Suchergebnisse

"In the last one of the nine chapters, Carolin Görzig gives the issue of stability yet another turn. In contrast to the two preceding chapters, stability here is not the opposite of one or more global risks but represents itself a global risks. Görzig claims that various asymmetric conflicts of today, including terrorism, languish in a deadly form of stability in the sense that they are caught in the trap of self-perpetual violence without any perspective for change. The main reason for this often decade-long continuation of the "new wars" frequently lies in the fact that war is fought for its own cause, as a result of three factors: the commercialisation of warfare, terrorism as provocation and spirals of radicalisation. Görzig takes on a global perspective and analyses the three factors by way of three rather distinct examples from Colombia, Turkey and Egypt. She shows that traditional modes of dealing with these situations, namely deterrence and military violence, only lead to a self-perpetuation of violence on all sides. Therefore, she calls for alternative ways to effectively govern new conflicts such as terrorism, one of them being active integration of violent nonstate actors through dialogue." (extract)

Abstract: According to William Zartman the elements necessary for a ripe moment are a Way Out and a Mutually Hurting Stalemate. This paper further develops ripeness theory by taking a closer look at these two conditions of ripeness. It finds that the two necessary elements of ripeness – Way Out and Mutually Hurting Stalemate – constrain each other. If there is a generous offer for a Way Out, the Mutually Hurting Stalemate will not be reached by all factions of a conflict party simultaneously. If the Way Out is not very far-reaching, it is more likely that a Mutually Hurting Stalemate is commonly perceived by all factions. In order to determine what can be done to exit this intricate relationship between Way Out and Mutually Hurting Stalemate and to bring a ripe moment about, this paper looks at the role that states and private actors can play in enhancing the negotiation willingness of non-state armed groups. The peace efforts by Ehud Olmert and the Carter Initiative in 2008, and the Road Map and the Geneva Initiative in 2003 serve as an illustration that private actors can play a key role in bringing ripeness about.

"This volume helps us understand the transformations of terrorist organisations, and the conflicts they are involved in, by broadening the perspective on what is considered terrorist learning. Using a variety of methodological approaches and empirical data, the volume offers a look at the clandestine inner lives of groups from different continents and ideological backgrounds in order to explore from whom they learn and how, and what the outcomes are. Their internal and external interactions are examined within their socio-political contexts to illuminate how they adapt to challenges or fail to do so. Unpacking the question of 'how do terrorists learn' helps us to grasp not only changes of violent means of action but also of operational and strategic approaches and, ultimately, even transformations of the ends pursued. The chapters demonstrate that terrorist learning is not principally different from that of other human organisations. The contributors draw on conceptual frameworks of organizational learning, but also broaden the scope beyond the organizational framework to acknowledge the variety of forms of informal and decentralized learning characteristic of much contemporary terrorism. This book will be of much interest to students of terrorism studies, violent extremism, organisational studies and International Relations"--

"This volume helps us understand the transformations of terrorist organisations, and the conflicts they are involved in, by broadening the perspective on what is considered terrorist learning. Using a variety of methodological approaches and empirical data, the volume offers a look at the clandestine inner lives of groups from different continents and ideological backgrounds in order to explore from whom they learn and how, and what the outcomes are. Their internal and external interactions are examined within their socio-political contexts to illuminate how they adapt to challenges or fail to do so. Unpacking the question of 'how do terrorists learn' helps us to grasp not only changes of violent means of action but also of operational and strategic approaches and, ultimately, even transformations of the ends pursued. The chapters demonstrate that terrorist learning is not principally different from that of other human organisations. The contributors draw on conceptual frameworks of organizational learning, but also broaden the scope beyond the organizational framework to acknowledge the variety of forms of informal and decentralized learning characteristic of much contemporary terrorism. This book will be of much interest to students of terrorism studies, violent extremism, organisational studies and International Relations"--

Introduction: Why engage, and why not? 1. - Part I: When to engage - Determining strategic moments 23. - 1. Growing up in groups 27. - 2. Growing out in organization 57. - 3. Community intervention as a negotiation strategy: Al-Qaeda in London 81. - 4. Terror, muscle, and negotiation: Failure of multiparty mediation in Sri Lanka 105. - 5. U.S. Policy toward nationalist terrorist organizations: Isolate or engage? 137. - Part II: How to engage - Devising strategy and tactics 165. - 6. Facing terrorism: Engagement and de-escalation 169. - 7. Egypt's Gama's Islamiya: Change through debate? 203. - 8. Tactics in negotiations between states and extremists: The role of cease-fires and counterterrorist measures 221. - 9. Eluding peace? Negotiating with Colombia's ELN 245. - Part III: Conclusion - When and how to engage 273