The Anti-democratic Major Questions Doctrine
In: The Supreme Court Review, Forthcoming
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In: The Supreme Court Review, Forthcoming
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In: Harvard Journal on Legislation, Forthcoming
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In: Global Climate Change and U.S. Law, Second Edition, Forthcoming
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In: Vanderbilt Public Law Research Paper No. 13-8
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Working paper
This Article argues that inter-agency coordination is one of the great challenges of modern governance. It explains why lawmakers frequently assign overlapping and fragmented delegations that require agencies to "share regulatory space," why these delegations are so pervasive and stubborn, and why consolidating or eliminating agency functions will not solve the problems they create. The Article describes a variety of tools that Congress, the President and the agencies can use to manage coordination challenges effectively, including agency interaction requirements, formal inter-agency agreements, and joint policymaking. The Article assesses the relative costs and benefits of these coordination tools, using the normative criteria of efficiency, effectiveness and accountability, and concludes that the benefits of coordination will frequently justify its costs. To varying extents, these instruments can reduce regulatory costs for both government and the private sector, improve expertise, and ameliorate the risk of bureaucratic drift without compromising transparency. Coordination can also help to preserve the functional aspects of shared or overlapping authority, which include promoting inter-agency competition and accountability, while minimizing its dysfunctions in terms of discordant policy. While burdensome, shared regulatory space should also provide an important opportunity for the President to extend his reach. The Article argues that the President is uniquely positioned and motivated to manage the problems of shared regulatory space, and that coordination tools afford him the chance to put his stamp on policy. The Article recommends a comprehensive executive branch effort to promote stronger inter-agency coordination and improve coordination instruments. Of course, any presidential exercise of centralized supervision must operate within legal bounds, and often will be politically contentious. On balance, however, presidential leadership will be crucial to managing the serious coordination challenges ...
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In: Harvard Law Review, Band 125
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In: University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Forthcoming
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In: Environmental Law Reporter, Band 41, Heft 8, S. 10726
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In: Environmental Law Reporter, Band 41, Heft 8, S. 10695
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In: Moving to Markets in Environmental Regulation, S. 3-15
In: American casebook series
In: Aspen casebook series
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