Suchergebnisse

Introduction : understanding conflict prevention in the shifting global context / Rachel F. Madenyika and Jason Tower -- How to sustain peace? : a review of the scholarly debate / Björn Gehrmann -- Political violence prevention : definitions and implications / Stephanie C. Hofmann -- A tale of two 'peaces' : liberal peace, developmental peace and peacebuilding / Yin He -- How to curb conflict : policy lessons from the economic literature / Dominic Rohner -- The deep roots of Swiss conflict prevention / David Lanz -- Considerations for the design and preparation of national dialogue processes / Katia Papagianni -- China and mediation : principles and practice / Tiewa Liu -- How to understand the peacebuilding potential of the Belt and Road Initiative / Dongyan Li -- Security sector reform and conflict prevention / Albrecht Schnabel -- 'A community of shared future for mankind' and implications for conflict prevention / Guihong Zhang -- Conclusion : future collaborative efforts to prevent conflict / Rachel F. Madenyika and Jason Tower.

This volume explains China's inconsistent response to intervention at the UN Security Council. It draws upon new data, and concludes with new perspectives on the malleability of China's core interests, insights about the application of status for cooperation, and the implications of the status dilemma for rising powers.

What explains rising powers' approach to emerging norms that challenge ontological order? The article uses a controlled comparison of two rising powers, China and India, as they address the responsibility to protect, which reconceives state sovereignty as contingent. Both states rejected the norm at its inception, before diverging as UN Security Council members during norm application in the Libya intervention. China assumed a creative resister role, offering tactical concessions, while using traditional sovereignty norms to renovate norm content. India assumed a norm begrudger role, typified by rhetorical rejection and disengagement from evolving normative discourse, coupled with practical support for the responsibility to protect. These rising powers' normative roles are shaped by their dual status and differing positions within the UN Security Council social environment. (J Contemp China/GIGA)

Much has been written about China's active engagement and progressive approach to the "responsibility to protect," a norm that reframes state sovereignty not as a right but as a responsibility. China's response to the "Report of the UN Commission of Inquiry on human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)," which invokes the norm, however, challenges existing literature. China flatly refuses to uphold the responsibility to protect in the case of the DPRK, despite using previously supported standards to invoke the norm elsewhere and the report's dozens of consensual recommendations. This article is the first to systematically investigate how China has responded to the report. It shows that China's responses are shaped by its exceptionalism and concerns that the responsibility to protect could lead to regime change. I conclude with implications for the broader question of China's engagement with international norms in its near abroad. In my discussion, I draw on interviews with Korean and Chinese foreign policy elites, UN and US officials and DPRK human rights advocates, as well as primary and secondary documents. (China Q/GIGA)

AbstractMuch has been written about China's active engagement and progressive approach to the "responsibility to protect," a norm that reframes state sovereignty not as a right but as a responsibility. China's response to the "Report of the UN Commission of Inquiry on human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)," which invokes the norm, however, challenges existing literature. China flatly refuses to uphold the responsibility to protect in the case of the DPRK, despite using previously supported standards to invoke the norm elsewhere and the report's dozens of consensual recommendations. This article is the first to systematically investigate how China has responded to the report. It shows that China's responses are shaped by its exceptionalism and concerns that the responsibility to protect could lead to regime change. I conclude with implications for the broader question of China's engagement with international norms in its near abroad. In my discussion, I draw on interviews with Korean and Chinese foreign policy elites, UN and US officials and DPRK human rights advocates, as well as primary and secondary documents.

How do rising powers execute normative resistance to shape international order? Contrary to the existing literature, I argue that rising powers are productive agents of normative change and international order-making, through the use of rhetorical adaptation to contest pre-existing orders. Rhetorical adaptation is a strategy and set of tactics that simultaneously modifies norm content, while reducing critiques of obstructionism. To make this argument, this article traces China's efforts as a 'norm shaper' regarding the responsibility to protect through the inception, institutionalization and implementation of the norm in the landmark 2011 Libya intervention. China layers traditional sovereignty norms under the responsibility to protect, focusing and narrowing the emerging norm by fortifying the primacy of the state. While I show how China resists co-option into an evolving ontological order that challenges traditional sovereignty, the article also addresses the unforeseen consequences of China's normative efforts that 'backfired' to permit the use of the responsibility to protect to justify Libyan regime change. More broadly, this article speaks to rising powers as agents crafting international order, and the process of normative resistance that occurs throughout the norm life cycle. I draw from publicly available documents and semi-structured interviews with Chinese foreign policy and United Nations elites.

How do rising powers execute normative resistance to shape international order? Contrary to the existing literature, I argue that rising powers are productive agents of normative change and international order-making, through the use of rhetorical adaptation to contest pre-existing orders. Rhetorical adaptation is a strategy and set of tactics that simultaneously modifies norm content, while reducing critiques of obstructionism. To make this argument, this article traces China's efforts as a 'norm shaper' regarding the responsibility to protect through the inception, institutionalization and implementation of the norm in the landmark 2011 Libya intervention. China layers traditional sovereignty norms under the responsibility to protect, focusing and narrowing the emerging norm by fortifying the primacy of the state. While I show how China resists co-option into an evolving ontological order that challenges traditional sovereignty, the article also addresses the unforeseen consequences of China's normative efforts that 'backfired' to permit the use of the responsibility to protect to justify Libyan regime change. More broadly, this article speaks to rising powers as agents crafting international order, and the process of normative resistance that occurs throughout the norm life cycle. I draw from publicly available documents and semi-structured interviews with Chinese foreign policy and United Nations elites.

ABSTRACTThis article describes a simulation scenario based on of-the-minute thinking about the Korean Peninsula crisis. The scenario highlights the tradeoffs and difficulties in addressing the nuclear and humanitarian crisis, tasking students to negotiate to reach consensus on track I and track II levels. Students are negotiators, gaining experience and exposure to key international relations and political science concepts through active learning. An optional media-teams and press-conference component also is discussed. The scenario, grading rubric, and supplemental materials are included to give instructors a resource that is easily modified across groups varying in size, ability, and composition.

China's response to the recent Syria crisis at the UN Security Council represents a crucial case in China's approach to intervention in that it breaks from China's recent practice of becoming more permissive regarding intervention. Instead, China actively worked to ensure that a firm line was drawn to separate intervention from foreign-imposed regime change. It did so by employing three diplomatic innovations: exercising multiple, successive vetoes; expanding discourse to delegitimize intervention as "regime change" by Western powers; and engaging in norm-shaping of the international community's "responsibility to protect" post-intervention. Together, these three innovations highlight China's desire to firmly separate the intervention norm from that of regime change. Using a variety of primary sources, the article also draws insights from interviews with foreign policy elites in Beijing, New York and New Delhi. (China Q/GIGA)