Suchergebnisse

Two western Pacific states — the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea (PNG) — experimented with unusual and ambitious reforms aimed at strengthening political parties in the new millennium. In this paper, we look at what those laws entailed and how they worked in practice. In both cases, we find that unforeseen repercussions dominated. In PNG, the new laws encouraged candidates who formerly contested as independents to now nominate as members of microscopic one‐ or two‐member parties whereas in the Solomon Islands many formerly party‐affiliated candidates adjusted by contesting as independents. In PNG, the law was one of a range of devices aimed at strengthening incumbent governments, but money politics and manipulation of parliamentary procedure proved more significant. Core anti‐defection provisions in the new law were ruled unconstitutional in 2010, but other still valid clauses preserved an advantage for the "largest party" in government formation. In the Solomon Islands, the law created a shadow world of free‐floating individuals able to switch at liberty between formally constrained hermit crab shell parties. In neither country did these laws succeed in strengthening party systems.

An election held under semi-authoritarian conditions in Fiji in December 2022 saw a narrow defeat for coup leader Frank Bainimarama's incumbent FijiFirst Party. This paper looks at the political parties, the campaign issues, and the results. It argues that fear of yet another coup, as occurred in 1987, 2000, and 2006, was a critical factor determining election outcomes in 2014 and 2018, but a credible rejection of that option by the Republic of Fiji Military Forces in 2022 and an opposition campaign that could no longer be depicted as ethno-nationalist paved the way for regime change in Fiji. (Pac Aff/GIGA)

Mandatory power-sharing laws aim to balance power between groups in contexts where majoritarian democracy might disadvantage minorities. Yet, unless veto arrangements are in place, cabinet-level decision-making usually continues to operate under majority rule. Minority parties participating in such power-sharing executives may lose support in their own communities owing to a failure to deliver substantial reforms or to advance minority objectives and become seen as 'Uncle Tom' type figures who no longer represent their own community. This article explores examples of these dilemmas facing power-sharing cabinets in Zimbabwe, South Africa, Bosnia–Herzegovina, Fiji, and the French Pacific territory of New Caledonia.

The Southern Rhodesian experiment with the alternative vote (AV) is not well known among electoral specialists. Yet this was the origin of the better known claim that such a preferential voting system might ameliorate ethnic tensions in deeply divided societies. AV was one among several institutional innovations deployed by a reformist white settler government in Southern Rhodesia in response to the emergence of the African nationalist movement. Despite its usage with a highly restrictive franchise, the system delivered a preference transfer-dependent victory for a centrist government that aimed to accommodate African political aspirations in 1958. Yet that outcome was not repeated in 1962 or 1965, when Ian Smith's Rhodesia Front instead obtained office, declared independence from the United Kingdom and – once freed of restraints from London – dismantled electoral devices aimed at encouraging inter-communal vote transfers. This article examines the debates about Southern Rhodesian electoral reform in the late 1950s and early 1960s, explores the working of accommodation-oriented devices at the elections of 1958, 1962 and 1965, and contests whether viable political settlements can be assembled in such contexts simply by institutional reform aimed at encouraging 'moderation'.

The Southern Rhodesian experiment with the alternative vote (AV) is not well known among electoral specialists. Yet this was the origin of the better known claim that such a preferential voting system might ameliorate ethnic tensions in deeply divided societies. AV was one among several institutional innovations deployed by a reformist white settler government in Southern Rhodesia in response to the emergence of the African nationalist movement. Despite its usage with a highly restrictive franchise, the system delivered a preference transfer-dependent victory for a centrist government that aimed to accommodate African political aspirations in 1958. Yet that outcome was not repeated in 1962 or 1965, when Ian Smith's Rhodesia Front instead obtained office, declared independence from the United Kingdom and – once freed of restraints from London – dismantled electoral devices aimed at encouraging inter-communal vote transfers. This article examines the debates about Southern Rhodesian electoral reform in the late 1950s and early 1960s, explores the working of accommodation-oriented devices at the elections of 1958, 1962 and 1965, and contests whether viable political settlements can be assembled in such contexts simply by institutional reform aimed at encouraging 'moderation'.