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This book examines Norway's affiliation to the EU and systematically assesses the potential suitability of this arrangement for the UK as a viable EU affiliation post-Brexit. Framing the book within the framework of the broader European context, the authors ask how much autonomy and room to manoeuvre tightly integrated non-member states have under this arrangement. They present an in-depth assessment of Norway's close EU affiliation and provide insight into what this may reveal to us about the post-Brexit European political order. The book's analytical framework centred on autonomy under complex interdependence has relevance well beyond the confines of the Norway case. This includes the UK, not least since the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) leaves considerable uncertainty. It contains transitory elements; there will be implementation reviews, and there may be many more bilateral and multilateral agreements before the trade relationship is fully defined. This book will be of key interest to scholars and students of European Union politics, Norwegian politics, British politics, European integration, and, more broadly, to European studies and international relations.

The purpose of this article is to assess the merits of comparing the EU and Canada from a federal perspective. The point of departure is that both are federal-type entities that represent deviations from the standard or mainstream American model of federalism. That has given rise to alternative conceptions, multilevel governance for the EU, and a multinational federation for Canada. The article discusses the limitations of each such notion and instead argues for the merits of seeing both as different versions of multiheaded federation which is a useful analytical device for analyzing contestation over federalism within federal-type entities. This notion directs our attention to those with power and in the position to shape the political system's federal-constitutional nature and design, which normally happens in the realm of constitutional politics. It is the fundamental struggle over sovereignty within a federal-type structure that gives rise to the notion of a multiheaded federation—there are multiple heads because there is no willingness to accept a hierarchical arrangement. The notion of a multiheaded federation is particularly suitable for capturing (de)federalisation processes and dynamics.

What kind of challenge is right-wing populism for the European Union (EU)? The EU has been frequently criticized by populists and non-populists alike for being a remote technocracy that suffers from serious democratic defects. Democratization relies on popular (and system insider) feedback, to spell out where the shortcomings are, and how these can be rectified. Does populism play this role—is it capable of playing this role—in the EU today? I discuss that under three headings: (1) Is populism a democratizing challenge for the EU? (2) Is populism a democratic challenge for the EU? (3) Is populism an existential threat to the EU? The article finds that populists dismiss the prospects for EU democracy and espouse conceptions of people, community, and values that are out of synch with the EU. Today's populists appear less concerned with abolishing the EU and more bent on altering it to serve their ends.

AbstractThis article discusses the democratic implications of third country incorporation for the EU and for third countries. The more the EU transforms sovereignty in an open and inclusive manner, the greater the scope for third country presence, participation and influence. For the EU, the greater the presence and influence of third countries, the more pressing the democratic incongruence. For third countries, the better included and the more they participate, the less incongruent their affiliation, and the more similar to members they become. These considerations depend on how the EU structures its relations with third countries and the nature of the EU's political order. It is in the EU's internal market and flanking areas that the pooling and sharing of sovereignty is the most pronounced. The conundrum facing third countries and the EU is that the internal market is central to the EU's constitution as a political system.

The main purpose of this article is to improve the wicked problem framework by incorporating the problem of political order, as it appears in the context of Brexit. The first part specifies what is meant by political order and highlights two core meanings: settled order, and orderliness as the presence or absence of rules. Thereafter, the article specifies what is meant by wicked problem and shows that this body of literature has not really engaged with the problem of political order. In the third section, the focus is on how and in what sense Brexit constitutes a wicked problem with reference to a set of criteria for delineating wicked problems. As part of that, it is made clear where and how matters of political order appear. In the conclusion, I discuss how we can improve the wicked problem framework by including questions of political order.

AbstractBrexit is a high‐stakes political process, but there is still no clear understanding of the political factors that underpin the various affiliation modes that the UK is currently debating. These are treated as quite static constructs, with emphasis on legal detail not the political and societal conditions that make them operate. What does the inclusion of the UK in the European Economic Area (EEA) agreement—which is the core component of the Norway model—do to that arrangement, itself a domestic Norwegian compromise? Will the arrangement continue to function, or will the UK's presence fundamentally alter or even abrogate the arrangement? This article spells out the specific political presuppositions that the Norway model rests on, and notes that the UK cannot emulate these. In addition, it argues that the more closely attached to the EEA agreement the UK is, the more precarious the arrangement will be.