Suchergebnisse

In this study, an FDR allocation scheme based on synergetic theory was designed to alleviate the drainage conflicts caused by the grabbing of flood drainage rights (FDR) in each region of the basin. An FDR allocation index system was constructed by employing synergetic theory and following the principles of safety, equity, efficiency, and sustainability. A new multi-criteria decision-making method, called FBWM-Grey-TOPSIS, was developed, which is based on the integration of the fuzzy best–worst method (FBWM) and Grey-TOPSIS. Among them, the FBWM method was used to distinguish the importance of subsystems and order parameters, and the Grey-TOPSIS method is applied to obtain the optimal FDR assignment results. Taking the Jiangsu section of the Sunan Canal as an example, the FDRs of the four regions in the basin were allocated. The results reveal that the proportion of FDRs obtained in descending order is Changzhou (32.69%), Suzhou (24.88%), Wuxi (23.01%), and Zhenjiang (19.42%). In addition, the performance of the proposed method is demonstrated by sensitivity analysis and comparative analysis with the existing methods. The methodology and research results presented in this paper can help governments and agencies achieve a scientific allocation of FDR in watersheds, thus promoting harmonious watershed development.

Transboundary water pollution is a long-standing problem in China, although the Chinese government has been committed to the protection of water resources. Due to the different interests of multilevel governments and the regionalization of management, there is still no unified plan to solve the transboundary water pollution in China. Watershed ecological compensation as a holistic plan to deal with transboundary water pollution is being promoted currently. Taking the South-to-North Water Transfer Project&rsquo ; eastern route as an example, this paper firstly analyses stakeholders&rsquo ; strategies and establishes a tripartite game model based on evolutionary game theory. Secondly, by introducing Cobb Douglas production function creatively, the supervision level of the central government is refined into supervisory attitude and supervisory skills. Thirdly, the numerical simulation is used to analyze the sensitivity of influencing factors. The results show that: (1) whether the central government supervises the local governments mainly depends on the benefits of water environment improvement and supervision costs ; (2) the initial negotiation plan of the stakeholders has a significant impact on their optimum strategies ; (3) the fines imposed by the central government on the local governments have a small impact on the stable state of the system ; (4) the higher the eco-compensation fee, the lower their likelihood of cooperation ; (5) the central government&rsquo ; s supervisory attitude and supervisory skills have significant effect on the sustainability of the optimum arrangement, even when willingness of upstream and downstream governments to cooperate is low ; (6) the initial ecological benefits of downstream governments have no effect on the optimum strategy. Therefore, considering these insights is helpful to improve the watershed ecological compensation mechanism in order to solve transboundary water pollution and achieve the sustainability of water resources.

To reduce groundwater overexploitation and alleviate water shortages, market mechanisms are introduced to allocate water rights. Scientific and reasonable pricing of groundwater rights is key to ensuring the effectiveness of the groundwater market. Because of the complexity and uncertainty of water resources, this study calculates the price of groundwater rights based on the value of water resources with an evaluation indicator system. The system includes 14 indicators developed with a fuzzy mathematics model addressing three dimensions: environment, society, and economy. The weights of the indicators are determined through the analytic network process (ANP) and the entropy method. The results show that the price of groundwater rights in Ningxia, China increased from 5.11 yuan/m(3) to 5.73 yuan/m(3) between 2013 and 2017; this means the price was basically stable, with a slight increase. The ratio of residents' water fee expenditures to real disposable income also remained essentially stable, fluctuating around 0.37%, far below the normal level. These data demonstrated that the current regional water price policy does not reflect the true value of groundwater resources; there is room to increase urban water prices. Local governments need speed up water price system reforms and adopt water rights systems to optimize water resource allocations.