Abstract Not all contract terms pose the same perils for efficient contracting and for consumer welfare. EU Law and the laws of many Member States make a distinction between core and non-core contract terms and tend to exempt the former from the ex-post substantive unfairness review to which the latter are subject to. By reviewing how the CJEU and European legal commentators have justified and construed the terms of Art. 4(2) of Directive 93/13 we may obtain a general picture of the analytical underpinnings deployed to provide useful content to that provision. The prevailing European approach is (unsurprisingly, perhaps) predominantly legalistic and uninterested in empirics. The CJEU analysis remains (unsurprisingly, perhaps) immune to the implications from the theoretical and empirical literature that economics and Law & Economics has produced in order to understand how market forces and other non-legal incentives for contract quality interact with ex post controls implemented by courts and based on broad legal standards. The ALI Restatement on Consumer Contracts may cogently make use of that input in crafting a less formalistic legal regime.
La aplicación de los controles judiciales de transparencia y abusividad de condiciones generales en contratos de préstamo hipotecario con consumidores ha provocado una ola de litigios en España. Un efecto colateral de esta nutrida litigación ha alcanzado al diseño del contrato de préstamo hipotecario y sus términos y ha inducido importantes cambios en ellos. No parece que el efecto en el diseño contractual haya aumentado la transparencia del contrato y el bienestar de los consumidores.
This paper explores the role of supplier performance measures (scorecards and others) in the internal design of relational contracts. We analyze a simple supplier–buyer repeated interaction in which incentives arise by the threat of terminating the relationship—temporarily or permanently. As the periods with no‐trade reduce the value of the relationship, the optimal relational contract minimizes the equilibrium punishment while preserving the supplier's incentives. We show that making the relational penalties conditional on additional supplier's performance measures increases total surplus. We also provide a rationale for "forgiveness" in relational contracting. The buyer may optimally forgive (decide not to sanction at all or to impose a lesser sanction) the supplier despite a bad outcome when some additional information is positive. We start with a binary performance measure, but we extend our analysis to more complex performance measures such as scorecards. Finally, we rank the scorecards in terms of their informativeness and we characterize the optimal investment in the design and improvement of these performance measures. ; Juan‐José Ganuza gratefully acknowledges the support of the Barcelona GSE Research, the government of Catalonia, and the project PID2020‐115044GB‐I00//AEI/10.13039/501100011033 of the AEI, Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation. Fernando Gomez acknowledges the financial support of the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation under project DER 2017‐82673‐R.
Abstract: Should states be liable towards individuals for failure to provide justice, good roads, or timely administrative decisions? In this article, we show that state liability can serve three different purposes, none of which implies that the state should be liable in tort, unless other specific conditions are met. One purpose is to provide incentives for state agencies and private individuals to act efficiently. Here, the effectiveness of liability depends on the channelling of incentives down the chain of command to the acting state employee. The second purpose of state liability is to remove incentives for private parties, when these incentives are distorted, as when compensating for wrongful conviction. The third aim of state liability is to allow a higher level of the administration to monitor the behaviour of a lower level. In this case, the judicial system and private parties are means towards the end of generating information about wrongful behaviour by public bodies and agencies. Within this framework, we discuss substantive and procedural aspects of state liability in torts. We provide an economic argument for court specialization in administrative law and explain why the different solutions around the world could be appropriate under local determinants. Résumé: Les Etats devraient-ils être tenus responsables envers les individus pour leurs manquements à assurer une bonne justice, des voiries en bon état, ou à rendre des décisions administratives dans des délais raisonnables? Dans cet article il est démontré que la responsabilité de l'Etat peut servir trois objectifs différents, aucun d'entre eux n'impliquant la responsabilité civile de l'Etat, excepté dans les cas où certaines conditions spécifiques sont réunies. L'un des objectifs est d'inciter les institutions de l'Etat et les individus à agir efficacement. Ici, une responsabilité effective dépend de la canalisation des motivations le long de la chaîne de prise de décisions jusqu'au fonctionnaire chargé d'agir. Le deuxième objectif de la responsabilité de l'Etat est d'éliminer toute incitation pour les personnes privées, lorsque leurs motivations sont perverties, comme dans le cas de compensation pour erreur judiciaire. Le troisième objectif de la responsabilité de l'Etat est de permettre à l'échelon supérieur de l'administration de superviser la conduite des échelons inférieurs. Dans ce cas, le système judiciaire et les parties personnes privées constituent des outils d'information sur le comportement fautif des institutions et services publics. Dans ce contexte, il est discuté les aspects matériels et procéduraux de la responsabilité civile de l'Etat. Cet article fournit un argument économique en faveur de cours et tribunaux spécialisés en droit administratif et envisage la possibilité d'adapter les différentes solutions appliquées dans le monde à des facteurs locaux.
