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We explore the individual and joint explanatory power of concepts from economics, psychology, and criminology for criminal behavior. More precisely, we consider risk and time preferences, personality traits from psychology (Big Five and locus of control), and a self-control scale from criminology. We find that economic preferences, personality traits, and self-control complement each other in predicting criminal behavior. The most significant predictors stem from all three disciplines: risk aversion, conscientiousness, and high self-control make criminal behavior less likely. Our results illustrate that integrating concepts from various disciplines enhances our understanding of individual behavior.

In economic models, risk and social preferences are major determinants of criminal behavior. In criminology, low self-control is considered a fundamental cause of crime. Relating the arguments from both disciplines, this paper studies the relationship between self-control and both risk and social preferences. To exogenously vary the level of self-control, we use a well-established experimental manipulation. We find that low self-control causes less risk-averse behavior. The effect of self-control on social preferences is not significant. In sum, our findings support the proposition that low self-control is a facilitator of crime. While our study is motivated by the literature on the determinants of criminal behavior, it has important implications for dual-system models and documents endogeneity of economic preferences.

This paper establishes that being asset-constrained may be advantageous for defendants in litigation contests. An active asset constraint of defendants (i) may increase (decrease) defendant (plaintiff) contest effort, (ii) may lower the sum of plaintiff and defendant contest effort, (iii) lowers expected defendant payment, and (iv) makes a symmetric contest asymmetric. Adapted from the source document.

Preliminary -- Introduction -- The Economics of Tort Law:Basics and Selected Core Themes -- On the Incentive Effects of Damage Averaging in Tort Law -- On the Superiority of Damage Averaging in the Case of Strict Liability -- Screening Accident Victims -- A Note on Judgment Proofness and Risk Aversion -- On the Similarity of Bilateral Harm and Unilateral Harm with Role-Type Uncertainty -- On Avoidance Activities After Accidents -- Conclusion.