Maternity leave and mothers' long-term sickness absence: evidence from Germany
In: ZEW Discussion Papers 14-109
In: Labour markets, human resources and social policy
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In: ZEW Discussion Papers 14-109
In: Labour markets, human resources and social policy
In: Discussion paper 12-073
In: Labour economics, human resources and social policy
Using a large-scale linked-employer-employee data set from western Germany, this paper presents new evidence on the wage premium of collective bargaining contracts. In contrast to previous studies, we seek to assess the extent to which differences in wages between workers in covered and uncovered firms arise from the non-random selection of workers and firms into collective bargaining coverage. By measuring the relative wage changes of workers employed in firms that change contract status, we obtain estimates that depart considerably from previous results relying on cross-sectional data. Results from analysing separate transitions show that leaving industry-level contracts is associated with subsequent wage losses. However, the results from a trendadjusted difference-in-difference approach indicate that the particularly the transitions to no-coverage appear to be associated with negative shocks. Overall, our findings provide no evidence of a true wage effect of leaving wage bargaining, once differences in pre-transition wage growth are accounted for.
In: ZEW Discussion Paper 09-043
In: ZEW Discussion Paper 08-130
In: ZEW Discussion Paper 05-15
In: Discussion paper 05-90
Using a linked employer-employee data set, this paper analyses the relationship between firm-profitability and wages. Particular emphasis is given to the question of whether the sensitivity of wages to firm-specific rents varies with collective bargaining coverage. To address this issue, we distinguish sector- specific wage agreements, firm-specific wage agreements and wage determination without any bargaining coverage. Our findings indicate that individual wages are positively related to firm-specific rents in the non-union sector and under firm-specific contracts. Industry-wide wage contracts, however, seem to suppress firm-level rent-sharing. While pooled OLS estimates yield a positive correlation between wages and quasi-rents under centralised contracts, estimates accounting for unobserved individual and establishment heterogeneity point to a coeØ cient of zero. Differenced GMM estimates accounting for the endogeneity of our profitability measure even point to a negative relationship under centralised contracts.
In: Discussion paper 03-28
In: Thünen-series of applied economic theory no. 28
In a framework of a unionised international Bertrand duopoly with differentiated products, this paper analyses national labour market interdependencies and the consequences of trade liberalisation for union wages. The analysis suggests that national wages are likely to be strategic complements (substitutes), if products are ordinary substitutes (complements). Under the assumption of linear demand it is shown that bilateral trade liberalisation always leads to higher union set wages and union utilities, regardless of the nature of product rivalry. Analysing the consequences of unilateral tariff reductions it is shown that foreign tariff reductions always give rise to higher union wages and utilities, whereas the impact of unilateral domestic tariff reductions depends an the nature of product rivalry.
In: Thünen-Series of Applied Economic Theory working paper
This article studies the role of collective bargaining coverage for the relationship between wages and firm-specific performance. The empirical evidence based upon German linked employer-employee data provides support for the hypothesis that industry-level contracts suppress firm wage differentials that arise from firm-specific profitability conditions. Addressing the role of the frequency of shocks to firm performance, the evidence further suggests that the insensitivity of wages to firm-specific productivity fluctuations is mainly driven by the insulation of wages from transitory shocks. For permanent shocks, however, the evidence points to somewhat more flexible wages as - at least at large employers - wages are found to significantly respond to permanent productivity fluctuations. As to the role of firm heterogeneity in a given industry, the empirical results also show that under industry-level bargaining workers in more heterogeneous sectors receive lower wages than workers in more homogeneous sectors. This may be interpreted as evidence that centralised unions internalise negative implications of a compressed industry wage structure for below-average performing firms.
BASE
This paper studies the relationship between wages and the degree of firm heterogeneity in a given industry under different wage setting structures. To derive testable hypotheses, we set up a theoretical model that analyses the sensitivity of wages to the variability in productivity conditions in a unionsised oligopoly framework. The model distinguishes centralised and decentralised wage determination. The theoretical results predict wages to be negatively associated with the degree of firm heterogeneity under centralised wage-setting, as unions internalise negative externalities of a wage increase for low-productivity firms. We test this prediction using a linked employeremployee panel data set from the German mining and manufacturing sector. Consistent with our hypotheses, the empirical results suggest that under industry-level bargaining workers in more heterogeneous sectors receive lower wages than workers in more homogeneous sectors. In contrast, the degree of firm heterogeneity is found to have no negative impact on wages in uncovered firms and under firm-level contracts.
BASE
Using a linked employer-employee data set, this paper analyses the relationship between firm profitability and wages. Particular emphasis is given to the question of whether the sensitivity of wages to firm-specific rents varies with collective bargaining coverage. To address this issue, we distinguish sector-specific wage agreements, firm-specific wage agreements and wage determination without any bargaining coverage. Our findings indicate that individual wages are positively related to firm-specific quasi-rents in the non-union sector and under firm-specific contracts. Industry-wide wage contracts, however, seem to suppress firm-level rent-sharing. While pooled OLS estimates yield a positive correlation between wages and quasirents under centralised contracts, estimates accounting for unobserved individual and establishment heterogeneity point to a coefficient of zero. Finally, GMM estimates using suitable lagged values as instruments indicate that this result appears to be robust to the endogeneity of quasi-rents.
BASE
Using a linked employer-employee data set, this paper analyses the relationship between firm-profitability and wages. Particular emphasis is given to the question of whether the sensitivity of wages to firm-specific rents varies with collective bargaining coverage. To address this issue, we distinguish sector- specific wage agreements, firm-specific wage agreements and wage determination without any bargaining coverage. Our findings indicate that individual wages are positively related to firm-specific rents in the non-union sector and under firm-specific contracts. Industry-wide wage contracts, however, seem to suppress firm-level rent-sharing. While pooled OLS estimates yield a positive correlation between wages and quasi-rents under centralised contracts, estimates accounting for unobserved individual and establishment heterogeneity point to a coe? cient of zero. Differenced GMM estimates accounting for the endogeneity of our profitability measure even point to a negative relationship under centralised contracts.
BASE
In a framework of a unionised oligopoly, this paper reconsiders the impact of the bargaining structure on union wages. In particular, two dimensions along which centralisation may occur, namely the professional and firm line, are integrated into one modelling framework. It will be shown that, when taking into account different centralisation dimensions, wage outcomes of different bargaining regimes cannot simply be ranked according to the degree of bargaining centralisation. The argument will be that negotiated wages rather depend on the technical relationship between different groups of labour and goods as well as upon the dimension along which centralisation takes place.
BASE
In: Discussion paper 16-028
In: Labour markets, human resources and social policy