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Previous research has proposed that ethnic conflict may spread across borders. Although the importance of transnational ethnic groups is often emphasized, the processes through which contagion may take place remain unspecified. The present study presents a context for more precise analysis of contagion. Further, it identifies distinct processes through which contagion is likely to occur within this context. It is argued that when an ethnic group engages in violent conflict in one state, kin in a nearby state may be inspired to rebel because the outbreak of conflict renders ethnic bonds and similar conditions salient. These bonds and similarities become even more salient when the kin group has opportunities and willingness to mobilize for rebellion. Statistical analysis employing unique global data covering 1946-2009 supports this argument. These results indicate that kinship ties matter for contagion and identify some of the conditions which amplify the effects such ties have for contagion.(International Interactions (London)/ FUB)

A common assertion is that refugees may cause civil war to spread from one state to another. Although often suggested, this claim has received little scrutiny. Hence, this study intends to statistically evaluate refugee flows as a cause of the contagion of conflict using a contagion process approach. This approach includes both the sending and receiving state by starting with a state with armed conflict – this conflict may generate refugee flows – and examining whether a neighboring state that receives these refugees are more prone to end up in armed conflict than a neighboring state that does not receive refugee flows. Adapting this approach enables an empirical distinction between some of the explanations proposed in previous literature. These explanations are very diverse; even so, they have not been separated systematically in previous empirical analyses. First, it is hypothesized that refugee flows from conflict areas are associated with spill-over effects that make receiving states more likely to experience conflict. Second, it is suggested that neighboring states with latent conflicts are more sensitive to the inflow of refugee flows and, consequently, more likely to escalate into militarized conflict. Third, it is argued that a significant change in the ethnic geography of the host state due to refugee flows makes ethnic conflict in the host state more likely. Such disruptions of the ethnic geography are more likely to generate conflict when the state is characterized by a precarious ethnic balance. The findings suggest that refugee flows are indeed associated with an increased risk of both internal conflict in general and ethnic conflict in particular. The conditional hypotheses, suggesting that the effect of refugees should be enhanced in the presence of latent conflict and a sensitive ethnic balance in the host state, are not supported. Indeed, evidence suggests the opposite, indicating that these factors, that normally are associated with an increased likelihood of conflict, dampen the risk of conflict in the presence of refugee flows. ; Paper prepared for presentation at the 50th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, New York, 15-18 February, 2009.

Ethnic groups and conflicts often transcend country borders, indicating that notions of relative strength and resolve may also surpass such borders. This study focuses on the association between ethnic polarization and conflict in a widened strategic environment, encapsulating each state that experiences ethnic conflict and its neighboring states, and involving contagion processes. Two claims are presented. First, when a state experiences ethnic conflict, neighboring states that are ethnically polarized are more likely to also experience ethnic conflict. Second, when a group involved in ethnic conflict has a kinship tie to a group in a neighboring state, the latter group is increasingly likely to be inspired to challenge the government and end up in ethnic conflict. This should be especially likely if the group resides in a state characterized by ethnic polarization. To evaluate these claims, this article employs logit regression on a global dataset covering the period from 1989 to 2004. The empirical analysis supports the first claim; polarized states are indeed associated with an increased likelihood of contagion processes. The findings also demonstrate that kinship links make contagion more likely; however, this effect is not conditioned by the level of ethnic polarization. The results are robust to a series of alternative specifications. In conclusion, these findings point to the importance of incorporating a widened strategic setting in the analysis when examining the association between ethnic polarization and civil conflict.

A growing body of quantitative research points to a robust relationship between gender inequality and armed conflict. In order to progress our understanding of this relationship, we make two contributions. First, we identify three potential explanations as to why gender inequality can be associated with conflict—gender inequality norms, societal capacity, and gendered socioeconomic development—and suggest an empirical strategy to gauge the explanatory leverage of each explanation. Second, we offer a more nuanced treatment of the dependent variable at the subnational level, moving beyond a dichotomized view of armed conflict to accounting for both its level and type. We test our hypotheses using district-level data on gender inequality and conflicts in India, covering the 1989–2014 period. Our findings show that the three explanations do not produce the same outcomes in the data. We argue that this speaks to the need to adjudicate between different forms of mechanisms that can connect gender inequality to conflict. Our results show support for women's status being important for understanding a society's capacity to handle conflict nonviolently. On the negative side, gendered socioeconomic developments resulting in a male surplus create conditions conducive for armed conflict, particularly in urban areas. A more surprising finding is that the gender inequality norm, in and of itself, does not appear to have a strong effect on the risk of armed conflict. This does not mean that we can disregard the explanation, but it underlines that there can be inherent problems with this commonly used argument.

AbstractA growing body of quantitative research points to a robust relationship between gender inequality and armed conflict. In order to progress our understanding of this relationship, we make two contributions. First, we identify three potential explanations as to why gender inequality can be associated with conflict—gender inequality norms, societal capacity, and gendered socioeconomic development—and suggest an empirical strategy to gauge the explanatory leverage of each explanation. Second, we offer a more nuanced treatment of the dependent variable at the subnational level, moving beyond a dichotomized view of armed conflict to accounting for both its level and type. We test our hypotheses using district-level data on gender inequality and conflicts in India, covering the 1989–2014 period. Our findings show that the three explanations do not produce the same outcomes in the data. We argue that this speaks to the need to adjudicate between different forms of mechanisms that can connect gender inequality to conflict. Our results show support for women's status being important for understanding a society's capacity to handle conflict nonviolently. On the negative side, gendered socioeconomic developments resulting in a male surplus create conditions conducive for armed conflict, particularly in urban areas. A more surprising finding is that the gender inequality norm, in and of itself, does not appear to have a strong effect on the risk of armed conflict. This does not mean that we can disregard the explanation, but it underlines that there can be inherent problems with this commonly used argument.

"Gender Inequality and Internal Conflict" published on by Oxford University Press.