Suchergebnisse

International audience ; This chapter analyses the evolution of the European Central Bank (ECB)'s institutional structures – which it finds to have indeed been great since its creation – and compares them to that of other European Union institutions and bodies. It also shows that the dual national and European nature of the National Central Banks and their governors has given rise to tensions and varying dynamics between supranational and national logics. The analysis provided concludes among other things that the institutional logics that govern today's ECB are somewhere between those of the supranational Commission and the intergovernmental Council, although in some ways the Supervisory Board could also be compared to EU agencies. It also outlines what the existing challenges might be in terms of accountability as a result of the existing (varying) institutional structures of the ECB.

International audience ; This chapter analyses the evolution of the European Central Bank (ECB)'s institutional structures – which it finds to have indeed been great since its creation – and compares them to that of other European Union institutions and bodies. It also shows that the dual national and European nature of the National Central Banks and their governors has given rise to tensions and varying dynamics between supranational and national logics. The analysis provided concludes among other things that the institutional logics that govern today's ECB are somewhere between those of the supranational Commission and the intergovernmental Council, although in some ways the Supervisory Board could also be compared to EU agencies. It also outlines what the existing challenges might be in terms of accountability as a result of the existing (varying) institutional structures of the ECB.

International audience ; This article shows that the level of protection the European Union affords to its citizens in the field of banking is now higher than it used to be a decade ago because of the reforms performed since, including the creation of the Banking Union in 2013. However, this protection is still only partial, for instance because a European Deposit Insurance Scheme is lacking. This article concludes that there is only little hope that remedy be provided to these shortcomings in the near future. ; Cet article démontre que, suite au renforcement de l'intégration européenne dans le domaine bancaire au cours de la dernière décennie, et notamment suite à la création de l'Union bancaire en 2013, l'Union protège désormais mieux ses citoyens dans ce domaine. Toutefois, cette protection demeure imparfaite, entre autres car il n'y a pas de protection des dépôts européenne. Cet article souligne qu'il n'y a que peu de chance que des améliorations notoires ne soient observées dans un futur proche.

International audience ; This article shows that the level of protection the European Union affords to its citizens in the field of banking is now higher than it used to be a decade ago because of the reforms performed since, including the creation of the Banking Union in 2013. However, this protection is still only partial, for instance because a European Deposit Insurance Scheme is lacking. This article concludes that there is only little hope that remedy be provided to these shortcomings in the near future. ; Cet article démontre que, suite au renforcement de l'intégration européenne dans le domaine bancaire au cours de la dernière décennie, et notamment suite à la création de l'Union bancaire en 2013, l'Union protège désormais mieux ses citoyens dans ce domaine. Toutefois, cette protection demeure imparfaite, entre autres car il n'y a pas de protection des dépôts européenne. Cet article souligne qu'il n'y a que peu de chance que des améliorations notoires ne soient observées dans un futur proche.

International audience ; This chapter analyses the evolution of the European Central Bank (ECB)'s institutional structures – which it finds to have indeed been great since its creation – and compares them to that of other European Union institutions and bodies. It also shows that the dual national and European nature of the National Central Banks and their governors has given rise to tensions and varying dynamics between supranational and national logics. The analysis provided concludes among other things that the institutional logics that govern today's ECB are somewhere between those of the supranational Commission and the intergovernmental Council, although in some ways the Supervisory Board could also be compared to EU agencies. It also outlines what the existing challenges might be in terms of accountability as a result of the existing (varying) institutional structures of the ECB.

International audience ; This article shows that the level of protection the European Union affords to its citizens in the field of banking is now higher than it used to be a decade ago because of the reforms performed since, including the creation of the Banking Union in 2013. However, this protection is still only partial, for instance because a European Deposit Insurance Scheme is lacking. This article concludes that there is only little hope that remedy be provided to these shortcomings in the near future. ; Cet article démontre que, suite au renforcement de l'intégration européenne dans le domaine bancaire au cours de la dernière décennie, et notamment suite à la création de l'Union bancaire en 2013, l'Union protège désormais mieux ses citoyens dans ce domaine. Toutefois, cette protection demeure imparfaite, entre autres car il n'y a pas de protection des dépôts européenne. Cet article souligne qu'il n'y a que peu de chance que des améliorations notoires ne soient observées dans un futur proche.

The eurocrisis led to significant reforms being conducted in the field of the European Union's (EU's) Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). In this framework, Member States executives, and Heads of States and Governments meeting in the European Council especially, played a key role, although the European Central Bank was long the 'only game in town'. As a result of this and other evolutions witnessed over the past decade, the gap between euro area and EU28(7) appeared to be ever-widening when the COVID-19 pandemic broke out. This article analyses the institutional balance among E(M)U institutions in the immediate response to the pandemic, how this compares to the management of the eurocrisis, and how it may be expected to play out in the implementation of the measures adopted. It finds that, this time around, a wide range of EU institutions and bodies, and the Member States, mobilized swiftly and that Member States executives played a key role again. It also shows that significant trends in favour of greater unity within the E(M)U exist.
Economic and Monetary Union, European Banking Union, Executive predominance, Eurogroup, European Council, Euro Summit, Euro area, COVID crisis, eurocrisis

Following the Great Financial Crisis, the European Central Bank's functions have been significantly altered. It is now involved in the functioning of a variety of European Union bodies and agencies, new powers in the field of banking supervision have been attributed to it and it has resorted to unconventional monetary policy. Such a concentration of powers arguably gives rise to issues of accountability and institutional balance within the European Union: (i) the resulting institutional framework is particularly complex and difficult to understand; (ii) the numerous functions the European Central Bank assumes makes it increasingly difficult to identify in which arena(s) it should be held to account for which action; and (iii) its role in the different bodies or agencies may vary in theory and in practice, which, in turn, influences the degree to which the European Central Bank should be held to account. This article aims at showing to what extent the European Central Bank's role has multiplied and diversified with a view to assess how it is held to account in those different instances, and what the consequences are for the European Central Bank's democratic accountability, primarily towards the European Parliament, as well as towards the Council of the European Union and national parliaments where applicable.

Following the Great Financial Crisis, the European Central Bank's functions have been significantly altered. It is now involved in the functioning of a variety of European Union bodies and agencies, new powers in the field of banking supervision have been attributed to it and it has resorted to unconventional monetary policy. Such a concentration of powers arguably gives rise to issues of accountability and institutional balance within the European Union: (i) the resulting institutional framework is particularly complex and difficult to understand; (ii) the numerous functions the European Central Bank assumes makes it increasingly difficult to identify in which arena(s) it should be held to account for which action; and (iii) its role in the different bodies or agencies may vary in theory and in practice, which, in turn, influences the degree to which the European Central Bank should be held to account. This article aims at showing to what extent the European Central Bank's role has multiplied and diversified with a view to assess how it is held to account in those different instances, and what the consequences are for the European Central Bank's democratic accountability, primarily towards the European Parliament, as well as towards the Council of the European Union and national parliaments where applicable.

Abstract
Interparliamentary conferences and other permanent forums for interparliamentary cooperation are blossoming in the European Union. Following more or less lengthy negotiations between national and European parliamentarians, two new conferences and a new joint parliamentary scrutiny group for Europol have been created since 2012. Against this background, this article examines to what extent the Joint parliament scrutiny group is comparable to the previously existing interparliamentary conferences. Beyond that, it asks the question as to whether any better-defined guidelines or procedures could be adopted to rationalise the process of creation of new forums for interparliamentary cooperation. It makes some concrete proposals in that direction.