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Although party competition is widely regarded as an important part of a working democracy, it is rarely analysed in political science literature. This article discusses the basic properties of party competition, especially the patterns of interaction in contemporary party systems. Competition as a phenomenon at the macro level has to be carefully distinguished from contest and cooperation as the forms of interaction at the micro level. The article gives special attention to the creation of issue innovations. Contrary to existing approaches, I argue that not only responsiveness but also innovation are necessary to guarantee a workable democratic competition. Competition takes place on an issue market, where parties can discover voters' demands. Combined with the concept of institutional veto points, the article presents hypotheses on how institutions shape the possibility for programmatic innovations.

In a recent article in Party Politics, Detlef Jahn proposed an alternative way of generating left–right scores using data from the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP). Despite presenting innovative ideas, the article requires comment and correction. First, Jahn's claim of a deductive approach is not convincing. He proceeds at least partly inductively. Furthermore, he ignores the theoretical ground of the competing approaches. Second, and more importantly, the central criterion by which to evaluate different approaches should be construct validity; however, Jahn does not conduct a full test of the construct validity. In this comment, I first explain the theoretical base of different approaches in generating left–right position scores using CMP. Second, I conduct a test of construct validity using not only expert data but also survey data. The results clearly suggest that approaches using a context-specific scheme for determining left–right issues are superior to the existing alternatives. This comment should be of interest to all scholars concerned with the question of how to create valid party position indicators.

Although party competition is widely regarded as an important part of a working democracy, it is rarely analysed in political science literature. This article discusses the basic properties of party competition, especially the patterns of interaction in contemporary party systems. Competition as a phenomenon at the macro level has to be carefully distinguished from contest and cooperation as the forms of interaction at the micro level. The article gives special attention to the creation of issue innovations. Contrary to existing approaches, I argue that not only responsiveness but also innovation are necessary to guarantee a workable democratic competition. Competition takes place on an issue market, where parties can discover voters' demands. Combined with the concept of institutional veto points, the article presents hypotheses on how institutions shape the possibility for programmatic innovations.

Although party competition is widely regarded as an important part of a working democracy, it is rarely analysed in political science literature. This article discusses the basic properties of party competition, especially the patterns of interaction in contemporary party systems. Competition as a phenomenon at the macro level has to be carefully distinguished from contest and cooperation as the forms of interaction at the micro level. The article gives special attention to the creation of issue innovations. Contrary to existing approaches, I argue that not only responsiveness but also innovation are necessary to guarantee a workable democratic competition. Competition takes place on an issue market, where parties can discover voters' demands. Combined with the concept of institutional veto points, the article presents hypotheses on how institutions shape the possibility for programmatic innovations. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

What effect does the presence of a coalition of the ideological center have on polarization in party systems? Studies of party positioning demonstrate the impact of a party's affiliation to the cabinet for its electoral campaigning. In addition, comparative studies of party systems analyzed the effects of the competitive situation between the coalition and the opposition on party competition dynamics. Nevertheless, the linkage between findings of both branches of literature is still missing. On the one hand, studies of party competition models generally focus on explaining party behavior and do not aggregate these insights. On the other hand, party system studies usually lack an analytical micro-foundation. Thus, we do not know the mechanism that drives a polity to the extreme. To find this missing link, we derive two potential explanations based on the spatial theory of party competition and Satori's study of party systems: incumbent punishment and limited contestation. We elaborate these mechanisms with the help of an agent-based model. Then, we trace the effect of cabinet type back to the limited contestation between coalition parties. If the incumbent parties avoid contestation with each other, a center cabinet induces polarizing dynamics since the opposition then has no incentive for responsible office-seeking. Specific circumstances such as a polarized electorate and voters' negative evaluation of the cabinet parties support this mechanism. Methodologically, our simulation study reveals three advantages of the agent-based modeling approach: (1) the uncovering of thus far implicit assumptions; (2) the possibility of analyzing causal dependencies within a complex and dynamic model; and (3) the precision of our theoretical expectations based on the micro-foundation.