Suchergebnisse

"Public Opinion and Foreign Policy" published on by Oxford University Press.

As Yugoslavia disintegrated in the 1990s, strong political pressures buffeted the Clinton administration. Daily images of death & destruction fueled public sentiment for the administration to "do something" to end the deepening violence & ethnic cleansing in Bosnia. The White House chose to steer a middle course, trying to satisfy a public that wanted the administration to take action, but with memories of the ill-fated U.S. intervention in Somalia still strong, did not want to commit U.S. ground forces. 1 Map.

This paper examines the influence of American public opinion toward Iraq on the administration of George W. Bush from September 11, 2001, to the start of the war on March 19, 2003. It argues, first, that public opinion constrained policy choices in 2001 by requiring the administration to delay action against Iraq until it had dealt directly with al Qaeda. With the main fighting in Afghanistan completed, the administration shifted its approach. It attempted to persuade public opinion to support the use of force in Iraq, principally by using references to weapons of mass destruction to prime public opinion. Second, it suggests that the administration accurately perceived the dimensions of domestic public opinion. Third, it shows that its leadership efforts did not dramatically change public attitudes on the desirability of war although it did appear to affect public perceptions of whether the administration had 'explained' its position. It concludes that if the administration successfully 'led' the public to war, it did so in large part because, after September 11, the public favored such a war. Public opinion also caused the Congress to support the Bush administration's position. However, the emphasis on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction as the reason for going to war suggests potential long-term challenges for the administration. 1 Table, 3 Figures, 76 References. Adapted from the source document.