Suchergebnisse

Secure property rights are central to economic development and stable government, yet difficult to create. Relying on surveys in Russia from 2000 to 2012, Timothy Frye examines how political power, institutions, and norms shape property rights for firms. Through a series of simple survey experiments, Property Rights and Property Wrongs explores how political power, personal connections, elections, concerns for reputation, legal facts, and social norms influence property rights disputes from hostile corporate takeovers to debt collection to renationalization. This work argues that property rights in Russia are better seen as an evolving bargain between rulers and rightholders than as simply a reflection of economic transition, Russian culture, or a weak state. The result is a nuanced view of the political economy of Russia that contributes to central debates in economic development, comparative politics, and legal studies

The political logic of economic and institutional reform -- Political polarization and economic inequality -- The pace and consistency of reform -- Political polarization and economic growth -- Political polarization and policy instability: the view from the firm -- Nationalism and endogenous polarization -- Russia: polarization, autocracy, and reform -- Bulgaria: polarization, democracy, and reform -- Poland: robust democracy and rapid reform -- Uzbekistan: autocracy and inconsistent gradualism

Introduction: the problem of social order -- Institutions and social order: sociological and economic approaches -- Self-governance and social order: a more political approach -- Benign neglect: self-governance on currency futures markets -- The meddlesome Leviathan: self-governance on the commodities markets -- Toward a politics of social order: self-governance on the equities market -- What governs? Organizational competition and the weak Russian state -- State policy and self-governance: the political roots of social order -- The Bear's bear: institutional developments and the crash of 1998 -- Conclusion: social order and social science

How do citizens respond to extreme violations of democratic institutions, such as the January 6th, 2021 insurrection at the US Capitol? Using an online survey of 900 employed respondents conducted January 5–9, 2021, I find that those interviewed just hours after the insurrection were about 10% points less likely to identify as Republicans, reported greater dislike for Donald Trump, and expressed less attachment to conservatism even controlling for prior levels of party identification. Self-reported Trump voters interviewed after the insurrection were also less likely to identify as Republican and expressed a less favorable view of Donald Trump. The findings only reflect the short-term reactions of employed respondents but are robust to alternative specifications and the very narrow temporal window of the analyses helps to isolate the impact of the insurrection. These results offer evidence in the on-going debate over how to interpret the events of January 6th, 2021.

Do economic sanctions turn the public against the target government or cause it to rally around the flag? How do sanctions affect attitudes toward the sanctioner? How does bad economic performance under sanctions shape support for the target government? Despite their importance, these questions have rarely been explored with survey data. Results from two surveys in Russia find that exposure to information about economic sanctions does not generate a rally around the flag, leads some groups to withdraw support from the target government, and reduces support for the sanctioner. Respondents also react more strongly to the reasons why sanctions were put in place—the annexation of Crimea—than to the sanctions themselves. These results suggest the need to reevaluate theories of the impact of economic sanctions and blame-shifting under autocracy.