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Although empirical studies have concluded that political leaders in democratic systems often respond to mass unrest by expanding the welfare state, most of this research fails to explain adequately why the state responds as it does. I test the validity of pluralist and social control theories of state response by examining black insurgency in the United States during the 1960s and 1970s. Using pooled time-series analysis, I estimate the relationship between state AFDC recipient rates, state incarceration rates, and black political violence, testing a series of specific hypotheses that distinguish between these two competing theories. The results lend much support to the social control characterization of state response and may help explain trends in welfare and criminal justice policies over the last two decades.

Although empirical studies have concluded that political leaders in democratic systems often respond to mass unrest by expanding the welfare state, most of this research fails to explain adequately why the state responds as it does. I test the validity of pluralist and social control theories of state response by examining black insurgency in the United States during the 1960s and 1970s. Using pooled time-series analysis, I estimate the relationship between state AFDC recipient rates, state incarceration rates, and black political violence, testing a series of specific hypotheses that distinguish between these two competing theories. The results lend much support to the social control characterization of state response and may help explain trends in welfare and criminal justice policies over the last two decades. (American Political Science Review / FUB)

'Hard White' explains how the mainstreaming of white nationalism occurred, pointing to two major shifts in the movement. First, Barack Obama's presidential tenure, along with increases in minority representation, fostered white anxiety about Muslims, Latinx immigrants, and black Americans. At the same time, white nationalist leaders shifted their focus and resources from protest to electoral politics, and the text traces the evolution of the movement's political forays from David Duke to the American Freedom Party, the Tea Party, and, finally, the emergence of the Alt-Right.

Welfare reform gave the U.S. states the opportunity to engage in second-order devolution (SOD), which allows local governments to exercise more discretion in the implementation of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program. Proponents of welfare decentralization insist that local governments better understand the needs of the poor and are therefore able to implement TANF more effectively. Nevertheless, opponents argue that decentralization could lead to a "race to the bottom" and, thus, SOD might lead to more restrictive TANF implementation. We investigate these competing claims by examining how differences in decentralization affect (1) TANF caseload decline, (2) the use of sanctions, and (3) several work-related outcomes among recipients. Based on a series of state-level analyses, we find that SOD states experienced a greater degree of caseload decline than non-SOD states. In addition, SOD states were more likely to use punitive policy tools, such as TANF sanctions. However, we also find that SOD states display marginally better TANF performance, as reflected in higher rates of employment exits and earnings gains among TANF recipients. Thus, we find support for both sides of the decentralization debate. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractWelfare reform gave the U.S. states the opportunity to engage in second-order devolution (SOD), which allows local governments to exercise more discretion in the implementation of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program. Proponents of welfare decentralization insist that local governments better understand the needs of the poor and are therefore able to implement TANF more effectively. Nevertheless, opponents argue that decentralization could lead to a "race to the bottom" and, thus, SOD might lead to more restrictive TANF implementation. We investigate these competing claims by examining how differences in decentralization affect (1) TANF caseload decline, (2) the use of sanctions, and (3) several work-related outcomes among recipients. Based on a series of state-level analyses, we find that SOD states experienced a greater degree of caseload decline than non-SOD states. In addition, SOD states were more likely to use punitive policy tools, such as TANF sanctions. However, we also find that SOD states display marginally better TANF performance, as reflected in higher rates of employment exits and earnings gains among TANF recipients. Thus, we find support for both sides of the decentralization debate.

Abstract. In this article, we update and expand the measure of voter ideology we originally proposed in this journal in 1998. Our new measure combines party manifesto data most recently updated byBudge et al. (2001) with election return data. Assuming the comparability and relevance of left‐right ideology, we estimate the median voter position in 25 Western democracies throughout most of the postwar period. With this measure, we are able to make cross‐national comparisons of voter ideology among these countries, as well as cross‐time comparisons within individual countries.