Suchergebnisse

In this article a theory of how foreign policy opinion depends on the social position of the opinion-holder is developed. The society is divided into a center and a periphery, where the center is the favored part and the periphery the rejected part of society. The periphery is the victim of insufficient communication and of isolation, and will for that reason represent other phases of attitude-formation than the center. Thus, the periphery will distinguish less between cognitions and evaluations of foreign policy alternatives, and be more absolutist in its orientation to change. The periphery will either favor the status quo or sudden and complete changes, whereas the center will be more revisionist in its outlook. The periphery will either keep silent or improvise demonstrations to make its attitude known. The theory is tested on survey data from Norway 1959-63, and confirmed on a number of points. More particularly, the periphery is found to have a different concept of consistency than the center. A tendency to combine attitudes in favor of atomic weapons with the signing of a protest against them was found to be most pronounced in the periphery. The importance of foreign policy attitude is seen above all in its bargaining value for a foreign minister, but also as a direct impetus provided foreign policy opinion is stabilized, and stabilized for peaceful policies. This can be done by 'making peace pay,' e.g. by including tax cuts in disarmament plans, and by tying the periphery more to the decision-makers through foreign policy oriented elections, or through government parties that also represent the periphery.

A theoretical development of a structural theory of aggression.

`Summit meetings' are defined as ad hoc meetings where heads of state &/or heads of gov &/or foreing ministers from at least 2 of the big powers are present. 147 meetings of this kind in the period Jun 1941 to Jun 1961 are analyzed using as independent variable the diff phases in East-West relations. As dependent variables use is made of a number of indicators of how limited or restricted the meetings were in scope &/or participation. The data give a certain support to a combination of hyp's about the effects of polarization & predictability in soc relations, but there are also alternative interpretations. The data seem to indicate that summit meetings are used most often & in a least restricted way when: (1) there is an alliance against a 3rd power, or (2) there is conflict, with bloc-formation (relatively) completed. The standard polarization hypothesis in sociol'al theory is then modified so as to be valid only till the conflict org's have been completed & predictability has been obtained, but it is indicated that contact in this late phase of the history of a conflict may be of little instrumental value. Finally the need is pointed out for a permanent pattern of summit contact, perhaps within the framework of the UN while the big powers can use ad hoc meetings as pol'al sanctions. HA.

A discussion of pacifism 'to clarify some theoretical problems in sociol as well as in pacifist ideologies & to point out some hyp's_that might not only be validated theoretically or ideologically but also possibly be tested empirically.' Conflict is defined as value disagreement, which must be distinguished from cognitive disagreement. There is a distinction between instrumental & expressive behavior in conflict situations. The former has the function of contributing to conflict resolution, while the latter serves the function of tension release from the latent intensity. The problem becomes: 'how can the expressive needs be taken care of in a conflict with minimal instrumental costs?' The following expressive equivalents of violence are seen: (1) aggression may be directed against more abstract entities, eg, soc structures, rather than against the individual antagonist, (2) 'some expressive outlet will be gained from the mere feeling of offering resistance of putting up a fight,' & (3) 'it may be that the kind of non-violent behavior indicated is not only compatible with, but directly an expression of, some deeper, latent urges that we do not know.' A structural-functional analysis of conflict-relevant behavior is undertaken. The following 3 techniques for the prevention of manifest conflicts are discussed: creation of a network of primary relations between groups, creation of mutual interdependencies, & creation of authority in a supersystem. Gandhi's methods of preventing the aggravation of conflicts are noted: sticking to the initial aim, showing confidence in the adversary, understanding the opponent's point of view, & fighting the antagonism, not the antagonist. 5 aspects of non-violent actions instrumental to accepted solutions are considered: conflict resolution as soc control, systematic norm infraction, emptying of statuses, suffering, & conflict behavior as anticipatory conflict resolution. Some res topics relevant to the nrohlems discussed are suneested. I. Taviss.