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This paper develops a positive theory of pollution taxation by a federal authority when pollution abatement subsidies are used by local governments. Environmental & industry lobby groups influence governments with campaign contributions. First, pollution may increase in the pollution tax because the abatement subsidy increases (decreases) with the tax, & pollution increases (decreases) in the abatement subsidy. This occurs because the lobbying incentives change at a pollution tax reform. Second, pollution taxes may reduce net revenues because subsidy expenditures rise. Third, pollution may increase simultaneously as net revenues fall. Finally, the welfare effect of a pollution tax may be negative. 1 Appendix, 59 References. Adapted from the source document.

The literature on trade liberalization and environment has not considered federal structures. This paper shows how the design of environmental policy in a federal system has implications for the effects of trade reform. Trade liberalization leads to a decline in pollution taxes regardless of whether pollution taxes are set at the federal (centralized) or local (decentralized) level, and it increases social welfare. The effect under a decentralized system is smaller than if these taxes are set by the federal government, and pollution emissions therefore decline in this case. Moreover, majority bias interacts with trade liberalization if federal taxes are used.

The literature on trade liberalization and environment has not considered federal structures. This paper shows how the design of environmental policy in a federal system has implications for the effects of trade reform. Trade liberalization leads to a decline in pollution taxes regardless of whether pollution taxes are set at the federal (centralized) or local (decentralized) level, and it increases social welfare. The effect under a decentralized system is smaller than if these taxes are set by the federal government, and pollution emissions therefore decline in this case. Moreover, majority bias interacts with trade liberalization if federal taxes are used.

This paper contributes to the unresolved issue regarding the effect of economic integration on environmental policymaking. In particular, we discuss the joint impact of trade openness and political stability on environmental policymaking. Our theory predicts that the effect of trade integration on environmental policy is conditional on the degree of political stability. Trade integration affects the stringency of environmental policies due to changes in industry bribery behavior, and the effect is conditional on the degree of political stability. The empirical findings support the theory and are robust to alternative specifications. The stringency enhancing effect on environmental policy of trade integration is greater in politically stable countries.

The authors use a proportional hazards framework to investigate the impact of various country characteristics on the duration of time taken to ratify the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC). The most significant findings are that the conditional probability of ratification is positively related to total C02 emissions & the presence of civil liberties. The finding for emissions indicates that large, polluting countries were under great political pressure to ratify the FCCC. The latter finding is consistent with earlier research that found that democratic freedoms raised the probability of signing the Montreal Protocol. 3 Tables, 2 Figures, 1 Appendix, 32 References. Adapted from the source document.

Examines impact of various country characteristics on duration of time taken to ratify the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, done at the "Earth Summit" held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 1992. Example of the FCCC as a measure of participation in global environmental policy making.