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AbstractIn this article I try to identify the nature of the Hobbesian Crowd Problem as a problem depending on the nature of the connection, or absence of connection, between the notions of "crowd" and "people." When a crowd is considered as a "subjected crowd" it is but the flip side of a people, which is itself the other name of the sovereign. When considered as a gathering of people, the crowd's status depends on the intention of its members as well as the number of its participants, but also on whether it is authorized by the sovereign. Within the framework of his complex theory of associations (or "system subjects"), Hobbes's theory of crowds is a useful instrument for assessing what we now call "populism," the claim by some citizens to speak for the whole political community.

Il s'agit de la réponse que j'ai faite lors de l'intervention de David Runciman au séminaire de philosophie politique normative (EHESS). ; The problem you are dealing with is not so much a problem about artificial intelligence per se – what is it all about? How does an algorithm function? Are we going to be subjugated by the intelligent robots and calculators we devised? –, but a problem about the political dimension, if any, of the technics we have gathered under this fancy expression of "artificial Intelligence", or, if we want to make it shorter, AI. How should we consider those technics now present in our daily lives as far as our political associations are concerned? Do we have to fear a new kind of intelligence that would in the end reduce our human intelligence to very little? When the best check player of all times loses against a program, is it the end of the supremacy of human intelligence? To approach this problem properly you suggest that we make a philosophical move away from the current formulation of the question: we should stop focusing on the distinction between artificial intelligence and natural intelligence, and focus instead on the distinction between artificial intelligence and what you call "artificial agency", or AA. In this text, Luc Foisneau tries to analyze the distinction introduced by David Runciman in the draft paper he presented at the Normative political philosophy seminar (EHESS, 8th June 2021). ; Le problème auquel vous êtes confronté n'est pas tant un problème d'intelligence artificielle en soi – de quoi s'agit-il ? Comment fonctionne un algorithme ? Allons-nous être subjugués par les robots et les calculateurs intelligents que nous avons conçus ? – mais un problème sur la dimension politique, s'il y en a une, des techniques que nous avons rassemblées sous cette expression fantaisiste d'"intelligence artificielle", ou, si nous voulons faire plus court, d'IA. Comment devons-nous considérer ces techniques désormais présentes dans notre vie quotidienne en ce qui concerne nos ...

Résumé La Théorie de la justice fait une place à la règle de majorité : cette règle étant à la fois une source de légitimité en régime démocratique et une source d'erreurs, Rawls lui fait l'honneur ambigu de justifier un devoir d'obéissance à des lois injustes. Il ne suffit pas, en effet, qu'une loi soit contraire à notre sens de la justice pour qu'aussitôt elle perde toute force d'obligation : nous avons aussi un « devoir de civilité » qui nous impose d'accepter, dans une certaine mesure, les défauts de nos institutions. Cette thèse pose une série de problèmes, dont nous partirons pour proposer une réflexion sur les relations entre théorie de la justice et gouvernement par la majorité.

A Theory of Justice makes room for majority rule: since the latter is at the same time a source of legitimacy in a democracy and a source of errors, Rawls uses it to explain that citizens in a well-ordered society have a duty to obey unjust laws. It is not enough, indeed, that a law opposes our sense of justice to make it loose its force of obligation: one has also a 'duty of civility' that imposes on us to accept, to a certain extent, the drawbacks of our institutions. That idea raises special problems that we shall be dealing with in order to better understand the relations between a theory of justice and majority rule. Adapted from the source document.

Sorell and Foisneau bring together original essays which discuss Hobbes's masterpiece after three and a half centuries. They address three themes: its place in Hobbes' output; the connection between his psychology and his politics; and his views on the Bible and the Church