Suchergebnisse

Theories of fiscal federalism explain the efficiency and other economic gains from decentralization but do not explain its extent and nature in practice. The authors develop a political theory of decentralization that focuses on the lines of political accountability between politicians at different levels of government. The more accountable central-level politicians—presidents and legislators—are to subnational politicians, the greater the extent of decentralization and the more it will conform to the preferences of subnational politicians, for example, with respect to the degree of the center's discretion. The model is tested on five Latin American countries that, although formally decentralized, in fact exhibit wide differences in the distribution of spending and revenue responsibilities. The theory also helps explain a number of problems governments have encountered in decentralizing, including subnational debt crises and a mismatch between responsibilities and resources.

ABSTRACT By examining the relationship between democratic governance and monetary authority this paper accomplishes two principal tasks. First, it justifies placing the study of monetary authority as a central item on the research agenda of political scientists. Beginning from the premise central banks constitute a special mode of political authority, we examine trade-offs between questions of transparency, democratic accountability, and public sector efficiency. Second, by conducting an empirical study of monetary authority for the Brazilian case, the paper inverts a commonly held assumption within the study of central banks. Rather than argue price stability follows from an autonomous central bank, the Brazilian case demonstrate nearly the opposite can take place.

AbstractOne of the most significant developments in Latin American politics and political economy in the last two decades has been the increasing decentralization of government. This development has generated a substantial literature on the pros and cons of decentralization and on subnational politics but few attempts to explain differences in the pattern of decentralization across countries. Fiscal decentralization must be understood as a political bargain involving presidents, legislators, and subnational politicians, each having somewhat conflicting preferences. How these bargains are struck will depend heavily on the lines of accountability within political parties. In systems with centralized political parties, the central government has exercised greater control over resources and uses than in countries with decentralized parties, in which subnational politicians exercise strong influence over legislators. The article explores this hypothesis through a comparative analysis of decentralization in Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, Venezuela, and Mexico.

By examining the relationship between democratic governance and monetary authority this paper accomplishes two principal tasks. First, it justifies placing the study of monetary authority as a central item on the research agenda of political scientists. Second, by conducting an empirical study of monetary authority for the Brazilian case, the paper inverts a common held assumption within the study of central banks. Rather than argue price stability follows from an autonomous central bank, the Brazilian case demonstrates nearly the opposite can take place. (Rev Econ Polit/DÜI)

ABSTRACT The implicit assumption that governments will bailout financial institutions under distress can generate negative incentives for the development of a sound financial system. This paper begins from the premise that these negative incentives, which create a situation of moral hazard, is essentially a political problem rather than a technical problem over generating correct institutional incentives. In the Brazilian case, we argue the current administration of Fernando Henrique Cardoso was only able to significantly reduce its moral hazard problem in the financial sector through distancing its political relationship with two important political actors: the private financial sector and state governors. The ability of the government to eliminate the implicit assumption of an eventual Central Bank bailout over public and private commercial banks was only made possible through a series of political conditions, which includes the end of hyper-inflation under the Real Plan, that reduced the government's dependence upon those two important political actors.

RESUMO Este artigo indica, por meio do estudo de caso do processo de federalização do Banespa, que deve haver sérias reservas quanto à ideia atual de que houve centralização do poder no governo central imposta pelo executivo federal nos anos 90. O caso Banespa é um estudo de caso crítico, pois demonstra que a reestruturação do sistema bancário estadual não é causada pelo governo federal em nome da manutenção do processo de estabilização econômica. Os autores argumentam que o acordo envolvendo a situação dos bancos estaduais foi fruto de uma negociação política entre o governo estadual e o governo federal. Assim, a atual reestruturação do sistema federativo pode ser melhor explicada por um processo de negociação entre os ramos do governo do que pela reestruturação imposta pelas pessoas maior escalão.

This article indicates, through the case study of the Banespa federalization process, that there should be serious reservations concerning the current idea that there was centralization of power in the central government enforced by the federal executive in the 1990s. The Banespa example is a critical case study as it demonstrates that the restructuring of the state banking system is not caused by the federal government in the name of the maintenance of the economic stabilization process. The authors argue that the agreement involving the situation of state banks was the fruit of a political bargaining between the state government and the federal government. (Rev Econ Polit/DÜI)

The implicit assumption that governments will bailout financial institutions under distress can generate negative incentives for the development of a sound financial system. In the Brazilian case, the current administration of Fernando Henrique Cardoso was only able to significantly reduce its "moral hazard" problem in the financial sector through distancing its political relationship with two important political actors: the private financial sector and state governors. An eventual Central Bank bailout over public and private commercial banks was eliminated due to the end of hyper-inflation unter the Real Plan, that reduced the government's dependence upon those important political actors. (Rev Econ Pol/DÜI)