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In: Pitt Russian East European
Russia today represents one of the major examples of the phenomenon of "electoral authoritarianism" which is characterized by adopting the trappings of democratic institutions (such as elections, political parties, and a legislature) and enlisting the service of the country's essentially authoritarian rulers. Why and how has the electoral authoritarian regime been consolidated in Russia? What are the mechanisms of its maintenance, and what is its likely future course? This book attempts to answer these basic questions.Vladimir Gel'man examines regime change in Russia from the collapse of the S
In: Russian analytical digest: (RAD), Heft 294, S. 4-5
ISSN: 1863-0421
In: Post-Soviet affairs, Band 39, Heft 1-2, S. 1-9
ISSN: 1938-2855
In: Europe Asia studies, Band 73, Heft 6, S. 1080-1101
ISSN: 1465-3427
In: Russian politics, Band 6, Heft 1, S. 71-90
ISSN: 2451-8921
Abstract
Among many arguments for constitutional changes presented in the wake of the 2020 campaign for the popular vote in Russia, there was the idea that "cementing" Russia's political landscape for the sake of the regime's durability would serve as a tool for improvement of quality of governance. This argument, in a way, followed the essential point of Mancur Olson describing many autocrats across the globe as "roving bandits" with their short-term time horizons and incentives for predatory behavior. To what extent may the constitutional extension of the time horizon of Russia's authoritarian regime contribute to conversion of Russia's state officials and top managers from the "roving" to the "stationary" model, in Olson's terms? On the basis of previous research, I argue that the nature of Russia's political regime—electoral authoritarianism under personalist rule—prevents such a trajectory of further evolution. Indeed, the set of constitutional changes adopted in Russia in July 2020 is likely to preserve bad governance as a mechanism of maintenance of politico-economic order, as intentionally built and developed during the post-Soviet period. While certain technocratic solutions for Russia's governance, aimed at "fool-proofing", may avert the risks of major disasters, under conditions of durable authoritarianism the use of these devices will not result in major advancements in the quality of governance. Rather, they may contribute to further decay and aggravation of the numerous vices of bad governance.
Among many arguments for constitutional changes presented in the wake of the 2020 campaign for the popular vote in Russia, there was the idea that "cementing" Russia's political landscape for the sake of the regime's durability would serve as a tool for improvement of quality of governance. This argument, in a way, followed the essential point of Mancur Olson describing many autocrats across the globe as "roving bandits" with their short-term time horizons and incentives for predatory behavior. To what extent may the constitutional extension of the time horizon of Russia's authoritarian regime contribute to conversion of Russia's state officials and top managers from the "roving" to the "stationary" model, in Olson's terms? On the basis of previous research, I argue that the nature of Russia's political regime-electoral authoritarianism under personalist rule-prevents such a trajectory of further evolution. Indeed, the set of constitutional changes adopted in Russia in July 2020 is likely to preserve bad governance as a mechanism of maintenance of politico-economic order, as intentionally built and developed during the post-Soviet period. While certain technocratic solutions for Russia's governance, aimed at "fool-proofing", may avert the risks of major disasters, under conditions of durable authoritarianism the use of these devices will not result in major advancements in the quality of governance. Rather, they may contribute to further decay and aggravation of the numerous vices of bad governance. ; Peer reviewed
BASE
This essay is focused on the analysis of several success stories of state-directed developmental projects and programmes in Russia, which are designed and implemented amid conditions of bad governance. I argue that these success stories do not serve as exceptions to the general rules of bad governance but rather confirm its overall tendencies. The prioritisation of state support for successful projects and programmes is related to conspicuous consumption of material and symbolic benefits by the political leadership against the background of mediocre policy outcomes beyond the 'pockets of efficiency' intentionally designed by authorities. The analysis of several success stories related to technological development and the advancement of higher education addresses the questions of why they were short-lived and resulted in diminished returns and/or weak multiplicative effects. Thus, success stories become the other side of the coin for bad governance: these achievements are intertwined with the general trends of governing the state. ; Peer reviewed
BASE
In: Russian analytical digest: (RAD), Heft 266, S. 6-7
ISSN: 1863-0421
In: Russian social science review: a journal of translations, Band 61, Heft 6, S. 467-482
ISSN: 1557-7848
In: Post-Soviet affairs, Band 34, Heft 5, S. 282-296
ISSN: 1938-2855
In: Post-Soviet affairs, Band 34, Heft 5, S. 265-266
ISSN: 1938-2855
In: Democratization, Band 26, Heft 1, S. 168-170
ISSN: 1743-890X
In: Russian politics, Band 3, Heft 2, S. 282-304
ISSN: 2451-8921
A number of policy reforms in post-Soviet Russia have been conducted within the framework of the technocratic model. Policy proposals have been developed and to some extent implemented by certain teams of professionals appointed by legitimate political leaders. The leaders, in turn, have tended to monopolize policy adoption and evaluation and to insulate the substance of reforms from public opinion. This article is devoted to a critical reassessment of the technocratic model of policy-making in the context of changes of the 1990s–2010s. The main focus of the analysis is on the political and institutional constraints of policy-making resulting from the influence of interest groups and mechanisms of governance within the state apparatus. Poor quality of governance and rent-seeking aspirations of major actors create significant barriers for reforms, while insulation of policy-making, although beneficial for technocratic reformers themselves, has resulted in an increase to the social costs of reforms and distorted their substantive outcomes. In the conclusion, possible alternatives to the technocratic model are discussed.
In: East European politics, Band 33, Heft 4, S. 496-516
ISSN: 2159-9173