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This article presents a counterpoint to the popular portrayals of political transitions in the Philippines and Indonesia as 'people power' driven by civil society mobilisation. Inherent in this kind of analysis is the popular assumption that transitions from sultanistic regimes are likely to be driven almost completely by forces outside of the regime, as they do not allow for independent actors or institutions that could peacefully arrange for transition 'from within'. This article suggests that, despite the appearance of a 'people power' revolution, the key driver behind the fall of the Marcos and Suharto regimes was forces internal to the regimes. Sultanistic regimes could collapse not only as a result of society-led displacement; sultanistic rulers could also be brought down by an alliance of moderate opposition elites and regime soft-liners, which opens up the way for a much less revolutionary path out of sultanism. More importantly, this article suggests that these elites emerged as a result of their growing marginalisation in the patronage system. Their challenge to the sultan was motivated less by strong democratic conviction than by desire to gain greater access to state patronage. (Pac Rev/GIGA)

This article presents a systematic review of the literature of oligarchy in Indonesia, which offers a distinctive interpretation of political change in Indonesia. The article argues that this literature is significant in two important ways. First, it invites ongoing rethinking of the ways in which authoritarian regimes fall. In the mainstream literature of democratisation, the fall of authoritarian regimes is often portrayed as the triumph of pro-democratic civil society mobilisation. Whereas many Indonesianists embrace this mainstream account in explaining the fall of the Suharto regime, the oligarchy literature suggests that its fall was driven not so much by the rise of civil society forces as by tensions between Suharto and oligarchs, in which the former was abandoned by the latter. Second, the oligarchy literature also compels a reappraisal of the nature of Indonesia's new democracy. Unlike the mainstream account of democratisation, which holds an optimistic view that the country is in the 'consolidation' stage towards a liberal democracy, the oligarchy literature sees political transition in Indonesia as a journey to an illiberal type of democracy: namely, oligarchical democracy. Adapted from the source document.

This article presents a systematic review of the literature of oligarchy in Indonesia, which offers a distinctive interpretation of political change in Indonesia. The article argues that this literature is significant in two important ways. First, it invites ongoing rethinking of the ways in which authoritarian regimes fall. In the mainstream literature of democratisation, the fall of authoritarian regimes is often portrayed as the triumph of pro-democratic civil society mobilisation. Whereas many Indonesianists embrace this mainstream account in explaining the fall of the Suharto regime, the oligarchy literature suggests that its fall was driven not so much by the rise of civil society forces as by tensions between Suharto and oligarchs, in which the former was abandoned by the latter. Second, the oligarchy literature also compels a reappraisal of the nature of Indonesia's new democracy. Unlike the mainstream account of democratisation, which holds an optimistic view that the country is in the 'consolidation' stage towards a liberal democracy, the oligarchy literature sees political transition in Indonesia as a journey to an illiberal type of democracy: namely, oligarchical democracy.

In Indonesia, democratic transition has led to the ascendance of business in the political arena. A growing number of entrepreneurs-turned-politicians have captured the power of office, taking over positions which had previously been held by bureaucratic elites. In the existing literature, the ascendance of politically assertive business, often through democratization, is associated with the emergence of a less interventionist state. However, despite the expectation that post-Soeharto Indonesia would embark on a swift process of change towards a regulatory form of state, the patrimonial features of the Indonesian state continue to display more fundamental continuity. This article presents an alternative framework through which to better understand changing state-business relations in Indonesia. The article argues that the fall of the Soeharto regime in Indonesia has had the effect of facilitating the transformation of the patrimonial state: from a patrimonial administrative state to a patrimonial oligarchic state. Democratization has changed the old hierarchy of state-business relations over the distribution of patronage. In post-Soeharto Indonesia, business elites are no longer dependent on bureaucratic elites, as the former now enjoys direct access to state resources. (Contemp Southeast Asia/GIGA)