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Cover -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- CONTENTS -- List of Figures and Maps -- List of Tables -- Acknowledgments -- INTRODUCTION -- CHAPTER ONE: A Theory of Agreements and the Durability of Peace -- CHAPTER TWO: Investigating the Durability of Peace -- CHAPTER THREE: The Baseline Prospects for Peace -- CHAPTER FOUR: Agreements: Epiphenomenal or Functional? -- CHAPTER FIVE: Agreements and the Durability of Peace -- CHAPTER SIX: Peace Mechanisms: What Works and What Doesn't? -- CONCLUSION -- APPENDIX A: Cease-Fires and the Resumption of War -- APPENDIX B: Cease-Fires Data Set -- References -- Index

In the last fifteen years, the number, size, and scope of peacekeeping missions deployed in the aftermath of civil wars have increased exponentially. From Croatia and Cambodia, to Nicaragua and Namibia, international personnel have been sent to maintain peace around the world. But does peacekeeping work? And if so, how? In Does Peacekeeping Work? Virginia Page Fortna answers these questions through the systematic analysis of civil wars that have taken place since the end of the Cold War. She compares peacekeeping and nonpeacekeeping cases, and she investigates where peacekeepers go, showing t

In the last fifteen years, the number, size, and scope of peacekeeping missions deployed in the aftermath of civil wars have increased exponentially. From Croatia and Cambodia, to Nicaragua and Namibia, international personnel have been sent to maintain peace around the world. But does peacekeeping work? And if so, how? In Does Peacekeeping Work? Virginia Page Fortna answers these questions through the systematic analysis of civil wars that have taken place since the end of the Cold War. She compares peacekeeping and nonpeacekeeping cases, and she investigates where peacekeepers go, showing that their missions are crucial to the most severe internal conflicts in countries and regions where peace is otherwise likely to falter. Fortna demonstrates that peacekeeping is an extremely effective policy tool, dramatically reducing the risk that war will resume. Moreover, she explains that relatively small and militarily weak consent-based peacekeeping operations are often just as effective as larger, more robust enforcement missions. Fortna examines the causal mechanisms of peacekeeping, paying particular attention to the perspective of the peacekept--the belligerents themselves--on whose decisions the stability of peace depends. Based on interviews with government and rebel leaders in Sierra Leone, Mozambique, and the Chittagong Hill Tracts in Bangladesh, Does Peacekeeping Work? demonstrates specific ways in which peacekeepers alter incentives, alleviate fear and mistrust, prevent accidental escalation to war, and shape political procedures to stabilize peace.

That terrorism is a "weapon of the weak" is such deeply held conventional wisdom it has become almost a cliché. "Weak" means many different things in the literature, however, and little rigorous empirical research has tested the contention that weaker groups, however conceived, are more likely to employ terrorism. This article explores prominent weapon of the weak arguments to develop testable hypotheses about group strength and the prevalence of terrorism. Using measures of deliberately indiscriminate attacks on civilians by rebel groups in civil conflicts, as well as multiple measures of rebel strength, it examines systematically whether weaker groups are more likely to employ terrorism. I find surprisingly little empirical support for the conventional wisdom. There is no clear or consistent evidence that deliberately indiscriminate terrorism is a weapon of the weak rather than the strong.

That terrorism is a "weapon of the weak" is such deeply held conventional wisdom it has become almost a cliché. "Weak" means many different things in the literature, however, and little rigorous empirical research has tested the contention that weaker groups, however conceived, are more likely to employ terrorism. This article explores prominent weapon of the weak arguments to develop testable hypotheses about group strength and the prevalence of terrorism. Using measures of deliberately indiscriminate attacks on civilians by rebel groups in civil conflicts, as well as multiple measures of rebel strength, it examines systematically whether weaker groups are more likely to employ terrorism. I find surprisingly little empirical support for the conventional wisdom. There is no clear or consistent evidence that deliberately indiscriminate terrorism is a weapon of the weak rather than the strong.

Peacekeeping is perhaps the international community's most important tool for maintaining peace in the aftermath of war. Its practice has evolved significantly in the past ten or fifteen years as it has been used increasingly in civil wars. However, traditional peacekeeping between states is not well understood. Its operation is undertheorized and its effects undertested. This article explores the causal mechanisms through which peacekeepers keep peace and examines its empirical effects after interstate wars. To take the endogeneity of peacekeeping into account, it also examines where peacekeepers tend to be deployed. Duration analysis shows that, all else equal, peacekeeping significantly increases the chances that peace will last. Peacekeepers can help adversaries to maintain peace by making surprise attack more difficult, by reducing uncertainty about enemy intentions, and by preventing and controlling accidents and incidents that can spiral back to war. (World Politics / SWP)

In the aftermath of war, what determines whether peace lasts or fighting resumes, and what can be done to foster durable peace? Drawing on theories of cooperation, I argue that belligerents can overcome the obstacles to peace by implementing measures that alter incentives, reduce uncertainty about intentions, and manage accidents. A counterargument suggests that agreements are epiphenomenal, merely reflecting the underlying probability of war resumption. I test hypotheses about the durability of peace using hazard analysis. Controlling for factors (including the decisiveness of victory, the cost of war, relative capabilities, and others) that affect the baseline prospects for peace, I find that stronger agreements enhance the durability of peace. In particular, measures such as the creation of demilitarized zones, explicit third-party guarantees, peacekeeping, and joint commissions for dispute resolution affect the duration of peace. Agreements are not merely scraps of paper; rather, their content matters in the construction of peace that lasts.