Suchergebnisse

The United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) and its allies in the Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition, known as the Alliance until 1974, dominated Malaysian elections for more than six decades. UMNO's winning formula was based on massive support for the politically dominant Malay community, and mobilising government institutions in support of the party. This was undermined towards the end of the 1990s by UMNO disunity, a strengthened civil society, and arrival of a digital media. Demands for comprehensive political and economic reforms (reformasi) emerged following the controversial sacking of Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim in 1998. UMNO had its worst result ever in the 1999 election, a trend that continued in 2008 and 2013 when BN lost its popular and two-thirds majority. Najib's attempt to reverse this by strengthening the call for Malay dominance and tightening coercion failed. His deep implication in multiple corruption cases, tactical campaign errors, and a united opposition, Pakatan Harapan, led to the BN's stunning defeat. (JCSA/GIGA)

Malaysia's policy towards southern Thailand has always required a balance between the country's internal security and concern about a neighbouring Muslim minority linked not only by religion but also ethnicity and culture. Security was a paramount concern at independence in 1957, with the southern provinces used as a base by the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM), the Communist Party of Thailand and Malay irredentists. But after Parti Islam made inroads against the ruling United Malays National Organization by capturing Kelantan (a state adjacent to Thailand) in the 1959 elections, the two premier Malay parties competed to present themselves as the protector of Thailand's Malay Muslims. Security concerns eased with the surrender of the CPM in 1989, but re-emerged in late 2001 with the resumption of conflict in southern Thailand, and the surfacing of militant Islamic groups in Malaysia. Though initially supportive of Thai security interests, Malaysias delicate balance swung towards focusing on the well-being of Thailand's Malays in 2004: the tragic 28 April Krue Se mosque and 25 October Tak Bai incidents led to strong Malaysian protests, an unprecedented parliamentary debate and a general willingness to push the envelope on intervention in Thailand's internal affairs. Tensions remained high through much of 2005, with Thailand alleging that Malaysia was complicit in southern violence. Nonetheless Malaysia ensured Thailand was not embarrassed in international forums such as the Organization of Islamic Conference or ASEAN, and relations improved late in the year. Changes in Thai policy after the September 2006 coup were largely welcomed in Malaysia, but since then Thai-Malaysian cooperation to address the problem has made little headway. (Contemp Southeast Asia/GIGA)

Malaysia's policy towards southern Thailand has always required a balance between the country's internal security & concern about a neighbouring Muslim minority linked not only by religion but also ethnicity & culture. Security was a paramount concern at independence in 1957, with the southern provinces used as a base by the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM), the Communist Party of Thailand & Malay irredentists. But after Parti Islam made inroads against the ruling United Malays National Organization by capturing Kelantan (a state adjacent to Thailand) in the 1959 elections, the two premier Malay parties competed to present themselves as the protector of Thailand's Malay Muslims. Security concerns eased with the surrender of the CPM in 1989, but re-emerged in late 2001 with the resumption of conflict in southern Thailand, & the surfacing of militant Islamic groups in Malaysia. Though initially supportive of Thai security interests, Malaysia's delicate balance swung towards focusing on the well-being of Thailand's Malays in 2004: the tragic 28 April KrueSe mosque & 25 October Tak Bai incidents led to strong Malaysian protests, an unprecedented parliamentary debate & a general willingness to push the envelope on intervention in Thailand's internal affairs. Tensions remained high through much of 2005, with Thailand alleging that Malaysia was complicit in southern violence. Nonetheless Malaysia ensured Thailand was not embarrassed in international forums such as the Organization of Islamic Conference or ASEAN, & relations improved late in the year. Changes in Thai policy after the September 2006 coup were largely welcomed in Malaysia, but since then Thai-Malaysian cooperation to address the problem has made little headway. Adapted from the source document.