Throughout history, the concept of command – as both a way to achieve objectives and as an assertion of authority – has been essential to military action and leadership. But, as Sir Lawrence Freedman shows, it is also deeply political. Military command has been reconstructed and revolutionized since the Second World War by nuclear warfare, small-scale guerrilla land operations and cyber interference. Freedman takes a global perspective, systematically investigating its practice and politics since 1945 through a wide range of conflicts from the French Colonial Wars, the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Bangladesh Liberation War to North Vietnam's Easter Offensive of 1972, the Falklands War, the Iraq War and Russia's wars in Chechnya and Ukraine. By highlighting the political nature of strategy, Freedman shows that military decision-making cannot be separated from civilian priorities and that commanders must now have the sensibility to navigate politics as well as warfare.
Originally published in 1986, although the pace of arms control negotiations has been stepped up, there is still little sign of agreement. In this paper the author examines the current negotiating effort, with particular emphasis on its implications for European security. He provides an up-to-date analysis of the superpower discussions on nuclear arms control, including the impact of star wars', and also of the talks at Vienna on conventional force reductions and at Stockholm on confidence-building measures. He notes a shift in emphasis from parity' to transparency' in Western proposals, and questions whether this promises greater results than were achieved from earlier approaches. He also warns of the risks of arms control arrangements obstructing possibilities for reforming the European security system.
Rapid developments in information technology and precision weaponry are said to herald a 'revolution in military affairs' (RMA), making possible quick and decisive victories with minimal casualties and collateral damage. But has such a revolution taken place? The issues that drive conflict will persist, and many of the technical advances associated with the RMA will not necessarily produce a transformation in the nature of warfare. The end of the Cold War has highlighted another revolution one in political affairs. Major powers appear less likely to go to war with one another than they are to intervene in conflicts involving weak states, with potential opponents including militia groups, drug cartels and terrorists. RMA technology may be less suited to conflicts such as these. If the cumulative effect of these changes has produced a revolution, it is a revolution in strategic, as much as military, affairs. This paper argues that: the RMA is the practical expression of a 'Western Way of Warfare', the key features of which are: professional armed forces; intolerance of casualties; and intolerance of collateral damage the key technological and conceptual components of the RMA were in place by the early 1970s. The trend has therefore been evolutionary, rather than revolutionary. The significant difference is in the new political setting of the end of the Cold War, and the revolution in perceptions of Western particularly US conventional military strength brought about by the Gulf War of 1991 the Gulf conflict could mark the start of a true 'revolution' if future battles offer similar opportunities to exploit the RMA's technology. However, since the US and its allies appear unbeatable when fighting on their own terms, future opponents will fight differently the West will therefore face opponents who will follow strategies that contradict the Western Way of Warfare. They will avoid pitched battles, will exploit the West's reluctance to inflict civilian suffering, and will target theiropponent's domestic political base, as much as its forward troops. The problem for the West is not how to prevail, but how to do so in an acceptable manner. The more warfare becomes entwined with civilian activity, the more difficult it is to respond with the type of decisive and overwhelming military means embodied in the RMA. The RMA does not create a situation in which information is the only commodity at stake, and so does not offer the prospect of a 'virtual war'. The new circumstances and capabilities do not prescribe one strategy, but extend the range of strategies available. The issue underlying the RMA is the ability of Western countries, in particular the US, to follow a line geared to their own interests and capabilities.
One of the most serious crises since the end of the Cold War began with Russia's seizure and annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and subsequent 'secret' war in Eastern Ukraine. As more territory was taken from Eastern Ukraine, Western countries countered with economic sanctions directed against Russia. While the conflict did not escalate to the levels originally feared, over time, it became apparent that President Putin had failed to affect the regime change intended in Ukraine, and Russia's economy had been damaged. In Ukraine and the Art of Strategy, Sir Lawrence Freedman provides an account of the origins and course of the Russia-Ukraine conflict through the lens of the theory and practice of strategy. That is, he explores Putin's near, medium, and long-term strategies when he decided to initiate the conflict. How successful has he been? In contrast to many who see Putin as a master operator who has resuscitated a supine Russia against all odds, Freedman is less impressed with his strategic acumen in terms of the long-term fallout. By exploring concepts such as coercive diplomacy, limited war, escalation and information operations, Freedman brings the story up to the present, where a low-level conflict between Ukrainian and breakaway rebel forces in the east grinds on, and illuminates the external challenges faced by the governments' involved.
In Strategy: A History, Sir Lawrence Freedman, one of the world's leading authorities on war and international politics, captures the vast history of strategic thinking, in a consistently engaging and insightful account of how strategy came to pervade every aspect of our lives. The range of Freedman's narrative is extraordinary, moving from the surprisingly advanced strategy practiced in primate groups, to the opposing strategies of Achilles and Odysseus in The Iliad, the strategic advice of Sun Tzu and Machiavelli, the great military innovations of Baron Henri de Jomini and Carl von Clausewit.
