Suchergebnisse

Existing studies on democracies' involvement in torture emphasise how governments have been able to circumvent the international anti-torture norm and shape public discourse on the issue through powerful rhetorical strategies of denial and exception. Less attention has been paid, however, to the rhetoric of opponents of torture and how it impacts on governments and security agencies. This article proposes a typology of four common arguments against torture, which make use variously of ethical, utilitarian and 'shaming' rhetoric. These arguments often take a narrative form and are extensively contested by governments. Drawing on the literature on rhetorical coercion, I argue that anti-torture narratives can play an important role in constraining democratic states and significantly reducing their perpetration of torture. Yet the multiplicity of narratives at play opens up opportunities for governments to accept some messages against torture while simultaneously contesting others in a way which enables them to continue their involvement in torture. I develop this argument through a comparative analysis of the role of torture in two British counterterrorism campaigns – against Irish republican terrorism in the 1970s and against jihadist violence after 9/11. Differences in the content and salience of the narratives advanced by critics of the government during the two time periods explain much about why the British government contested some arguments against torture, but accepted others. This variation helps to explain in turn why British security agencies carried out coercive interrogations on a wide scale during the 1970s, while their perpetration of torture was significantly reduced in the post-9/11 case.

Existing studies on democracies? involvement in torture emphasise how governments have been able to circumvent the international anti-torture norm and shape public discourse on the issue through powerful rhetorical strategies of denial and exception. Less attention has been paid, however, to the rhetoric of opponents of torture and how it impacts on governments and security agencies. This article proposes a typology of four common arguments against torture, which make use variously of ethical, utilitarian and ?shaming? rhetoric. These arguments often take a narrative form and are extensively contested by governments. Drawing on the literature on rhetorical coercion, I argue that anti-torture narratives can play an important role in constraining democratic states and significantly reducing their perpetration of torture. Yet the multiplicity of narratives at play opens up opportunities for governments to accept some messages against torture while simultaneously contesting others in a way which enables them to continue their involvement in torture. I develop this argument through a comparative analysis of the role of torture in two British counterterrorism campaigns ? against Irish republican terrorism in the 1970s and against jihadist violence after 9/11. Differences in the content and salience of the narratives advanced by critics of the government during the two time periods explain much about why the British government contested some arguments against torture, but accepted others. This variation helps to explain in turn why British security agencies carried out coercive interrogations on a wide scale during the 1970s, while their perpetration of torture was significantly reduced in the post-9/11 case.

Existing studies on democracies' involvement in torture emphasise how governments have been able to circumvent the international anti-torture norm and shape public discourse on the issue through powerful rhetorical strategies of denial and exception. Less attention has been paid, however, to the rhetoric of opponents of torture and how it impacts on governments and security agencies. This article proposes a typology of four common arguments against torture, which make use variously of ethical, utilitarian and 'shaming' rhetoric. These arguments often take a narrative form and are extensively contested by governments. Drawing on the literature on rhetorical coercion, I argue that anti-torture narratives can play an important role in constraining democratic states and significantly reducing their perpetration of torture. Yet the multiplicity of narratives at play opens up opportunities for governments to accept some messages against torture while simultaneously contesting others in a way which enables them to continue their involvement in torture. I develop this argument through a comparative analysis of the role of torture in two British counterterrorism campaigns – against Irish republican terrorism in the 1970s and against jihadist violence after 9/11. Differences in the content and salience of the narratives advanced by critics of the government during the two time periods explain much about why the British government contested some arguments against torture, but accepted others. This variation helps to explain in turn why British security agencies carried out coercive interrogations on a wide scale during the 1970s, while their perpetration of torture was significantly reduced in the post-9/11 case.

AbstractWhile US counterterrorism has improved in many respects since the attacks of 11 September 2001, there have still been turf battles and many cases of inadequate coordination between security agencies, which have had damaging effects on intelligence work and operations against terrorist groups. Why, more than 14 years after 9/11, do US inter-agency operations still break down in this manner? By comparing the United States with the United Kingdom, this article provides a new explanation for the deficiencies in the American response. It shows how US inter-agency conflict has negative operational consequences and draws a contrast with the British security agencies, which tend to be more closely integrated and refrain from engaging in major turf battles. I argue that the differences between the cases stem from a combination of distinct institutions and different organisational routines in the US and UK. In the United States, divided national institutions and the informal routines of its security agencies have proved problematic for joint operations and intelligence work. The article also critiques some influential existing accounts of US inter-agency counterterrorism, which emphasise bureaucratic politics or organisational culture, and shows how such perspectives can produce unrealistic policy recommendations. A focus on the deep-seated routines and institutions of the United States leads one to be more sceptical about the prospects for meaningful organisational reform.

This article approaches the question of whether terrorism "works" and argues that an examination of some of terrorism's more "modest" effects can contribute to the way we analyse its overall effectiveness and strategic impact. The article looks at whether terrorist violence has brought "disorientation" to European societies and led states to launch repressive counterterrorist operations. Its main empirical focus is a comparison of Britain's and France's responses to contemporary jihadist terrorism. It examines the extent to which we can understand these cases from a rational choice perspective, before going on to argue that a state's responses to terrorism are filtered through certain domestic societal norms in each country that determine whether or not terrorist violence leads to a repressive response from governments. This has implications for the way we analyse the interaction between terrorists and the state, as well as the effectiveness of terrorism itself.

While US counterterrorism has improved in many respects since the attacks of 11 September 2001, there have still been turf battles and many cases of inadequate coordination between security agencies, which have had damaging effects on intelligence work and operations against terrorist groups. Why, more than 14 years after 9/11, do US inter-agency operations still break down in this manner? By comparing the United States with the United Kingdom, this article provides a new explanation for the deficiencies in the American response. It shows how US inter-agency conflict has negative operational consequences and draws a contrast with the British security agencies, which tend to be more closely integrated and refrain from engaging in major turf battles. I argue that the differences between the cases stem from a combination of distinct institutions and different organisational routines in the US and UK. In the United States, divided national institutions and the informal routines of its security agencies have proved problematic for joint operations and intelligence work. The article also critiques some influential existing accounts of US inter-agency counterterrorism, which emphasise bureaucratic politics or organisational culture, and shows how such perspectives can produce unrealistic policy recommendations. A focus on the deep-seated routines and institutions of the United States leads one to be more sceptical about the prospects for meaningful organisational reform.

AbstractThe UK's domestic intelligence agency, MI5, has become increasingly involved in the realm of law enforcement over the last decade. This article puts the British experience in perspective by comparing it with France's main domestic intelligence agency, which has pushed deep into the law enforcement arena in recent years. A similar perception of Islamist terrorism underpins these parallel developments in the two countries. However, differences relating to accountability, legal systems and conceptions of the state mean that the French intelligence agency has expanded its role considerably more than its British counterpart. The analysis indicates that MI5's move into law enforcement is likely to remain a relatively conservative one.

Advisor to Javier Solana and a Director General at the European Council, Robert Cooper argues for an assertive European stance against threats while at the same time emphasising the importance of gaining international legitimacy for the EU's actions abroad. This paper outlines how elements of a colonialist worldview inform the first part of Cooper's proposed response to threats—force, preemptive if necessary, against terrorists and potentially aggressive 'modern' states. Yet Cooper is keenly aware that force by itself is unlikely to foster benign long term changes in unstable or potentially threatening parts of the world. Drawing on what he views as the 'postmodern' European achievement of peace and order between nations, Cooper argues that Europe and the West should strive to win legitimacy for their actions by consulting deeply with other countries and by making extensive financial and security commitments to the unstable regions where they intervene military. Fashioning a combination of realist, liberal and constructivist ideas, Cooper's broadly coherent worldview is nevertheless marked by tensions between his conceptions of force and legitimacy. Demonstrating Cooper's significant influence on the European Security Strategy, the paper concludes that the tensions in his thinking are significant not only for his individual worldview but also for an understanding of the conflicting impulses shaping the development of European foreign policy today.