the types of behaviour it tracks, are also considered.
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In: Critical review of international social and political philosophy: CRISPP, Band 23, Heft 2, S. 137-162
ISSN: 1743-8772
In: Journal of international political theory: JIPT, Band 12, Heft 2, S. 152-168
ISSN: 1755-1722
This article takes a new idea, 'normative behaviourism', and applies it to global political theory, in order to address at least one of the problems we might have in mind when accusing that subject of being too 'unrealistic'. The core of this idea is that political principles can be justified, not just by patterns in our thinking, and in particular our intuitions and considered judgements, but also by patterns in our behaviour, and in particular acts of insurrection and crime. The problem addressed is 'cultural relativism', understood here not as a meta-ethical doctrine but as the apparent 'fact' that people around the world have culturally varying intuitions and judgements of a kind that lead them to affirm different political principles. This is a problem because it seems to follow (1) that global agreement on any substantial set of political principles is impossible and (2) that any political theory in denial of this 'fact' would be, for that reason, deeply unrealistic. The solution to this problem argued for here is that if domestic political principles (i.e. principles intended to regulate a single state) could be justified by normative behaviourism, and in reference to culturally invariant behaviour, then an international system supportive of such principles is justifiable by extension.
In: Journal of international political theory: JIPT, Band 12, Heft 2, S. 93-95
ISSN: 1755-1722
This special edition brings together (1) the recent methodological worries of the moralism/realism and ideal/non-ideal theory debates with (2) the soaring ambition of work in international or global political theory, as found in, say, theories of global justice. Contributors are as follows: Chris Bertram, Jonathan Floyd, Aaron James, Terry MacDonald, David Miller, Shmulik Nili, Mathias Risse and Matt Sleat.
In: Floyd , J 2016 , ' Normative behaviourism and global political principles ' , Journal of International Political Theory , vol. 12 , no. 2 , pp. 152-168 . https://doi.org/10.1177/1755088216630998
This article takes a new idea, 'normative behaviourism', and applies it to global political theory, in order to address at least one of the problems we might have in mind when accusing that subject of being too 'unrealistic'. The core of this idea is that political principles can be justified, not just by patterns in our thinking, and in particular our intuitions and considered judgements, but also by patterns in our behaviour, and in particular acts of insurrection and crime. The problem addressed is 'cultural relativism', understood here not as a meta-ethical doctrine but as the apparent 'fact' that people around the world have culturally varying intuitions and judgements of a kind that lead them to affirm different political principles. This is a problem because it seems to follow (1) that global agreement on any substantial set of political principles is impossible and (2) that any political theory in denial of this 'fact' would be, for that reason, deeply unrealistic. The solution to this problem argued for here is that if domestic political principles (i.e. principles intended to regulate a single state) could be justified by normative behaviourism, and in reference to culturally invariant behaviour, then an international system supportive of such principles is justifiable by extension.
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In: Floyd , J 2016 , ' Rawls' Methodological Blueprint ' , European Journal of Political Theory , vol. 16 , no. 3 , pp. 367-381 . https://doi.org/10.1177/1474885115605260
Rawls' primary legacy is not that he standardised a particular view of justice, but rather that he standardised a particular method of arguing about it: justification via reflective equilibrium. Yet this method, despite such standardisation, is often misunderstood in at least four ways. First, we miss its continuity across his various works. Second, we miss the way in which it unifies other justificatory ideas, such as the 'original position' and an 'overlapping consensus'. Third, we miss its fundamentally empirical character, given that it turns facts about the thoughts in our head into principles for the regulation of our political existence. Fourth, we miss some of the implications of that empiricism, including its tension with moral realism, relativism, and conservatism.
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In: European journal of political theory: EJPT, Band 16, Heft 3, S. 367-381
ISSN: 1741-2730
Rawls' primary legacy is not that he standardised a particular view of justice, but rather that he standardised a particular method of arguing about it: justification via reflective equilibrium. Yet this method, despite such standardisation, is often misunderstood in at least four ways. First, we miss its continuity across his various works. Second, we miss the way in which it unifies other justificatory ideas, such as the 'original position' and an 'overlapping consensus'. Third, we miss its fundamentally empirical character, given that it turns facts about the thoughts in our head into principles for the regulation of our political existence. Fourth, we miss some of the implications of that empiricism, including its tension with moral realism, relativism, and conservatism.
In: European journal of political theory: EJPT, Band 15, Heft 2, S. 155-171
ISSN: 1741-2730
This article makes four claims. First, that the analytic/Continental split in political theory stems from an unarticulated disagreement about human nature, with analytics believing we have an innate set of mostly compatible moral and political inclinations, and Continentals seeing such things as alterable products of historical contingency. Second, that we would do better to talk of Continental-political-theory versus Rawlsian-political-philosophy, given that the former avoids arguments over principles, whilst the latter leaves genuine analytic philosophy behind. Third, that Continentals suffer from a lack of such arguments, even by their own lights, whilst Rawlsians suffer from inconsistencies within the thought-patterns (e.g. conflicting intuitions and judgements) on which their principles depend. Fourth, that there is an alternative method – 'normative behaviourism' – that at least tries to move beyond the problems of both approaches, whilst sharing an idea of 'praxis' with the first, and an idea of deriving-principles-from-existing-judgements with the second.
In: Floyd , J 2015 , ' Analytics and Continentals : Divided by nature but united by praxis? ' , European Journal of Political Theory , vol. 15 , no. 2 , pp. 155-171 . https://doi.org/10.1177/1474885115582075
This article makes four claims. First, that the analytic/Continental split in political theory stems from an unarticulated disagreement about human nature, with analytics believing we have an innate set of mostly compatible moral and political inclinations, and Continentals seeing such things as alterable products of historical contingency. Second, that we would do better to talk of Continental-political-theory versus Rawlsian-political-philosophy, given that the former avoids arguments over principles, whilst the latter leaves genuine analytic philosophy behind. Third, that Continentals suffer from a lack of such arguments, even by their own lights, whilst Rawlsians suffer from inconsistencies within the thought-patterns (e.g. conflicting intuitions and judgements) on which their principles depend. Fourth, that there is an alternative method – 'normative behaviourism' – that at least tries to move beyond the problems of both approaches, whilst sharing an idea of 'praxis' with the first, and an idea of deriving-principles-from-existing-judgements with the second.
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