Suchergebnisse

Do democracies discriminate less against minorities as compared to non-democracies? How does the dominance of an ethnic group affect discrimination under various political regimes? We build a theory which tries to answer such questions. In our model, political leaders (democratically elected or not) decide on the allocation of spending on different types of public goods: a general public good and an ethnically-targetable public good which benefits the majority ethnic group while imposing a cost on the other minorities. We show that, under democracy, lower ethnic dominance leads to greater provision of the general public good while higher dominance implies higher provision of the ethnically-targetable good. Interestingly, the opposite relation obtains under dictatorship. This implies that political regime changes can favour or disfavour minorities based on the ambient level of ethnic dominance. Several historical events involving regime changes can be analysed within our framework and are consistent with our results.

Abstract The role of fiscal policy is examined when public goods provide both productive and utility services. In the presence of congestion, the consumption tax is shown to be distortionary. Optimal fiscal policy involves using consumption‐based instruments in conjunction with the income tax. An income tax‐financed increase in government spending dominates both lump‐sum and consumption tax‐financing. Replacing the lump‐sum tax with an income tax to finance a given level of spending dominates introducing an equivalent consumption tax. These results contrast sharply with the literature, where the consumption tax is generally viewed as the least distortionary source of public finance.

ABSTRACTThis paper investigates the impact of government expenditure on growth, in a heterogeneous panel, for a sample of developing countries. Using generalized method of moments techniques, we show that countries with substantial government current expenditure have strong growth effects, which vary considerably across the nations.

In the context of strikingly low literacy rates among Indian women and low caste population, the paper explores whether and how far the interests of the marginalized poor are undermined by the dominant elite consisting mainly of the landed and the capitalists. We distinguish the dominant elite from the minority elite (i.e., elected women and low caste representatives in the ruling government) and also the marginalised as measured by the state poverty rate. Results based on the Indian state-level data suggest that a higher share of land held by the top 5% of the population lowers public spending on education while presence of capitalist elite, as reflected in greater degree of industrialisation enhances it, even in poorer states; the landed elite thus appears to be unresponsive to the underlying poverty rate. The effect of minority representation in the government appears to have a limited impact, indicating a possibility of their non-accountability to serve their cohorts and/or a possible alliance with the dominant elite.

In this paper we examine the implication of a simple class of fiscal rules for long‐run economic growth and welfare. The Golden Rule of Public Finance that we examine is motivated by institutional arrangements in countries such as Germany and the UK. We find that rules that seek to limit government borrowing to productive investment spending have a clear justification in terms of growth and welfare when government‐provided goods are otherwise excessively provided. Even in the case where it is private consumption that is excessive, the Golden Rule of Public Finance is likely to be good from a growth perspective, but the welfare effects are more ambiguous.

Inter- and intra-state disparities in levels of literacy rates in India are striking, especially for the marginalized groups of women and low caste population. The present paper offers an explanation of this disparate development in terms of elite dominance that discriminates against the minority groups of people and systematically under-invests in mass education. We experiment with various indirect economic and political measures of elite dominance. Results based on the Indian state-level data for the period 1960-92 suggest that higher share of land held by the top 5% of the population (a) lowers spending on education as well as total developmental spending and (b) increases total non-developmental spending. Greater proportion of minority representations (female and low caste members) in the ruling government however fails to have any perceptible impact on development (including education) spending in our sample. This analysis also identifies land reform and poverty alleviation as two important policy instruments to erode the initial disadvantage of the marginalised people.

Abstract.  We introduce public capital and public services as inputs in an endogenous growth model. We show that the growth rate depends on the apportionment of tax revenues between the accumulation of public capital and the provision of public services. When public spending is financed by proportional income taxes, the growth rate, the level of public spending as a proportion of GDP, the level of investment in public capital as a proportion of total public spending, and the level of private investment as a proportion of total private spending all are lower in the equilibrium outcome than in the optimal outcome. JEL classification: E62, O40

AbstractWithin the Barro (1990) model of productive public services, but with the inclusion of public debt, we derive and characterize on the balanced growth path, a set of welfare‐maximizing fiscal rules under two budgetary regimes – one with only the standard dynamic government budget constraint, and the other involving the golden rule of public finance. We demonstrate analytically that the optimal fiscal policy differs in the two budgetary regimes considered. We also analyse two cases within the second regime: one, where the ratio of current spending to tax revenues is parametrically given, and another, where this ratio is optimally chosen by the government.

This paper examines the effects of money financing of deficits on capital accumulation and growth in a framework where inflationary finance is determined endogenously through a dynamic game between an optimising central bank which attempts to minimise the inflation‐tax and a rational private sector, and this in turn determines the long‐run growth rate of the economy. We use dynamic programming to derive the time‐consistent equilibrium, which has intuitive properties. Our results indicate clearly that the inflation tax and the long‐run growth rate are negatively related.

The paper introduces decentralized policymaking into a game‐theoretic model with output growth through capital accumulation, and in which the determination of taxes, seigniorage and the long‐run growth rate of the economy reflects the strategic interactions between the government, the central bank and the private sector. The paper investigates, among other things, the impact on the long‐run growth rate of a higher degree of inflation aversion of the central bank and a higher degree of inefficiency in the tax system.

We estimate the fiscal multiplier associated with shocks to government spending. We consider increases in government spending in the U.S. states in the wake of natural disasters to capture spending shocks that are both unexpected and unrelated to the preceding state of the economy. We find that these have a powerful stimulating effect on the local economy, which is reflected in the value taken by the fiscal multiplier. This result is obtained when we identify fiscal shocks by the states' own exposure to natural disasters, or when we use nearby states' exposure to disasters instead.