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Despite the rise of religion as a visible force in the sociopolitical life of post-Soviet countries, little is known about how religion has contributed or may yet contribute to tensions or peace in this region. An improved understanding of the relationship between religion and conflict in the former Soviet republics can fill a critical gap and help inform policymakers and other actors working to bring peace and stability to this volatile region. This volume of essays takes a multidisciplinary and cross-domain look at religion and how it affects the stability of the former Soviet republics. Contributions by a range of international researchers and policy experts on religion and conflict and the post-Soviet region address the dynamics among religion, conflict, and stability in the South and North Caucasus, Central Asia, Ukraine, and Russia. The authors found that while the role of religion varies across contexts, religion has not been the original source of conflict in the FSU. Religion has, however, increasingly been used by both states and nonstate groups to mobilize supporters, and the infusion of religion in existing grievances has exacerbated existing tensions and encumbered progress toward peace. While broad in scope, this volume of essays provides an improved understanding of the role of religion in conflict and stability in the FSU. Further inter- and multidisciplinary work and scholar-practitioner collaborations will be crucial to developing comprehensive and nuanced recommendations for how to approach religion when working toward building sustainable peace in the FSU and beyond

This article describes the first complete release of the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) Territorial Claims dataset, which covers all interstate territorial claims between 1816 and 2001. Territory can have substantial tangible and intangible value for states, and competing claims for control of territory represent one of the leading sources of interstate conflict. The dataset identifies 843 territorial claims and includes measures of the salience of the claimed territory, as well as details of the militarization and ending of each claim. Beyond a discussion of the structure and contents of the dataset and the coding procedures that were used to generate it, this article also presents descriptive analyses of the dataset. These analyses highlight important patterns across time and space, including changes in the prevalence, frequency of initiation, salience, militarization, and resolution of territorial claims. Notable patterns include recent declines in the frequency with which claims tend to become militarized and a lower prevalence of tangible salience measures such as natural resources. The regional distribution of claims has also shifted markedly over time, from a historical concentration in Europe towards Asia, where by 2001 claims were far more prevalent than in any other region. The article concludes with suggestions for future research.

Introduction -- Identifying Possible Factors: Literature Review -- Patterns in Chinese Military Interventions -- Case Study 1: 1979 Chinese Invasion of Vietnam -- Case Study 2: China's Gulf of Aden Counterpiracy Mission and Establishment of Djibouti Base, 2008-Present -- Conclusion.

"Whenever and however Russia's invasion of Ukraine ultimately ends, the U.S.-Russia relationship is likely to remain hostile in its aftermath. Over the long term, however, the United States will have incentives to reduce the risks and costs of its relationship with Russia in order to focus on other challenges, such as China. Future U.S. policymakers might therefore wish to again consider a limited less-hardline approach toward Russia. Supporters of such approaches contend that limited less-hardline approaches can reduce an adversary's insecurity, moderate its behavior, and reduce the costs and risks associated with competition between the two countries. Critics are reluctant to make concessions to U.S. rivals and worry that softening the U.S. stance could embolden a rival to become more demanding and aggressive. The authors used four historical case studies of limited less-hardline approaches with strategic similarities to the U.S.-Russia relationship before the war in Ukraine to evaluate these competing claims. These cases were (1) negotiations between Britain and Russia over Central Asia from 1899 to 1914 (2) U.S.-Soviet negotiations on the post-World War II order from 1945 to 1946, (3) the U.S.-Soviet détente from 1969 to 1975, and (4) the U.S.-Russia reset from 2009-2013. The authors found that such approaches have led to durable but narrow gains without emboldening the rival to be more demanding or aggressive. These limited policies also have limited effects. They only reduce a rival's threat perceptions modestly and do not prevent future deterioration of the relationship over outstanding conflicts of interest."

The expansion of Chinese military activity and capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region has led the United States to undertake its own increase in activity in the region over the past decade. As the United States expands its military activities to safeguard its regional interests, the potential reactions of China are a crucial consideration. This report provides U.S. military planners and policymakers with guidance regarding how the characteristics of different potential U.S. military activities may affect Chinese perceptions and reactions, either in ways that the United States may prefer, such as by enhancing deterrence of People's Republic of China (PRC) aggression against U.S. allies and partners, or in ways that the United States may wish to avoid, such as by increasing the risk of aggression and escalation. The authors developed a framework for assessing likely Chinese reactions to U.S. military activities. The framework identifies the key factors that drive Chinese thinking and reactions, assesses how the characteristics of U.S. activities-their location, the U.S. allies or partners involved, their military capabilities, and the public profile or messaging that accompanies them-have the potential to affect Chinese reactions through each key factor, and provides a typology of potential Chinese reactions organized by their level of intensity. The authors also developed a comprehensive set of potential military activities that the United States could undertake in the Indo-Pacific and evaluated the implications of the framework, highlighting how the PRC would likely perceive and react to different types of activities

Introduction -- Why Do States Intervene? A Summary of Past Research -- A Quantitative Look at Adversary Military Interventions -- Summary of Factors Driving Adversary Interventions -- Summary, Signposts, and Implications -- Appendix A: Full List of Adversary Intervention Cases -- Appendix B: Coding of Adversary Case Studies -- Appendix C: Key Factors for Other U.S. Adversaries.

"This report examines the impact of renewed tension between NATO and Russia on a group of key allies and partners in central and northeastern Europe. It identifies how changes in the interests, security strategies, and defense capabilities of these countries may affect U.S. defense partnering in the region, with a specific focus on opportunities and implications for the U.S. Air Force. While both politics and resources will constrain partnership opportunities and the ability of these countries to contribute to U.S. regional defense objectives, opportunities for strengthening partnerships do exist in multiple areas"--Publisher's web site

"This report proposes an alternative approach to Security Force Assistance (SFA) derived from an interpretation of nation-building and legitimacy formation grounded in history; it highlights the importance of ideas, identities, and ideology and argues that SFA efforts often err by focusing too much on force structure, capabilities, and readiness, while not sufficiently considering the extent to which a force's development complements the larger nation-building project and the formation of appropriate ideas, identities, and ideologies within the force. The report uses six case studies (South Korea, South Vietnam, Iraq, Ghana, Mali, and Nigeria) to analyze the relationship between building armies and building nations as well as potential U.S. contributions."--Publisher's description

The 2018 U.S. National Defense Strategy instructed the U.S. military to become more operationally unpredictable and suggested that doing so would help the United States deter attacks on U.S. partners. The authors of this report propose a definition of U.S. operational unpredictability-adversary uncertainty about how the United States would fight; develop four potential approaches for increasing U.S. operational unpredictability and deterring attacks on U.S. allies and partners; and assess how the four approaches could affect U.S. relations with Russia and China. They also examine two Cold War-era cases in which the United States sought to be more operationally unpredictable. The authors find that increasing adversaries' perceptions of U.S. operational unpredictability may be possible if the United States has detailed information about their operational analysis and decisionmaking processes. The most promising way to increase U.S. operational unpredictability is to publicize new U.S. capabilities and demonstrate that they give the United States multiple options for achieving its key objectives. However, increasing U.S. operational unpredictability may be costly and, in some cases, involve negative side effects (e.g., reducing U.S. military effectiveness and increasing China's and Russia's threat perceptions). The authors recommend weighing the potential costs and effectiveness of these approaches against more traditional approaches to deterring U.S. adversaries

Introduction -- Defining Power and Influence -- Framework for Assessing Chinese Influence -- Measuring Chinese Influence: Inputs -- Measuring Chinese Influence: Intervening Factors -- Measuring Chinese Influence: Outputs -- Case Studies of Chinese Influence-Seeking -- Historical Influence Case: Finland in the Cold War -- Overall Findings and Implications.