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Events of the 1970s and 1980s have provoked intense controversy about the desirability of existing political and economic institutions. On the basis of an analysis of social welfare in varying types of market systems and in certain democratic political systems, Democracy and Markets illuminates alternative directions for institutional reform. Examining in detail the experiences of several democratic European countries, John R. Freeman considers whether a mixed ownership structure is preferable to a private ownership structure; and whether a pluralist type of democratic politics is preferable to a corporatist type. Freeman compares the benefits of the two economic and two political systems separately, and then analyzes the workings of four basic political economies. This analysis yields a welfare taxonomy for alternative forms of democratic capitalism and more specifically a characterization of the blends of collective gain and distributional equity that can be achieved in the four systems. Freeman demonstrates the validity of this taxonomy through an empirical investigation of the political economies of Britain, Austria, Sweden, and Italy. Under current conditions, he concludes, the corporatist-mixed system produces the most desirable blend of welfare outcomes

Events of the 1970s and 1980s have provoked intense controversy about the desirability of existing political and economic institutions. On the basis of an analysis of social welfare in varying types of market systems and in certain democratic political systems, Democracy and Markets illuminates alternative directions for institutional reform.

Cointegration was introduced to our discipline by Renée Smith and Charles Ostrom Jr. and by Robert Durr more than two decades ago at political methodology meetings in Washington University�St. Louis and Florida State University. Their articles, along with comments by Neal Beck and John T. Williams, were published in a symposium like this one in the fourth volume of Political Analysis. Keele, Lin, and Webb (2016; hereafter KLW) and Grant and Lebo (2016; hereafter GL) show how, in the years that followed, cointegration was further evaluated by political scientists, and the related idea of error correction subsequently was applied.Have the last twenty-plus years witnessed significant progress in modeling nonstationary political time series? In some respects, the answer is yes. The present symposium represents progress in understanding equation balance, analyzing bounded variables, and decomposing short- and longterm causal effects. In these respects KLW's and GL's articles deserve wide dissemination. But KLW and GL leave important methodological issues unresolved. They do not address some critical methodological challenges. From a historical perspective, the present symposium shows that we have made relatively little progress in modeling nonstationary political time series.

Der Artikel überarbeitet und erweitert die Forschungsagenda für geldpolitische Institutionen. Erstens werden die Analysen und Forschungsansätze dieser Ausgabe von "International Organization" evaluiert. Aus dieser Evaluierung entstehen einige Ideen, wie eine Forschung "dritter Generation"über dieses Thema aussehen könnte. Spezifische Ideen beinhalten eine bessere Synthese mit bestimmten Zweigen der Ökonomie, wie z.B. der Informationsökonomie; eine Erweiterung der Wohlfahrtskriterien nach denen Institutionen ausgewählt werden können; eine Vertiefung der Analyse von Koalitions- und anderen politischen Prozesse, auf denen die Wahl der Institutionen basiert sowie die Ausarbeitung der Tests, die sich zur Überprüfung der Wahl eignen. Der zweite Teil des Artikels untersucht, wie öffentliche Souveränität über die Wirtschaftspolitik und die Wahl von Institutionen erreicht werden. Institutionelle Regime dieser Spezialausgabe sind solange demokratisch wie der wahrgenommene öffentliche Konsens hinsichtlich der Wirtschaftspolitik und wirtschaftlicher Ergebnisse tatsächlich besteht. Wenn es jedoch, wie neuere Arbeiten nahelegen, echte Meinungsverschiedenheiten über Politiken und makroökonomische Ziele gibt, ist es nicht länger sicher, dass alle Regime dieser Spezialausgabe tatsächlich demokratisch sind. Am Schluss wird kurz eine mögliche Krise der Vorstellungskraft hinsichtlich des institutionellen Designs diskutiert. (SWP-Jns)

In this article, I refine and expand the agenda for research on monetary institutions. First, I evaluate the analyses and research designs presented in this special issue ofInternational Organization. Out of this evaluation, several ideas about how to produce a "third generation" of research on this topic emerge. Specific ideas include how to: create a better synthesis with certain branches of economics, such as information economics; broaden the welfare criteria on which institutional choices are made; deepen the analyses of coalitional and other political processes on which the choice of institutions are based; and strengthen the tests that are offered in support of these choices.In the second part of this article, I explore questions of how popular sovereignty over economic policy and institutional choice are achieved. I show that the institutional regimes proposed in the special issue are, in a sense, democratic as long as the public's "perceived consensus" about economic policies and macroeconomic outcomes is real. However, if, as new work suggests, there is genuine dissensus about policy and macroeconomic objectives, it is no longer clear that the regimes proposed in the special issue are democratic. In the conclusion, I briefly discuss a possible crisis of imagination in institutional design.

Systematic sampling and temporal aggregation are the practices of sampling a time series at regular intervals and of summing or averaging time series observations over a time interval, respectively. Both practices are a source of statistical error and faulty inference. The problems that systematic sampling and temporal aggregation create for the construction of strongly specified and weakly specified models are discussed. The seriousness of these problems then is illustrated with respect to the debate about superpower rivalry. The debate is shown to derive, in part, from the fact that some researchers employ highly temporally aggregated measures of U.S. and Soviet foreign policy behavior. The larger methodological lessons are that we need to devote more time to determining the natural time unit of our theories and to conducting robustness checks across levels of temporal aggregation.