Suchergebnisse

La teoría sobre negociación multilateral y formación de coaliciones aplicada a asambleas legislativas predice que el poder de negociación de un partido queda determinado por la proporción de escaños obtenidos. En este artículo, presentamos algunos resultados que son difícilmente conciliables con dicha predicción. Usamos datos de 2.898 elecciones municipales españolas en las que dos partidos empataron en número de escaños, y demostramos que el partido con unos pocos votos más tiene una probabilidad sustancialmente mayor de nombrar el alcalde (formar gobierno). Dado que dos partidos que empatan en escaños deberían tener, en media, igual poder de negociación, esta diferencia en votos identifica el efecto de ser el más votado debido a una norma que prescribe que «el más votado debe formar gobierno». El efecto de ser el más votado es comparable en magnitud con el efecto de tener un escaño adicional. Esta norma se cumple incluso cuando el segundo y el tercer partido más votados están alineados ideológicamente y podrían formar una coalición desplazando al más votado. Los votantes castigan en futuras elecciones a los segundos partidos que nombran el alcalde, lo que sugiere que hacen cumplir la norma. También documentamos efectos similares cuando el segundo y el tercer partido empatan en escaños, y proporcionamos resultados que sugieren la existencia de normas similares, usando datos de 28 Parlamentos nacionales en Europa. Un modelo en el que las elecciones cumplen un papel dual (agregar información y disciplinar al partido en el gobierno) y distintos equilibrios (normas) pueden suceder es consistente con nuestros resultados y proporciona predicciones adicionales ; Theories of multilateral bargaining and coalition formation applied to legislatures predict that parties' seat shares determine their bargaining power. We present findings that are difficult to reconcile with this prediction. We use data from 2,898 municipal Spanish elections in which two parties tie in the number of seats. The party with slightly more general election votes is substantially more likely to appoint the mayor (form the government). Since tied parties should, on average, have equal bargaining power, this identifies the effect of being the most voted due to a norm prescribing that "the most voted should form government." The effect of being most voted is comparable in size to the effect of obtaining an additional seat. This norm binds behavior even when the second and third most voted parties can form a winning coalition that prefers the most voted not to appoint the mayor. Voters punish, in future elections, second most voted parties that appoint mayors, suggesting that they enforce the norm. We document a similar second-versus-third most voted effect and provide suggestive evidence of similar norms from 28 national European parliaments. A model where elections play a dual role (aggregating information and disciplining incumbents) and different equilibria (norms) can occur is consistent with our results and yields additional predictions

Do single women avoid career-enhancing actions because these actions signal undesirable traits, like ambition, to the marriage market? While married and unmarried female MBA students perform similarly when their performance is unobserved by classmates (on exams and problem sets), unmarried women have lower participation grades. In a field experiment, single female students reported lower desired salaries and willingness to travel and work long hours on a real-stakes placement questionnaire when they expected their classmates to see their preferences. Other groups' responses were unaffected by peer observability. A second experiment indicates the effects are driven by observability by single male peers. (JEL C93, D82, J12, J16, J31)

AbstractIn a randomized experiment in cooperation with two national parties competing in a congressional election in the Philippines, we estimate the causal effect on voting behavior of a town‐hall style campaign in which candidates discuss their campaign platform with small groups of citizens. Keeping the parties' platform fixed, we find that town‐hall meetings have a positive effect on parties' vote shares compared to the status quo, in which voters play a passive role. Consistent with the parties' advocacy for underprivileged groups, we observe heterogeneous effects by income, education, and gender. Deliberative campaigns increase voters' awareness on the issues parties campaign on, affecting the vote of the direct beneficiaries of the parties' platform.