Suchergebnisse

Intro -- Contents -- Contributors -- 1 Introduction -- References -- 2 Poland -- Abstract -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Constitution-Making After 1989 I: The Way to the Small Constitution (1992) -- 3 Constitutional Politics from 1992 Until 1997: Amending the Small Constitution -- 3.1 Successful Amendments -- 3.1.1 The Introduction of the State Council on Radio and TV (1992) -- 3.1.2 Defining the End of Legislative Terms and Reducing Fast-Track Legislation (1995) -- 3.1.3 Constraining the President's Competencies (1995) -- 3.1.4 Increasing the Prime Minister's Leverage on the Ministers (1996) -- 3.2 Unsuccessful Amendment Attempts -- 4 Constitution-Making After 1989 II: The 1997 Constitution -- 5 Constitutional Politics in the Post-1997 Period -- 5.1 Successful Amendments -- 5.1.1 The European Arrest Warrant (2006) -- 5.1.2 The Disenfranchisement of Passive Electoral Rights for Persons with Criminal Records (2009) -- 5.2 Unsuccessful Amendments -- 5.2.1 The Protection of Unborn Life (2007) -- 5.2.2 Reorganizing the Tasks and Competencies of the President (2010) -- 5.2.3 The Introduction of the Euro and Poland's Relation to International Institutions (2011) -- 6 Conclusion: The Polish Constitutional Order a Quarter Century After 1989 -- Appendix: Constitutional Politics in Poland 1992-2014 -- References -- Sources -- 3 Czech Republic -- Abstract -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Constitution-Making After 1989 -- 3 Constitutional Politics in the New Constitutional Framework -- 3.1 How to Amend the Czech Constitution -- 3.2 The Preparation of EU Accession (2001/2002) -- 3.3 The Dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies (2009) -- 3.4 The Direct Election of the President (2012) -- 4 Unsuccessful Amendments -- 4.1 State-Wide Referendum -- 4.2 Abolition of the Senate -- 4.3 Supreme Audit Office -- 5 Conclusion.

Does the process of making a constitution affect the expansiveness of rights protections in the constitution? In particular, is more participation in constitution-making processes better for minority rights protections? While the process of constitution making and its impact on various outcomes have received significant attention, little is known about the impact public participation or deliberation in this process has on the scope and content of minority rights. Using a wide variety of data to empirically assess the relationship between constitution-making processes and the protection of rights for minorities, we find a positive relationship between participatory drafting processes and the inclusion of minority protections in constitutions under some conditions. The article's findings have important implications for understanding political representation and lend support to core arguments about the role of the public in constitutional design.

Why are some institutions capable of enhancing democracy, while others struggle under pressure? Shugart and Carey wrote their seminal book Presidents and Assemblies at a crucial time in modern history in an effort to answer these fundamental questions. Because of bold claims and huge theoretical and conceptual contributions, their timely publication became the starting point for a new way to think about institutional specifications and types of political systems. And although their examples are by now dated, the idea of "trade-off" or "balancing efficiency and representativeness" still speaks to the fundamental questions of regime change and democratic sustainability. While their study made clear that there are distinctions between system types, they also argued that not a specific type is more conducive or damaging to democracy; rather specific institutional configurations lead to a vulnerability of a political regime. Twenty-five years after the first publication of Presidents and Assemblies, this special issue uses this argument and reconnects Shugart and Carey's book with the recent debate on individual attributes of legislative–executive relations and their effect on democracy. This article serves as an introduction and highlights the rationale and the major themes that run through the contributions to the special issue.

Institutional interests are often the main determinant of day-to-day politics. However, do they also matter in the more consensus-oriented field of constitutional politics? To answer this question, this article examines the success and failure of constitutional amendment drafts. We reassess a hypothesis proposed by Donald S. Lutz more than 20 years ago, according to which the initiator of an amendment is a significant determinant of its success, that is, of its passing or not passing. This study is based on a unique dataset of successful and failed constitutional amendments, covering 18 post-socialist countries in Central and Eastern Europe (1990–2014). We demonstrate that the chances of success for a given constitutional amendment are clearly driven by institutional interests: cabinet and presidential proposals have significantly higher chances of success than parliamentary and public initiatives. Additionally, success or failure also depend on the level of democracy and the rigidity of the amendment process.

In diesem Beitrag suchen wir eine Annäherung an die Frage, wie das genuin westliche Konstitutionalismusmodell jenseits des Westens interpretiert und implementiert wird. Der Beitrag zeigt, dass der Fokus auf ein allzu formalistisches Verfassungsverständnis nicht in der Lage ist, den globalen Variantenreichtum des Konstitutionalismus zu erfassen und vielmehr um ein substantielles Verfassungsverständnis erweitert werden muss. Erst die substantielle Perspektive ermöglicht es, die Einbettung des Konstitutionalismus in regionale und historische Kontexte zu erfassen. Damit werden nicht nur Aspekte der Möglichkeit und Sinnhaftigkeit einer Übertragung westlicher Konstitutionalismusvorstellungen in Frage gestellt, sondern auch Wege eines wechselseitigen Lernens aufgezeigt. Gerade mit Blick auf die Rolle von Konstitutionalismus jenseits der Ordnungseinheit Autokratie und Demokratie spielt diese Weiterentwicklung eine wichtige Rolle.

The four state-like entities on the territory of the former Soviet Union that emerged about twenty years ago have successfully defended their precarious independence until today. However, we still know very little about the internal political developments in these de facto states, because so far most research has focused on the regional and international dimensions of the now "frozen" secessionist conflicts which brought them into being. The authors of this issue argue that it is high time to have a closer look at the developments inside these de facto states for several reasons. First, in order to understand whether there is mutual dependence between internal political structures and processes and the chances of international recognition. Second, the post-Soviet de facto states are model cases for internal transformation or even democratization efforts as a strategy of internal and/or external legitimacy building. Finally, the issue proves that the reluctance of academia to analyze the political systems of these entities for fear of legitimizing regimes that do not deserve it is not reasonable: the post-Soviet de facto states are fully grown states for all but international recognition – they are not supposed to disappear because we refuse to admit this fact.