Suchergebnisse

This book investigates how multilevel polities organize openness in a globalizing political and economic environment. It tests its theory's explanatory power on the understudied case of international procurement liberalization in extensive studies of three systems of multilevel government: Canada, the European Union, and the United States.

This book investigates how multilevel polities organize openness in a globalizing political and economic environment. It tests its theory's explanatory power on the understudied case of international procurement liberalization in extensive studies of three systems of multilevel government: Canada, the European Union, and the United States.

What kind of European Union (EU) emerges from the "polycrisis"? This article argues that the EU is developing into a "reinsurance polity". In this system of public reinsurance, the nation states remain the direct insurers of their citizens against individual and societal risks. As their insurance capacity is increasingly overstretched by transboundary crises, however, the EU is creating standing resources to provide support in emergencies. In contrast to federal co-insurance, reinsurance is primarily aimed at states and affects citizens only indirectly. This article defines the term public reinsurance, describes its origins and workings, and provides three examples from the polycrisis (rescEU, Frontex, HERA). Reinsurance is a new path of EU institutional development that overcomes the regulatory polity without pushing it in the direction of positive federal statehood.

AbstractThe European Union (EU) has taken a geoeconomic turn since 2017 by creating a series of new unilateral instruments designed to preserve European autonomy and adjust to the progressive unravelling of the liberal international economic order. The most controversial of these instruments is the 2023 Anti‐Coercion Instrument (ACI), designed to deter third countries from targeting the EU and its member states with economic coercion through measures affecting trade or investment. This article analyses why this new policy instrument was created, traces its institutional genesis and explores its implications by asking whether the ACI represents an intentional attempt to transform the foreign policy issue of coercion into a commercial one. Using process tracing based on interviews and primary and secondary materials, we argue that 'foreign policy becoming trade policy' through the ACI was an unintended consequence both of external pressures to institutionalise the trade–security nexus and of the EU's uneven internal competence base.

AbstractEuropeanization research found no general convergence towards centralized EU policy coordination, despite decentralized systems' comparatively slow and ineffective position‐taking. Does this finding hold against the threat, urgency, and uncertainty exerted by recent years' polycrisis? We posit that decentralized systems indeed persist, albeit in a three‐step reactive sequence in which situational centralization during crises dialectically reinforces decentralization in the long run. First, the prime minister's office harnesses a crisis to acquire hierarchical control of position‐taking. Second, to exploit the deep expertise of the bureaucracy and maximize its bargaining power on the EU‐level, it co‐opts a lead ministry. Third, due to the institutional underpinnings of the decentralized system, the lead ministry, rather than the prime minister's office, eventually retains the administrative capacities created in crisis. We illustrate this causal mechanism in a comparison of the German government's EU policy coordination during the Eurozone and Schengen crises.