Markets, democracy, and new private business in Russia
In: Post-soviet affairs, Band 19, Heft 1, S. 24-45
ISSN: 1060-586X
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In: Post-soviet affairs, Band 19, Heft 1, S. 24-45
ISSN: 1060-586X
World Affairs Online
In: World politics: a quarterly journal of international relations, Band 54, Heft 3, S. 308-337
ISSN: 0043-8871
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In: Europe Asia studies, Band 54, Heft 7, S. 1017-1036
ISSN: 0966-8136
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In: Post-soviet affairs, Band 13, Heft 4, S. 366-395
ISSN: 1060-586X
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In: Journal of international affairs, Band 45, Heft 2, S. 599-624
ISSN: 0022-197X
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In: Russian analytical digest: (RAD), Heft 119, S. 17-23
ISSN: 1863-0421
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In: European Journal of Political Economy, Band 27, Heft 4, S. 642-658
In: European journal of political economy, Band 27, Heft 4, S. 642-658
ISSN: 1873-5703
We propose three ideal types of business-state relations in a transition economy and explore the impact of government directors on corporate boards for firm behavior. Using a unique dataset of joint-stock companies in Russia, we find that the presence of government directors on corporate boards is more consistent with a "collusion" ideal type of relations between firms and the state than with a managerial discipline or rent-extraction ideal type. The state sends directors to firms that both extract resources from the state, but that also provide important benefits and services to the state. [Copyright Elsevier B.V.]
In: Russland-Analysen, Heft 179, S. 13-15
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In: Pro et contra: žurnal rossijskoj vnutrennej i vnešnej politiki, Band 11, Heft 4-5, S. 118-134
ISSN: 1560-8913
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In: British journal of political science, Band 33, Heft 4, S. 635-657
ISSN: 0007-1234
Scholars and policy makers have displayed a longstanding interest in the politics of economic reform, particularly over the 1990s as former Communist countries struggled to develop market economies. Yet remarkably little systematic research has been conducted on the political economy of commercial reform in the post-Communist world. We argue that the fragmentation of power within post-Communist countries has been a potent force for trade liberalization. In non-democracies where political power is highly concentrated in the hands of a small group of elites, state leaders face few impediments to rent seeking and are well insulated from interests favouring commercial reform. In non-democracies where power is fragmented within the national government, however, new elites with weak ties to the old regime are well placed to use trade liberalization as a weapon against their political opponents. Moreover, the dispersion of power in non-democracies creates space for groups favouring free trade to promote trade liberalization. Finally, in democracies, the dispersion of power within the national government combined with electoral competition creates an especially potent impetus to trade liberalization. To assess these arguments, we analyse the trade policy of post-Communist countries during the period 1990-98. The results support our claims, highlighting the importance of examining institutional differences within as well as across regime types in analyses of economic policy. (British Journal of Political Science / FUB)
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In: Post-soviet affairs, Band 33, Heft 1, S. 1-15
ISSN: 1060-586X
World Affairs Online