Suchergebnisse

This book details fifteen debilitating fault lines facing the United States, ranging from Beltway dysfunction, to incoherent foreign policy pursuits. It then offers specific policy solutions, based on best practices, which will erase these fault lines and permit the United States to enter a new era of "Renaissance America" by 2030.

Europe 1992 has become a major focus of attention for the Western media, because if all goes as planned, a unified and integrated common market of 12 nations and 320 million consumers will be created, a market running from the mountains of Mourne to the Peloponnese with a GNP rivaling that of the United States. Further east, the Kremlin is determined to put the Soviet Union's tattered economic house in order under Gorbachev's much ballyhooed perestroika strategy. And along Asia's Pacific rim, rapid growth may permit this region to match the productive capacity of both the United States and the European Community within the next two decades.

In an effort to protect and enhance the interests of their constituents in a complex era of globalization, interdependence, and "creative destruction," mostu.s.state governments have chosen to be engaged internationally, especially in economic activities, such as export promotion and the attraction of direct investment, tourists, and students from abroad. However, these activities have often been sporadic and are subject to being downsized or eliminated during tough fiscal periods, such as the Great Recession of 2007–2009. Moreover,u.s.federalism has been in a period of centralization with more power assumed by the national government at the expense of state governments. The executive branches of the national and state governments occasionally clash over international competencies, with the national government almost always prevailing. Nonetheless, most state governments continue to be actively engaged in "foreign affairs," as contrasted with "foreign policy," and future trends should result in the proliferation of these pursuits.

"Das Transatlantische Freihandelsabkommen, offiziell Transatlantische Handels- und Investitionspartnerschaft, steckt mitten in der Verhandlungsphase, die Verhandlungen werden sich bis mindestens Ende 2014 hinziehen. Es soll das Wirtschaftswachstum der Teilnehmerstaaten beleben, neue Arbeitsplätze schaffen und das Durchschnittseinkommen der Arbeitnehmer erhöhen." (Autorenreferat)

By 2040, the United States will no longer be considered as a global superpower and the world may be headed toward a long era devoid of any superpowers. This will occur as a result of several negative trends within the United States itself, combined with changing dynamics and exigencies in the global system and the rise of more powerful competitors in Asia and Europe. The negative trends within the United States include unprecedented governmental and international debt, dysfunctional campaign-finance and lobbying systems, unmanageable entitlement and health-care obligations, a deteriorating public education network, an inordinate concentration of wealth and power in the hands of relatively few individuals and corporate interests, and imperial overstretch. Internationally, globalization trends will necessitate much more cooperation across national borders with a premium placed on multilateral cooperation as opposed to unilateral initiatives. More than one-third of humanity in China and India is now being integrated into the international market system and new national and regional competitors such as the EU and ASEAN will diminish the overall economic and political influence of the United States. In 2040, the United States may be primus inter pares among the leading group of nations, but both the ``American Century" and America's ``unipolar moment" in history will have come to an end.

This paper examines the Republican Main Street Partnership, a moderate faction in an increasingly conservative Republican Party. Using party & interest group measures, we examine to what extent RMSP members differ from their fellow Republicans in their unity around partisan & ideological issues. We find that Partnership members differ from other Republicans in their partisan & ideological behavior, but share similarities with the Party on specific policy areas. Understanding these factional differences may shed further light on the political battles before the modern Republican Party. Adapted from the source document.