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Political macroeconomy refers to the interconnection between macroeconomic politics and macroeconomic performance. The expectational Phillips curve may be used to examine the economic aspects of this interrelation. Macroeconomic politics relates to voter behavior, presidential reelection ambition, partisan economic priorities, and special interests. These factors impact the fiscal and monetary policy actions of the president, Congress, and central bank. According to the electoral effect, presidents attempt to boost the economy before an election to increase reelection votes. According to the partisan effect, conservative presidencies are relatively inflation averse, while liberal administrations are relatively unemployment averse. The evidence, however, suggests that the electoral and partisan effects occurred idiosyncratically in the U.S. economy during 1961-2016. The economy also affects presidential approval, Congressional elections, consumer sentiment, voter participation, and macropartisanship. An international dimension of the political macroeconomy is the issue of free trade versus protectionism and the perspectives of economic liberalism, neomercantilism, and structuralism.

This book considers the interrelation among macroeconomic politics, macroeconomic policymakers, macroeconomic policies, and macroeconomic perform ance. This interaction is examined using the expectational Phillips curve model, which measures macroeconomic outcomes in terms of inflation and unemployment. The subject of macroeconomic politics mainly focuses on voter behavior, presidential re­election ambition, and political party priorities. These political factors influence the macroeconomic policy actions of the president, Congress, and the central bank; the analysis takes into acc

This book considers the interrelation among macroeconomic politics, macroeconomic policymakers, macroeconomic policies, and macroeconomic performance. This interaction is examined using the expectational Phillips curve model, which measures macroeconomic outcomes in terms of inflation and unemployment. In this book, the subject of macroeconomic politics mainly focuses on voter behavior, presidential re-election ambition, and political party priorities. These factors influence the macroeconomic policy actions of the president, Congress, and the central bank. This analysis takes into account both fiscal and monetary policies. Our examination of citizen sentiment is based on rational voter theory and the median voter model. We compare the effects of macroeconomic farsightedness versus shortsightedness among voters. We also contrast the conservative versus liberal perspectives on macroeconomic policy and performance. The empirical component of our analysis examines the electoral and partisan political business cycle effects upon the U.S. economy, and we find evidence of idiosyncratic effects during the time frame of 1961 through 2014. Finally, we discuss macroeconomic influence on various measures of voter sentiment, such as presidential job approval as well as presidential and congressional election outcomes.

"Firms in the same industry can differ in measured productivity by multiples of 3. Griliches (1957) suggests one explanation: the quality of inputs differs across firms. We add labor market history variables such as experience and firm and industry tenure, as well as general human capital measures such as schooling and sex. We also use the wage bill and worker fixed effects. We show adding human capital variables and the wage bill decreases the ratio of the 90th to 10th productivity quantiles from 3.27 to 2.68 across eight Danish manufacturing and service industries. The productivity dispersion decrease is roughly of the same order of magnitude as some competitive effects found in the literature, but input quality measures do not explain most productivity dispersion, despite economically large production function coefficients. We find that the wage bill explains as much dispersion as human capital measures"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site

Structural estimation of matching games with transferable utility, including matching games of trading networks and many-to-many matching, is increasingly popular in empirical work. I explore several modeling decisions that need to be made when specifying a structural model for a matching game. One decision is the choice of a game theoretic solution concept to impose in the structural model. I discuss pairwise stability, competitive equilibrium, and noncooperative games such as auctions. Another decision is whether to work with a continuum of agents or a finite number of agents. I explore other issues as well.

This study examines the influence of 9/11, the Iraq War, the economy, and the coalition-of-minorities on presidential approval of G. W. Bush across partisan subgroups and aggregate popularity. The analysis considers the effect of underlying partisan preferences on overall approval. A partisan divide occurs for war and the economy on Bush popularity. The events of 9/11 and the Iraq War affect Democratic opinions of Bush more than Republican opinions, whereas the economy impacts Republicans more than Democrats. An in-party/out-party rally effect occurs. Democrats show stronger rallies than Republicans for 9/11 and the Iraq War, but also faster and deeper popularity decay of the rallies. All economic and war-related effects significantly influence Independents and aggregate Bush popularity. The coalition-of-minorities pattern of declining presidential approval is caused by the 9/11 rally decay effect, the war casualties effect, and the slowing economy during Bush's second term in office.

Nonlogit maximum‐likelihood estimators are inconsistent when using data on a subset of the choices available to agents. I show that the semiparametric, multinomial maximum‐score estimator is consistent when using data on a subset of choices. No information is required for choices outside of the subset. The required conditions about the error terms are the same conditions as for using all the choices. Estimation can proceed under additional restrictions if agents have unobserved, random consideration sets. A solution exists for instrumenting endogenous continuous variables. Monte Carlo experiments show the estimator performs well using small subsets of choices.