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This paper studies the effect of elections and democracy on bond and equity flows to emerging countries. Our results indicate that elections affect portfolio flows: the period following an election is generally characterised by a fall in equity flows, and this occurs only where the incumbent is not re-elected. We interpret this result as evidence that political uncertainty about future policies plays a key role in explaining the effect of elections. Bond flows decrease after an election that brings a change of ideology in government, with some evidence that this effect is stronger if such change is from right- to leftwing. This set of results suggests that investors value continuity and stability in the political environment, and dislike changes. Finally, democracy, in itself, is not found to significantly influence portfolio equity and bond flows, such that there is no democratic premium. On the other hand, a decrease in the democracy score implies lower equity flows. Investors value continuity (stable democracy level, even if low) rather than improvements (democratic transitions) but are responsive to a deterioration in the democratic environment that is often accompanied by less transparency, and therefore greater uncertainty.

Although there exists a vast literature on aid efficiency (the effect of aid on GDP), and that aid allocation determinants have been estimated, little is known about the minute details of aid allocation. This article investigates empirically a claim repeatedly made in the past that aid donors herd. Building upon a methodology applied to financial markets, this article finds that aid donors herd similarly to portfolio funds on financial markets. It also estimates the causes of herding and finds that political transitions towards more autocratic regimes repel donors, but that transitions towards democracy have no effect. Finally, identified causes of herding explain little of its overall level, suggesting strategic motives play an important role.

This paper measures and compares fragmentation in aid sectors. Past studies focused on aggregate country data but a sector analysis provides a better picture of fragmentation. We start by counting the number of aid projects in the developing world and find that, in 2007, more than 90 000 projects were running simultaneously. Project proliferation is on a steep upward trend and will certainly be reinforced by the emergence of new donors. Developing countries with the largest numbers of aid projects have more than 2 000 in a single year. In parallel to this boom of aid projects, there has been a major shift towards social sectors and, as a consequence, these are the most fragmented. We quantify fragmentation in each aid sector for donors and recipients and identify which exhibit the highest fragmentation. While fragmentation is usually seen as an issue when it is excessive, we also show that some countries suffer from too little fragmentation. An original contribution of this paper is to develop a monopoly index that identifies countries where a donor enjoys monopoly power. Finally, we characterise countries with high fragmentation levels. Countries that are poor, democratic and have a large population get more fragmented aid. However, this is only because poor and democratic countries attract more donors. Once we control for the number of donors in a country-sector, democratic countries do not appear different from non-democratic ones in any sector and poor countries actually have a slightly less fragmented aid allocation.

We argue that the tilt towards donor interests over recipient needs in aid allocation and practices may be particularly strong in new partnerships. Using the natural experiment of Eastern transition we find that commercial and strategic concerns influenced both aid flows and entry in the first half of the 1990s, but much less so later on. We also find that fractionalization increased and that early aid to the region was particularly volatile, unpredictable and tied. Our results may explain why aid to Iraq and Afghanistan has had little development impact and serve as warning for Burma and Arab Spring regimes.

We argue that the nature of aid flows early on in a bilateral partnership may be different from that at a later stage. Commercial and strategic interests may carry particular weight after a significant regime change when new relationships need to be established, whereas development concerns come to carry greater weight as the relationship matures. We test this argument using the natural experiment of the break-up of communism in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. By looking at the allocation of aid across recipients, how that allocation has changed over time, and the urgency by which donors entered certain markets, we get a sense of the donors' changing priorities. We find that trade flows and geographical proximity lead to more aid during the early period, 1990-95, but not after that. On the other hand, political openness and natural disasters have no effect in the early going but are correlated with more aid in the later time period. We also find that donors are in more urgency to enter into countries with higher per capita incomes and with which they trade, but they also prioritize more democratic countries in this respect. Our results hold up to a thorough sensitivity analysis, including using a gravity model to instrument for bilateral trade flows. Our findings may have implications for what to expect about partnerships, and the role of aid, emerging between Western donors and new regimes put in place by the Arab Spring.