Suchergebnisse

The present study explores the economic nature and property rights related to the provision of forest fire prevention. Fire protection is consumed collectively and can be co-produced by beneficiaries. Hence, we test features that may facilitate agents' coordination in the emergence of decentralized solutions, and the role economic incentives and government intervention may have for a successful low risk maintenance. A review of scholar literature on common-pool resources and public goods allow for distinguish forest-related problems in the Mediterranean and establish the framework for analysing facilitating factors for collective action. Several case studies have been assessed in this frame, namely: public contracts with shepherds, public grants for herders and voluntary agreements private forest owners-herders, always with the purpose of lowering biomass in fuel breaks for fire prevention. Accumulation of shrub biomass in forests is a relatively recent phenomenon, what may preclude for successful, spontaneous self-management solutions. Government involvement is present in all cases in different degrees and is justified by the conservation of forest externalities to society at large. Results show that external (usually government) support is required for catalyzing agreements and covering start-up expenses. There is a large expectation in this pastoral approach, seen as potentially more financially sustainable that traditional mechanical interventions, given the reduced costs for the administration while it also provides a marketable product. Secondary benefits accrue: an innovation in the social role of herders, incentives for indigenous cattle races conservation and better coordination between departments. Compensation payments are seen as a deserved reward for the effort incurred by herders due to grazing in less attractive areas for their business. Private owners agreements with herders are more likely to take place in areas with previous experiences of cooperation, high risk perception and with potential ...

This report is the result of part of the activities developed in action A6 of the Life BIORGEST project. In this action an analysis of the potential innovative financing mechanisms to be applied in Spain for biodiversity conservation in sustainable forest management has been conducted. A wide range of mechanisms have been explored: public (tax measures, European funds, green funds, etc.), private (capital funds, certifications, corporate social responsibility, etc.), or public/private (carbon markets, biodiversity banking, payment for environmental services, etc.). This document also explores the opportunities of using the Potential Biodiversity Index (PBI), a practical tool to indirectly measure forest biodiversity that is being adapted to the Mediterranean context within the framework of the Life BIORGEST project, for the design of political and economic instruments oriented towards forestry practices that maintain or improve biodiversity. Finally, some guidelines and recommendations are given in order to implement these financing mechanisms more effectively in the Spanish context ; Funded by LIFE BIORGEST

Incentive schemes and payments for ecosystem services attract increasing attention as a means for aligning the interests of landowners and society by remunerating forest owners for the goods and services their forests produce. As incentive schemes expand around the world, questions related to their institutional dimensions, as well as the role of different actors and existing institutions in their initiation, design and implementation, arise. This paper seeks to gain an understanding of these issues by analysing a number of voluntary incentive schemes currently implemented in Denmark, Finland, Spain and Italy. The analysed schemes are predominantly aimed at enhancing biodiversity and improving recreation. One of the schemes is also related to preserving a variety of forest ecosystem services from forest fires. The incentive schemes are studied following a framework for the institutional analysis of PES developed by Prokofieva and Gorriz (Prokofieva, I. and Gorriz, E. 2013: Institutional analysis of incentives for the provision of forest goods and services: an assessment of incentive schemes in Catalonia (North-East Spain), Forest Policy and Economics, 37, 104-114.). We focus on actor and institutional interactions and outcomes that are likely to result from schemes implementation to draw conclusions regarding the factors that influence the success and the durability of these schemes. Our results show that the nature of the actors initiating the schemes has a paramount effect on their design and performance. Actors' networking capacity, consensus regarding the problem and its solution, and concordance of values are important determinants of schemes' success. Existing institutions (both at local and at an international level) on the one hand provide support for the new schemes, but on the other hand can also constraint their design and limit their applicability and implementation potential. Lack of integration with other sectoral policies creates tensions and weakens the performance of some schemes. The environmental effectiveness, economic efficiency and additionality of many schemes are highly questionable, although in some cases can be solvable by redesigning the schemes. Despite these serious shortcomings, in overall the experience with the schemes is perceived as positive with space for improvements. Yet, coordinated effort among actors at different levels is required to increase the overall governance quality of the incentive schemes. ; Incentive schemes and payments for ecosystem services attract increasing attention as a means for aligning the interests of landowners and society by remunerating forest owners for the goods and services their forests produce. As incentive schemes expand around the world, questions related to their institutional dimensions, as well as the role of different actors and existing institutions in their initiation, design and implementation, arise. This paper seeks to gain an understanding of these issues by analysing a number of voluntary incentive schemes currently implemented in Denmark, Finland, Spain and Italy. The analysed schemes are predominantly aimed at enhancing biodiversity and improving recreation. One of the schemes is also related to preserving a variety of forest ecosystem services from forest fires. The incentive schemes are studied following a framework for the institutional analysis of PES developed by Prokofieva and Gorriz (Prokofieva, I. and Gorriz, E. 2013: Institutional analysis of incentives for the provision of forest goods and services: an assessment of incentive schemes in Catalonia (North-East Spain), Forest Policy and Economics, 37, 104-114.). We focus on actor and institutional interactions and outcomes that are likely to result from schemes implementation to draw conclusions regarding the factors that influence the success and the durability of these schemes. Our results show that the nature of the actors initiating the schemes has a paramount effect on their design and performance. Actors' networking capacity, consensus regarding the problem and its solution, and concordance of values are important determinants of schemes' success. Existing institutions (both at local and at an international level) on the one hand provide support for the new schemes, but on the other hand can also constraint their design and limit their applicability and implementation potential. Lack of integration with other sectoral policies creates tensions and weakens the performance of some schemes. The environmental effectiveness, economic efficiency and additionality of many schemes are highly questionable, although in some cases can be solvable by redesigning the schemes. Despite these serious shortcomings, in overall the experience with the schemes is perceived as positive with space for improvements. Yet, coordinated effort among actors at different levels is required to increase the overall governance quality of the incentive schemes.