Great Britain and the European Union finally agreed upon their Trade and Cooperation Agreement. It was a long, arduous process. Although Brexit comes at a high social and political price, eventually, moderate Brexiteers got much of what they were looking for. What about the future?
The EU has turned from ostensible pandemic underachiever to COVID-19 management role model. Increasingly apt at containing COVID-19 at home, the EU is now providing substantial global assistance, too.
The COVID-19 pandemic is testing international cooperation and presents a particularly daunting challenge to regionalism. The transboundary nature of pandemics requires regional cooperation for successful pandemic management. However, even the two most successful regional organisations, the European Union (EU) and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), seemed unable to muster a sufficient regional response. This was in stark contrast to timely securitisation and robust responses at the national level. Several months into the pandemic, both the EU and ASEAN are somewhat recovering from their initial COVID-19 paralysis. In particular, the EU has responded belated but comprehensively to the pandemic. This report investigates how both organisations responded in the months following the global COVID-19 outbreak, how ASEAN can look towards the EU for regional pandemic management best-practices, and how both organisations can explore greater EU-ASEAN cooperation by building on existing strong inter-regional ties.
The global spread of COVID-19 exposes the strong nationalistic tendency in the European Union and the United States and – ironically – provides China with a unique opportunity to shine.
To combat the economic crisis in Europe that will inevitably follow the current COVID-19 crisis, Italy, France and others demand collective Eurozone debt. A non-starter for some of their neighbours – and rightly so.
The COVID-19 pandemic is the first global crisis in decades in which United States leadership is entirely absent. Regional organisations such as EU and ASEAN will have to manage the pandemic and economic recovery – and they are doing a decent job so far.
EU elections are taking place this week, but contrary to popular belief, voters have no lawful say in who will occupy the most powerful EU office. The selection process for the President of the EU Commission reveals the EU's inter-governmentalist character at the very top.
ASEAN has now added to the ongoing Indo-Pacific debate. The question is, where to go from here? Is ASEAN's Outlook an end in itself or a constructive roadmap for the future of regional cooperation?
Berlin is considering some limited military presence in the Taiwan Strait. This would be a radical shift in Germany's military doctrine and self-perception. For the time being, however, the domestic environment is unlikely to allow for more military deployment.
After a controversial package deal, the European Council finally settled on a new leadership for the bloc's top jobs. How will the new leadership affect the EU's outreach to Asia?
This paper reports on the Thai ASEAN Chairmanship at its mid-term, by evaluating the domestic background as well as three key issues that emerged after the 34th ASEAN Summit, and assesses them against Thailand's declared ambitions. The three selected issues, one under each of the three ASEAN Community pillars, are critical for the further evolution of ASEAN and the well-being if its people: (i) ASEAN's Outlook on the Indo-Pacific in the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC); (ii) the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) in the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC); and (iii) the Bangkok Declaration on Combating Marine Debris in the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC). Despite manifold challenges, the association's progress under Thai leadership has been laudable. However, immediate deliverables should not detract from the need for sustainable long-term progress and, thus, this report aims to provide some inputs for the consideration of the incumbent and future chairs.
Nationalist obsessions and failure to grasp the transboundary ramifications of the COVID-19 pandemic characterise the deficient responses of the world's two leading regional organisations. Serious reputational damage has been inflicted on the European Union and ASEAN.
"This book argues that the new great power contest between the United States and the People's Republic of China, which has as its epicentre the complex Indo-Pacific region, is having a detrimental impact on the region's existing order system. Analysing why the great powers are increasingly at loggerheads, the manifold risks this entails, and how the various stakeholders in the Indo-Pacific can find a durable regional order more constructive than confrontational, the book, avoiding theory, proposes a new equilibrium based on practical ways to manage burgeoning conflict and maintain order and stability by compartmentalising problems and challenges while seeking to maintain a balance among stakeholder interests"--
Russia's invasion of Ukraine has been widely condemned by governments of the 'political West'. Most other states have been either neutral or even Russia-leaning in this war. Southeast Asia is no exception. There is a sense in the West that the primary explanation for this reluctance to unambiguously side against Russia is the relationship, perhaps even dependency, that these states may have vis-à-vis Moscow; prima facie, a logical presumption. This article finds that while there is some truth to this claim, the relations between individual governments' responses to the war and their bilateral relationships with Moscow is too uneven to suffice as a satisfactory explanation. Instead, one must look beyond materialistic, mono-causal explanations. To get the full picture, one must appreciate Southeast Asia's diplomatic tradition, their form of open and inclusive regionalism and the continued focus on domestic politics. This research provides the first comprehensive empirical categorisation of Southeast Asian responses to the Ukraine war and traces these to ASEAN's diplomatic culture. (Pac Rev / GIGA)