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Introduction: The iron law of megaproject management / Bent Flyvbjerg -- Part I: Challenges. Has megaproject management lost its way? Lessons from history / Sylvain Lenfle and Christoph Loch ; Cycles in megaproject development / Matti Siemiatycki ; Big is fragile : an attempt at theorizing scale / Atif Ansar, Bent Flyvbjerg, Alexander Budzier, and Daniel Lunn ; Institutional challenges and solutions for global megaprojects / Raymond E. Levitt and W. Richard Scott ; Megaproject decision making and management : ethical and political issues / Bert Van Wee and Hugo Priemus ; Biggest infrastructure bubble ever? City and nation building with debt-financed megaprojects in China / Xuefei Ren -- Part II: Causes. Did megaproject research pioneer behavioral economics? The case of Albert O. Hirschman / Bent Flyvbjerg ; Megaproject escalation of commitment : an update and appraisal / Helga Drummond ; Megaprojects as games of innovation / Roger Miller, Donald Lessard, and Vivek Sakhrani ; Power and sensemaking in megaprojects / Stewart R. Clegg, Shankar Sankaran, Chris Biesenthal, and Julien Pollack ; A collective-action perspective on the planning of megaprojects / Nuno Gil ; Understanding drivers of mega-events in emerging economies / Robert A. Baade and Victor A. Matheson -- Part III: Cures. Innovation and flexibility in megaprojects : a new delivery model / Andrew Davies, Mark Dodgson, and David M. Gann ; Megaproject stakeholder management / Graham Winch ; Private finance : what problems does it solve, and how well? / Graeme Hodge and Carsten Greve ; Wider impacts of megaprojects : curse or cure? / Roger Vickerman ; Quality assurance in megaproject management : the Norwegian way / Gro Holst Volden and Knut Samset ; The good megadam : does it exist, all things considered? / Thayer Scudder -- Part IV: Cases. Cracking the code of megaproject innovation : the case of Boeing's 787 / Vered Holzmann, Aaron Shenhar, Yao Zhao, and Benjamin Melamed ; The power of systems integration : lessons from London 2012 / Andrew Davies ; Iconic urban megaprojects in a global context : revisiting Bilbao / Gerardo Del Cerro Santamaría ; Private provision of public services : the case of Australia's motorways / Demi Chung ; Megaprojects as political symbols : South Africa's Gautrain / Janis Van Der Westhuizen ; Large dam development : from Trojan horse to Pandora's box / Rhodante Ahlers, Margreet Zwarteveen, and Karen Bakker

Este artículo examina cinco malentendidos comunes sobre la investigación mediante estudios de caso: 1) elconocimiento teórico es más valioso que el conocimiento práctico; 2) no podemos generalizar a partir de unsolo caso y, por lo tanto, el estudio de un solo caso no puede contribuir al desarrollo científico; 3) los estudiosde caso son más útiles para generar hipótesis, mientras otros métodos son más adecuados para verificar lashipótesis y construir las teorías; 4) el estudio de caso contiene un sesgo hacia la verificación, y 5) suele ser difícilresumir estudios de caso específicos. El artículo explica y corrige estos malentendidos uno por uno y concluyecon el principio kuhniano de que una disciplina científica que carece de una elevada cantidad de estudiosde caso concienzudamente desarrollados es una disciplina sin producción sistemática de ejemplares, yuna disciplina sin ejemplares es una disciplina ineficaz. La ciencia social debe reforzarse mediante la realizaciónde más estudios profundos de caso.

Behavioral science has witnessed an explosion in the number of biases identified by behavioral scientists, to more than 200 at present. The paper identifies the ten most important behavioral biases for project planning and management. First, we argue it is a mistake to equate behavioral bias with cognitive bias, as is common. Cognitive bias is only half the story; political bias is the other half. Second, we list the top-ten behavioral biases in project management: strategic misrepresentation; optimism and uniqueness bias; the planning fallacy; overconfidence, availability, and hindsight bias; the base-rate fallacy; anchoring; and escalation of commitment. Each bias is defined and its impacts on project management explained, with examples. Third, base-rate neglect is identified as a primary reason projects underperform. This is supported by presentation of the most comprehensive set of base rates that exists in project management scholarship, from 2,062 projects. Finally, recent findings of power-law outcomes in project performance are identified as a possible first stage in discovering a general theory of project management, with more fundamental and more scientific explanations of project outcomes than found in existing theory. ; Behavioral science has witnessed an explosion in the number of biases identified by behavioral scientists, to more than 200 at present. This article identifies the 10 most important behavioral biases for project management. First, we argue it is a mistake to equate behavioral bias with cognitive bias, as is common. Cognitive bias is half the story; political bias the other half. Second, we list the top 10 behavioral biases in project management: (1) strategic misrepresentation, (2) optimism bias, (3) uniqueness bias, (4) the planning fallacy, (5) overconfidence bias, (6) hindsight bias, (7) availability bias, (8) the base rate fallacy, (9) anchoring, and (10) escalation of commitment. Each bias is defined, and its impacts on project management are explained, with examples. Third, base rate neglect is identified as a primary reason that projects underperform. This is supported by presentation of the most comprehensive set of base rates that exist in project management scholarship, from 2,062 projects. Finally, recent findings of power law outcomes in project performance are identified as a possible first stage in discovering a general theory of project management, with more fundamental and more scientific explanations of project outcomes than found in conventional theory.

In conventional business and government megaprojects—such as hydroelectric dams, chemical-processing plants, or big-bang enterprise-resource-planning systems—the standard approach is to build something monolithic and customized. Such projects must be 100% complete before they can deliver benefits: Even when it's 95% complete, a nuclear reactor is of no use. In this article, the author argues that two factors play a critical role in determining success or failure: modularity in design and speed in iteration. The article examines those factors by looking at well-known megaprojects, both successful ones and cautionary tales. It argues that "What's our LEGO?" is a key question for big projects. If you don't have a LEGO, you need to find one, or your project will be slow, expensive, and failure prone. If you have one, replicate and learn, over and over, to shorten delivery, bring down costs, and get to your revenues and benefits sooner. ; In conventional business and government megaprojects—such as hydroelectric dams, chemical-processing plants, or big-bang enterprise-resource-planning systems—the standard approach is to build something monolithic and customized. Such projects must be 100% complete before they can deliver benefits: Even when it's 95% complete, a nuclear reactor is of no use. In this article, the author argues that two factors play a critical role in determining success or failure: modularity in design and speed in iteration. The article examines those factors by looking at well-known megaprojects, both successful ones and cautionary tales. It argues that "What's our LEGO?" is a key question for big projects. If you don't have a LEGO, you need to find one, or your project will be slow, expensive, and failure prone. If you have one, replicate and learn, over and over, to shorten delivery, bring down costs, and get to your revenues and benefits sooner.