Suchergebnisse

This report certainly has its limitations—some of which are discretionary, and others attributable to the unique fact that it is a product of the U.S. intelligence community. I will give particular attention to this aspect because it is part of the National Intelligence Council's (NIC) "DNA," rather than a reflection of managerial preference. My main point, however, has less to do with any faults in the report itself, but rather with faults in the way it is applied to policy: something that is far more the responsibility of "consumers" in the policy world than of "producers" in the Intelligence Community (IC). The U.S. government badly needs a systematic process for applying foresight to long-range policy, and in my opinion, the NIC's 2030 edition qualifies as a major source of input to that process. I certainly do not have it in mind that the NIC foresight process should become the sole such source of foresight for an integrated policy process but as part of a blended feedstock. As for how to accomplish such a blend, given the many possible sources, I will also have some observations.

[Campbell, K. M.; Weitz, R.]: Introduction: the methodological approach of this study and previous research on the impacts of climate change. - S. 13-22 [McNeill, J. R.]: Can history help us with global warming? - S. 23-34 [Gulledge, J.]: Three plausible scenarios of future climate change. - S. 35-54 [Podesta, J.; Ogden, P.]: Securtiy implications of climate scenario 1: expected climate change over next 30 years. - S. 55-70 [Fuerth, L.]: Security implications of climate scenario 2: severe climate change over next 30 years. - S. 71-80 [Woolsey, R. J.]: Security implications of climate scenario 3: catastrophic climate change over next 100 years. - S. 81-92 Smith, J.; Lennon, A. T. J.; Mix, D.: Setting the negotiating table : the race to replace Kyoto by 2012. - S. 93-102