Trade, global policy, and the environment
In: World Bank discussion papers 402
In: World in progress for public discussion
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In: World Bank discussion papers 402
In: World in progress for public discussion
In: CESifo working paper series 4717
In: Resource and environment economics
The literature on trade liberalization and environment has not considered federal structures. This paper shows how the design of environmental policy in a federal system has implications for the effects of trade reform. Trade liberalization leads to a decline in pollution taxes regardless of whether pollution taxes are set at the federal (centralized) or local (decentralized) level, and it increases social welfare. The effect under a decentralized system is smaller than if these taxes are set by the federal government, and pollution emissions therefore decline in this case. Moreover, majority bias interacts with trade liberalization if federal taxes are used.
In: NBER working paper series 9801
In: Public choice, Band 107, Heft 1-2, S. 65-85
ISSN: 0048-5829
This paper develops a positive theory of pollution taxation by a federal authority when pollution abatement subsidies are used by local governments. Environmental & industry lobby groups influence governments with campaign contributions. First, pollution may increase in the pollution tax because the abatement subsidy increases (decreases) with the tax, & pollution increases (decreases) in the abatement subsidy. This occurs because the lobbying incentives change at a pollution tax reform. Second, pollution taxes may reduce net revenues because subsidy expenditures rise. Third, pollution may increase simultaneously as net revenues fall. Finally, the welfare effect of a pollution tax may be negative. 1 Appendix, 59 References. Adapted from the source document.
In: Public choice, Band 107, Heft 1, S. 65-86
ISSN: 0048-5829
SSRN
Working paper
SSRN
Working paper
In: Journal of development economics, Band 163, S. 1-15
ISSN: 0304-3878
World Affairs Online
In: Environmental and resource economics, Band 81, Heft 2, S. 323-353
ISSN: 1573-1502
In: Environmental and resource economics, Band 63, Heft 2, S. 451-469
ISSN: 1573-1502
The literature on trade liberalization and environment has not considered federal structures. This paper shows how the design of environmental policy in a federal system has implications for the effects of trade reform. Trade liberalization leads to a decline in pollution taxes regardless of whether pollution taxes are set at the federal (centralized) or local (decentralized) level, and it increases social welfare. The effect under a decentralized system is smaller than if these taxes are set by the federal government, and pollution emissions therefore decline in this case. Moreover, majority bias interacts with trade liberalization if federal taxes are used.
BASE
The literature on trade liberalization and environment has not considered federal structures. This paper shows how the design of environmental policy in a federal system has implications for the effects of trade reform. Trade liberalization leads to a decline in pollution taxes regardless of whether pollution taxes are set at the federal (centralized) or local (decentralized) level, and it increases social welfare. The effect under a decentralized system is smaller than if these taxes are set by the federal government, and pollution emissions therefore decline in this case. Moreover, majority bias interacts with trade liberalization if federal taxes are used.
BASE
In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4717
SSRN
Working paper
In: Ecological Economics, Band 95, Heft 2013
SSRN
In: Advances in economic analysis & policy, Band 4, Heft 2
ISSN: 1538-0637
This paper contributes to the unresolved issue regarding the effect of economic integration on environmental policymaking. In particular, we discuss the joint impact of trade openness and political stability on environmental policymaking. Our theory predicts that the effect of trade integration on environmental policy is conditional on the degree of political stability. Trade integration affects the stringency of environmental policies due to changes in industry bribery behavior, and the effect is conditional on the degree of political stability. The empirical findings support the theory and are robust to alternative specifications. The stringency enhancing effect on environmental policy of trade integration is greater in politically stable countries.