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We conceptualize and measure upward mobility over income or wealth. At the core of our exercise is the Growth Progressivity Axiom: transfers of instantaneous growth rates from relatively rich to poor individuals increases upward mobility. This axiom, along with mild auxiliary restrictions, identifies an "upward mobility kernel" with a single free parameter, in which mobility is linear in individual growth rates, with geometrically declining weights on baseline incomes. We extend this kernel to trajectories over intervals. The analysis delivers an upward mobility index that does not rely on panel data. That significantly expands our analytical scope to data-poor settings. (JEL D31, D63, I32, O15, O40)

We first clarify the precise theoretical foundations behind the notion of diffusion centrality. This allows us to address a minor inconsistency in the model description of Banerjee et al. (2013). We then identify unnatural implicit assumptions in the model of political intermediation proposed by Cruz, Labonne & Querubfn (2017). We introduce two extensions of diffusion centrality, targeting centrality and reachability, which we believe better capture features of contexts with targeted requests. We derive general explicit formulas to compute these new measures.

We first clarify the precise theoretical foundations behind the notion of diffusion centrality. This allows us to address a minor inconsistency in the model description of Banerjee et al. (2013). We then identify unnatural implicit assumptions in the model of political intermediation proposed by Cruz, Labonne & Querubfn (2017). We introduce two extensions of diffusion centrality, targeting centrality and reachability, which we believe better capture features of contexts with targeted requests. We derive general explicit formulas to compute these new measures.

Achieving peace and building the institutions that will make it last require much time and effort on the part of adversaries. While making this effort, the likelihood of peace is uncertain, and preparations for conflict are ongoing. Using a model that takes such considerations into account, adversaries divide their resources between "guns,""butter," and investments in conflict management. Even when all adversaries undertake sizable investments in conflict management, peace is uncertain. Results show that larger initial wealth increases the likelihood of peace, whereas the number of adversaries can have widely different effects. A larger number of adversaries in cases of international conflict tends to increase the likelihood of peace but has the opposite effect in cases of domestic conflict.

Achieving peace & building the institutions that will make it last require much time & effort on the part of adversaries. While making this effort, the likelihood of peace is uncertain, & preparations for conflict are ongoing. Using a model that takes such considerations into account, adversaries divide their resources between "guns," "butter," & investments in conflict management. Even when all adversaries undertake sizable investments in conflict management, peace is uncertain. Results show that larger initial wealth increases the likelihood of peace, whereas the number of adversaries can have widely different effects. A larger number of adversaries in cases of international conflict tends to increase the likelihood of peace but has the opposite effect in cases of domestic conflict. 2 Figures, 14 References. [Copyright 2002 Sage Publications, Inc.]