Suchergebnisse

Reconstructing the workings of colonial Spanish bureaucracy in the production of reports on individuals' achievements, this book explores the interrelation of state-induced curricula vitae and individuals' endeavor to outsmart this system in the genesis of modern forms of literature.

One: Forms of Justice -- 1. Emerging Issues in the Social Psychology of Justice -- 2. The Multidimensionality of Justice -- 3. Fairness and Effectiveness in Predmeditated Helping -- Two: Antecedents of Justice Concerns -- 4. Catalysts for Collective Violence: The Importance of a Psychological Approach -- 5. Relative Deprivation and Equity Theories: Felt Injustice and the Undeserved Benefits of Others -- 6. On the Apocryphal Nature of Inequity Distress -- Three: Arenas of Justice -- 7. Justice in the Political Arena -- 8. Legal Justice and the Psychology of Conflict Resolution.

Klappentext: Das Handbuch Spanisch ist ein Novum in der deutschsprachigen Romanistik und Spanien-/Lateinamerikaforschung. Erstmals werden die Gegenstandsbereiche der Sprach-, Kultur- und Literaturwissenschaften sowie der Geschichte, die sich auf die spanischsprachigen Länder und Regionen der Erde beziehen, in umfassender, enzyklopädischer Weise beschrieben. Das Handbuch wendet sich an Studierende des Faches Spanisch in allen Studiengängen, an Lehrende in Schule und Hochschule sowie an alle Interessierten, die sich in Bildungseinrichtungen, Verlagsredaktionen, Medienorganisationen, Wirtschaftsunternehmen, transnationalen Mittlerorganisationen etc. mit den historischen und gegenwärtigen Gegebenheiten der spanischsprachigen Welt auseinandersetzen.

In this article, we begin to integrate two fields that have, until now, remained largely independent of one another: organizational justice and transaction-cost economics. Transaction costs consist of search, bargaining, monitoring, enforcement, and other costs not directly related to the production of goods or services. Usually such costs are attributed to difficulties in measurement (the metering problem) or difficulties in redeploying assets to alternative uses (asset specificity). These variables are thought to be objective features of economic transactions. Rarely are the social-psychological dimensions of these objective features taken into account. Although economic transactions are fundamentally human activities, human behavior in the economics literature is usually reduced to such simplifying assumptions as shirking and bounded rationality. In this article, we develop a model of transaction costs based on a more complete description of human psychology as it operates in exchange relationships.We argue that transaction costs are often due to the difficulty of evaluating the fairness of a specific exchange of goods and services. Besides asset specificity and the metering problem, which are treated in the transaction-cost economics literature, the organizational justice literature is especially relevant. Beginning with the work of Ouchi (1980), the paper examines some of the ways that the organizational justice literature complements transaction-cost economics. Because mechanisms that order economic transactions are essentially conflict-resolution structures, we develop a model of economic organization in which transaction costs are related to the perception of fairness in economic exchange. In the literature, governance mechanisms are selected so as to minimize transaction costs. Based on the organizational justice framework, we suggest that the transaction-cost calculus is affected by the perception of fairness in the exchange. In addition, the relationship between the governance mechanism and the perception of fairness is moderated by the elements of interactional justice that characterize the exchange.

We analyze business behavioral ethics in terms of bounded autonomy, namely the result of tensions between the countervailing motivations of reactance (tendencies that involve the freedom of behaving in certain ways as a right) versus deonance (tendencies that involve the appropriateness of behaving in certain ways as an obligation). We focus in particular on how the resolution of such tensions (i.e. establishment of a boundary between rights and duties—"free" behaviors versus "non-free" behaviors—in a state of dynamic equilibrium) can cause behavior to be seen as ethical by the person performing the behavior (the actor), but seen as unethical by impartial observers. That discrepancy comes from the actor's assessment of the behavior in question as having either an inherent status (the type of behavior it is) or an instrumental status (what it does). This analysis leads us to a discussion of the following four types of situations involving unethical behavior: freedom expansion based on a behavior's inherent status or on its instrumental status; and freedom contraction based on a behavior's inherent status or on its instrumental status. We outline propositions consistent with those distinctions and conclude with theoretical implications.