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To understand dynamics within communities of organized interests, researchers have primarily studied organizational births and deaths. The organizational development of established interest organizations has received far less attention. This article claims that the evolution of interest groups' organizational features is strongly affected by evolving resource dependencies with the state. A life-history case study of an environmental interest organization is used to substantiate this argument empirically. The findings demonstrate that resource dependence relations with state actors critically shape organizational development, but that this dependence affects an organization's mission, structure, and strategy in different ways. This conclusion highlights the vital role of government patronage in the survival and maintenance of interest organizations. Adapted from the source document.

While think tanks are no longer solely a feature of Anglo-Saxon countries, they still appear less prevalent in consensus-oriented and neo-corporatist political regimes. To what extent do central characteristics of these countries shape the organizational characteristics and political activities of think tanks? We theoretically contribute to the existing literature on policy advice by drawing inspiration from niche theory, and empirically complement previous work by focusing on think tanks in Belgium, a country with a crowded and closed advisory landscape. Relying on a combination of data sources, our analysis highlights three central features of think tanks: (1) the long-term and anticipatory character of their policy advice, (2) the evidence-based nature of their policy work, and (3) their consensus-oriented mode of operating. The first two features echo what earlier studies in pluralist setting identified as key distinguishing characteristics. The third feature, their consensus-oriented mode of operating, represents a new element that turns out critical for understanding the niche of think tanks in Belgium. Its consensus-style tradition shows not only in how think tanks position themselves externally, but also in their internal organizational structure. Points for practitioners - Think tanks have potential to be key providers of policy advice, also in relatively closed systems with neo-corporatist traits. - In such settings, think tanks especially benefit from a consensual mode of operating, both internally and externally. - The long-term orientation of think tanks can set them apart from other providers of policy advice, such as interest groups and political party think tanks.

AbstractInterest groups are key intermediary actors that communicate societal interests and preferences to public officials. Given public officials' reliance on interest groups' input in public policy processes, it is essential to understand how groups establish policy positions and assess the democratic nature of this process. Focusing on the leadership perspective, this article examines how interest groups involve their membership base in the process of defining their policy positions. The article relies on qualitative data from interviews with the leaders of interest groups active at the EU level and the statutes of these organizations. The findings show that the nature of policy issues under discussion and unequal resources of members lead to biased membership involvement in policy position-taking. While leaders are aware of these dynamics, their efforts to mitigate unequal participation seem limited, which raises questions about the representative potential of interest groups and the legitimacy of their policy claims.

AbstractAn agency's self‐portrayal can help to protect its jurisdictional turf and strengthen its reputational uniqueness. While prior reputational studies have shown that agencies are attentive to the media and political principals, they have not assessed how inter‐agency dynamics might shape their public outreach and message. This paper argues that if multiple public agencies are confronted with a shared salient issue, such as the Covid‐19 pandemic, they engage in 'issue segmentation': mindful of each other's distinct jurisdictional and reputational profiles, their communication centers around sub‐issues that do not overlap with core missions of other agencies. We assess this expectation via a study of Twitter communication of 38 European Union agencies related to Covid‐19. Using an automated thematic analysis of tweets, we show that agencies engage in issue segmentation and focus on unique sub‐issues. The findings contribute to a better understanding of public outreach of agencies in times of crisis.

This chapter provides an overview of the various means by which interest groups involved themselves in the 2016 Australian federal election campaign. As far as possible, we address this task through an engagement with the broader political science and public policy literature on interest groups and elections. This literature is sparse, but our hope is that through this contribution we can play some small part in pushing the broader engagement of group scholars with those of elections and political parties.

The ongoing embrace of interest groups as agents capable of addressing democratic deficits in governing institutions is in large part because they are assumed to contribute democratic legitimacy to policy processes. Nonetheless, they face the challenge of legitimating their policy advocacy in democratic terms, clarifying what makes them legitimate partners in governance. In this article we suggest that digital innovations have disrupted the established mechanisms of legitimation. While the impact of this disruption is most easily demonstrated in the rise of a small number of 'digital natives', we argue that the most substantive impact has been on more conventional groups, which typically follow legitimation logics of either representation or solidarity. While several legacy groups are experimenting with new legitimation approaches, the opportunities provided by technology seem to offer more organizational benefits to groups employing the logic of solidarity, and appear less compatible with the more traditional logic of representation. ; Australian Research Council, Grant/Award number: DP140104097

The ongoing embrace of interest groups as agents capable of addressing democratic deficits in governing institutions is in large part because they are assumed to contribute democratic legitimacy to policy processes. Nonetheless, they face the challenge of legitimating their policy advocacy in democratic terms, clarifying what makes them legitimate partners in governance. In this article we suggest that digital innovations have disrupted the established mechanisms of legitimation. While the impact of this disruption is most easily demonstrated in the rise of a small number of 'digital natives', we argue that the most substantive impact has been on more conventional groups, which typically follow legitimation logics of either representation or solidarity. While several legacy groups are experimenting with new legitimation approaches, the opportunities provided by technology seem to offer more organizational benefits to groups employing the logic of solidarity, and appear less compatible with the more traditional logic of representation.

Any democratic society requires mechanisms for citizens to have effective political voice. Clearly, political parties provide a key channel for expressing views and preferences. However, organised interests provide another important mechanism for such representation. A crucial question in this regard is whether the interest group system is capable of ensuring the representation of a variety of public and private interests. Resolving these debates requires data that map the terrain and also are attentive to organisational diversity. This article takes up this challenge through exploring the composition and diversity of the Australian system of organised interests, using a new data set based on the Directory of Australian Associations. This system‐level approach delivers important insights into the nature of the Australian interest group system, as well as provides a framework for subsequent work interpreting and contextualising advocacy activities of particular groups, or lobbying dynamics in specific policy domains.

In most political systems, the community of policy insiders represents a small subset of the total interest group population. Therefore, one key question is which factors explain why some mobilized interests become insiders and others remain outsiders. By contrasting a bottom-up registration of interest groups with a top-down census of all groups that enjoy access to policymakers, we present a unique approach to distinguish insiders from outsiders. This approach allows us to systematically analyze which factors-such as resources, constituency, scale of organization and policy portfolio-predict who becomes a policy insider. Our analysis focuses on interest group politics in Belgium, and shows that next to resources, the size of the membership, the scale of organization and a group's policy portfolio are strong predictors of the likelihood to gain access.