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What are the historical roots of the battle of ideas that shape the euro area asymmetry and why was it conducive to the crisis? What does the response of political authorities to the euro crisis teach us about the battle of ideas that underlies the 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) negotiations and the present state of distributional conflicts between EU countries? This chapter aims at answering these questions by shedding light on the ideational struggles about the EMU economic governance before, during and, to a lesser extent, after the euro crisis. In the first section, we underline that the institutional design of the euro area is the outcome of ideational struggles, which are unfolding and evolving since the 1960s. The second section analyses the battle of ideas between the different policy players who were fighting to frame the causes of the euro area crisis and the subsequent policy solutions. In our conclusion, we draw links between the battle of ideas that took place during the euro area crisis and the negotiations on the RFF and the MFF.

What are the historical roots of the battle of ideas that shape the euro area asymmetry and why was it conducive to the crisis? What does the response of political authorities to the euro crisis teach us about the battle of ideas that underlies the 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) negotiations and the present state of distributional conflicts between EU countries? This chapter aims at answering these questions by shedding light on the ideational struggles about the EMU economic governance before, during and, to a lesser extent, after the euro crisis. In the first section, we underline that the institutional design of the euro area is the outcome of ideational struggles, which are unfolding and evolving since the 1960s. The second section analyses the battle of ideas between the different policy players who were fighting to frame the causes of the euro area crisis and the subsequent policy solutions. In our conclusion, we draw links between the battle of ideas that took place during the euro area crisis and the negotiations on the RFF and the MFF.

Interruption d'une conférence de presse par un jet de confettis en mars, manifestations pendant l'inauguration de son siège à Francfort en février, fortes mobilisations sociales en Grèce suite à la mise en œuvre d'un montant maximum de retrait aux distributeurs bancaires: en 2015, l'action de la Banque Centrale Européenne (BCE) se lisait autant sur les panneaux de manifestants que dans les journaux financiers. Avant la crise financière débutée en 2007, la BCE était une institution relativement méconnue, chargée d'assurer la stabilité des prix dans la zone euro. À l'instar des autres banques centrales, la BCE a joué un rôle décisif dans la réponse des autorités publiques à la crise, mais elle a dû s'éloigner de son cadre d'action originel. En ne régulant plus l'économie à distance et en agissant directement et massivement sur les marchés financiers pour stabiliser les systèmes économiques des pays de la zone euro, la BCE a aussi endossé un rôle plus associé au domaine politique et son action a suscité plus de contestations. Le but de ce chapitre est d'identifier les buts de la BCE dans sa réponse à la crise.

Interruption d'une conférence de presse par un jet de confettis en mars, manifestations pendant l'inauguration de son siège à Francfort en février, fortes mobilisations sociales en Grèce suite à la mise en œuvre d'un montant maximum de retrait aux distributeurs bancaires: en 2015, l'action de la Banque Centrale Européenne (BCE) se lisait autant sur les panneaux de manifestants que dans les journaux financiers. Avant la crise financière débutée en 2007, la BCE était une institution relativement méconnue, chargée d'assurer la stabilité des prix dans la zone euro. À l'instar des autres banques centrales, la BCE a joué un rôle décisif dans la réponse des autorités publiques à la crise, mais elle a dû s'éloigner de son cadre d'action originel. En ne régulant plus l'économie à distance et en agissant directement et massivement sur les marchés financiers pour stabiliser les systèmes économiques des pays de la zone euro, la BCE a aussi endossé un rôle plus associé au domaine politique et son action a suscité plus de contestations. Le but de ce chapitre est d'identifier les buts de la BCE dans sa réponse à la crise.

Financial Citizenship addresses the new era of central banking by focusing on the conflicts over central banking legitimacy in order to ultimately provide "a new theory and practice of legitimacy" for central bankers. In this article, I summarize first how Riles accounts for the "culture clash" between central bankers and the public, and how she aims to solve these tensions with the concept of financial citizenship. Second, I argue that the book has missed one of the main problematic dimension of contemporary central banking, which is the rise of private financial power. I also contend that the analysis of the "populist backlash" lacks empirical underpinning and that the concept of "financial citizenship" is unlikely to restore central banks' legitimacy.

Financial Citizenship addresses the new era of central banking by focusing on the conflicts over central banking legitimacy in order to ultimately provide "a new theory and practice of legitimacy" for central bankers. In this article, I summarize first how Riles accounts for the "culture clash" between central bankers and the public, and how she aims to solve these tensions with the concept of financial citizenship. Second, I argue that the book has missed one of the main problematic dimension of contemporary central banking, which is the rise of private financial power. I also contend that the analysis of the "populist backlash" lacks empirical underpinning and that the concept of "financial citizenship" is unlikely to restore central banks' legitimacy.

In this article, I examine the bias in favour of financial markets displayed by the European Central Bank (ECB) during the Eurozone crisis. Having analysed the roots of the ECB's bias, I explore the discrepancy between the conditionality of ECB financial support that is directed towards states and that which is directed towards markets. On the one hand, the ECB has exerted strong coercive and cognitive pressures to reform Eurozone economic governance in a market-friendly way. On the other hand, it has employed monetary measures to save large Eurozone banks from a complete meltdown without controlling how these banks use their provided liquidities. I conclude by stressing the democratic problems engendered by the ECB's bias.

In this article, I examine the bias in favour of financial markets displayed by the European Central Bank (ECB) during the Eurozone crisis. Having analysed the roots of the ECB's bias, I explore the discrepancy between the conditionality of ECB financial support that is directed towards states and that which is directed towards markets. On the one hand, the ECB has exerted strong coercive and cognitive pressures to reform Eurozone economic governance in a market-friendly way. On the other hand, it has employed monetary measures to save large Eurozone banks from a complete meltdown without controlling how these banks use their provided liquidities. I conclude by stressing the democratic problems engendered by the ECB's bias.

Résumé Bien que la Banque centrale européenne (BCE) dispose d'un niveau élevé d'indépendance, les représentants étatiques ont gardé un moyen de contrôle sur la politique monétaire en nommant de manière autonome les six membres de son directoire. Cet article montre d'abord que ces nominations sont structurées par un jeu à double niveau où les dirigeants doivent prendre en compte les logiques du jeu politique domestique et de la négociation intergouvernementale. Puis, l'article revient sur l'écart existant entre les nouveaux enjeux générés par la réponse de la BCE à la crise et l'absence de leur prise en compte dans le processus de nomination du directoire.