Suchergebnisse

This volume confronts and debates the issues faced by the growing field of experimental economics. For example, as experimental work attempts to test theory, it raises questions about the proper relationship between theory and experiments. As experimental results are used to inform policy, the utility of these results outside the lab is questioned, and finally, as experimental economics tries to integrate ideas from other disciplines like psychology and neuroscience, the question of their proper place in the discipline of economics becomes less clear.

Preliminary Material -- BRENTANO'S IMPACT /Guillaume Fréchette -- CONSCIOUSNESS. BRENTANIAN AND NEO-BRENTANIAN PERSPECTIVES -- BRENTANO'S MOST STRIKING THESIS: NO REPRESENTATION WITHOUT SELF-REPRESENTATION /Uriah Kriegel -- WHAT IS PRE-REFLECTIVE SELF-AWARENESS? BRENTANO'S THEORY OF INNER CONSCIOUSNESS REVISITED /Johannes L. Brandl -- UNITY WITHOUT SELF: BRENTANO ON THE UNITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS /Mark Textor -- VARIETIES OF INTENTIONALITY -- BRENTANO'S THESIS (REVISITED) /Guillaume Fréchette -- BRENTANO AND ARISTOTLE ON THE ONTOLOGY OF INTENTIONALITY /Arkadiusz Chrudzimski -- ANTON MARTY'S INTENTIONALIST THEORY OF MEANING /Laurent Cesalli -- PHENOMENOLOGY OF INTENTIONALITY /Matjaž Potrč -- ONTOLOGY AND METAPHYSICS -- BEING AS THE TRUE: FROM ARISTOTLE TO BRENTANO /Werner Sauer -- FRANZ BRENTANO'S MEREOLOGY /Wilhelm Baumgartner -- BRENTANO AT THE INTERSECTION OF PSYCHOLOGY, ONTOLOGY, AND THE GOOD /Susan Gabriel -- CRITICS AND HEIRS. THE SCHOOL OF BRENTANO -- MIXED FEELINGS. CARL STUMPF'S CRITICISM OF JAMES AND BRENTANO ON EMOTIONS /Denis Fisette -- THE INTENTIONALITY OF PLEASURES AND OTHER FEELINGS. A BRENTANIAN APPROACH /Olivier Massin -- BRENTANO AND STUMPF ON TONAL FUSION /Riccardo Martinelli -- EXPOSITIONS AND DISCUSSIONS. SELECTED MATERIALS AND TRANSLATIONS -- THERE AND BACK AGAIN. AN UPDATED HISTORY OF FRANZ BRENTANO'S UNPUBLISHED PAPERS /Thomas Binder -- ABSTRACTION AND RELATION, FOLLOWED BY SELECTED LETTERS FROM BRENTANO TO MARTY /Franz Brentano -- ABSTRACTION AND RELATION /Franz Brentano -- SELECTED LETTERS TO MARTY /Franz Brentano -- ABSTRAKTION UND RELATION /Franz Brentano -- AUSGEWÄHLTE BRIEFE AN MARTY /Franz Brentano -- MODERN ERRORS CONCERNING THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE LAWS OF INFERENCE /Franz Brentano -- MODERNE IRRTHÜMER ÜBER DIE ERKENNTNIS DER GESETZE DES SCHLIEßENS /Franz Brentano -- INDEX OF NAMES.

Introduction (Fisette, Fréchette, Janousek) -- Part1. History of Philosophy. Chapter1. Brentano as a Historian of (Medieval) Philosophy (Laurent Cesalli (Geneva) ) -- Chapter2. Brentano on Aristotle's Categories. A Critical Assessment (Venanzio Raspa (Urbino) ) -- Chapter3. Brentano, Aristotle, and the Project of a scientific Philosophy (Emanuele Mariani (Lissabon)) -- Chapter4. Brentano and his scholastic roots (David Torrijos-Castrillejo (Madrid)) -- Part2. Psychology. Chapter5. Brentano on Phenomenalism and Physical Phenomena (Denis Fisette (Montreal)) -- Chapter6. Brentanian Psychology as a Foundation for Philosophy (Arkadiusz Chrudzimski (Stettin)) -- Chapter7. On the Several Senses of Psychology in Brentano (Charles Niveleau (Paris)) -- Chapter8. Franz Brentano and Brain Anatomy in Vienna (Josef Halde (Graz)) -- Part3. Descriptive phenomenology. Chapter9. Was Brentano a Self-Representationalist? (Denis Seron (Liège) ) -- Chapter10. The Phenomenology of Mentality (Arnaud Dewalque (Liège)) -- Chapter11. Attention in Brentano's Descriptive Psychology (Hynek Janousek (Prague)) -- Chapter12. Brentano, Pre-Reflexive Consciousness, and Temporality (Martin Moore (Montreal)) -- Chapter13. Brentano's Emotional Cognitivism (Gemmo Iocco (Parma)) -- Chapter14. Brentano on Emotions (Ingrid Vendrell Ferran (Basel)) -- Part 4. Chapter15. Language and Existence. About some Brentanian Paradoxes (Jan Sebestik (Paris)) -- Chapter16. Brentanian Mereology. The theory of Parts and Wholes (Wilhelm Baumgartner (Würzburg)) -- Chapter17. Substance and Accident in Brentano's Reism (Robin Rollinger (Prague)) -- Chapter18. Logical tools for descriptive psychology. Set theory and foundational Mereology (Bruno Leclercq (Liège)) -- Chapter19. Are Ideal Objects only Objects of Thought? The Controversy between Kotarbinski and Ingarden (Sébastien Richard (Brussels) -- Chapter20. Linguistic Fictions in Brentano (Charlotte Gauvry (Liège)).

We use a novel experimental design to reliably elicit subjects' strategies in an infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma experiment with perfect monitoring. We find that three simple strategies repre‑ sent the majority of the chosen strategies: Always Defect, Tit‑for‑Tat, and Grim. In addition, we identify how the strategies systematically vary with the parameters of the game. Finally, we use the elicited strategies to test the ability to recover strategies using statistical methods based on observed round‑by‑round cooperation choices and find that this can be done fairly well, but only under certain conditions. (JEL C72, C73, C92)

A usual criticism of the theory of infinitely repeated games is that it does not provide sharp predictions since there may be a multiplicity of equilibria. To address this issue, we present experimental evidence on the evolution of cooperation in infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma games as subjects gain experience. We show that cooperation may prevail in infinitely repeated games, but the conditions under which this occurs are more stringent than the subgame perfect conditions usually considered or even a condition based on risk dominance. (JEL C71, C73)

This paper presents a dynamic equilibrium model of a taxi market. The model is estimated using data from New York City yellow cabs. Two salient features by which most taxi markets deviate from the efficient market ideal are, first, matching frictions created by the need for both market sides to physically search for trading partners, and second, regulatory limitations to entry. To assess the importance of these features, we use the model to simulate the effect of changes in entry, alternative matching technologies, and different market density. We use the geographical features of the matching process to back out unobserved demand through a matching simulation. The matching function exhibits increasing returns to scale, which is important to understand the impact of changes in this market and has welfare implications. For instance, although alternative dispatch platforms can be more efficient than street-hailing, platform competition is harmful because it reduces effective density. (JEL C78, L51, L84, L92, L98, R48)

The adoption of mandatory gender quotas in party lists has been a subject of discussion in many countries. Since any reform obviously requires the approval of a (sometimes qualified) majority of incumbent legislators' votes, keeping an eye on incumbents' interests and incentives in different systems seems a natural thing to do if we want to understand different prospects for reforms in different countries. Such differences in the cost-benefit analysis of incumbents may well depend on the electoral system. We argue that if male candidates have a higher probability of being elected when running against a female candidate than when running against a male of similar characteristics (male advantage), then single member district majority rule and closed list proportional representation are opposite extremes in terms of incentives for incumbents to pass parity laws. We validate the above argument using a formal model of constitutional design as well as an empirical analysis of the legislative elections in France, since France offers a natural experiment for both electoral systems. Given the male advantage, increasing the number of female new candidates made the incumbents' probability of reelection higher and thus male incumbent members of the Assembly have actually benefited from the parity law. We also show that parity may have Assembly composition effects and policy effects that vary with the electoral system.

We experimentally investigate a legislative bargaining model with both public and particularistic goods. Consistent with the qualitative implications of the model: there is near exclusive public good provision in the pure public good region, in the pure private good region minimum winning coalitions sharing private goods predominate, and in the "mixed" region proposers generally take some particularistic goods for themselves, allocating the remainder to public goods. As in past experiments, proposer power is not nearly as strong as predicted, resulting in public good provision decreasing in the mixed region as its relative value increases, which is inconsistent with the theory.

We experimentally investigate a legislative bargaining model with both public and particularistic goods. Consistent with the qualitative implications of the model: There is near exclusive public good provision in the pure public good region, in the pure private good region minimum winning coalitions sharing private goods predominate, and in the 'mixed' region proposers generally take some particularistic goods for themselves, allocating the remainder to public goods. As in past experiments, proposer ower is not nearly as strong as predicted, resulting in public good provision decreasing in the mixed region as its relative value increases, which is inconsistent with the theory.