Suchergebnisse

Career diplomats have expertise. Why, then, do U.S. presidents appoint relative novices to key diplomatic posts? Conventional wisdom points to patronage. Yet this explanation overlooks the benefits of a diplomat's familiarity with political superiors. Inherent in delegated diplomacy is uncertainty over diplomats' ability to "deliver" on understandings reached at the negotiating table. Non-career diplomats often speak more credibly for political superiors, creating an incentive for foreign counterparts to engage in diplomacy. I theorize a tradeoff between familiarity and expertise to generate empirically testable prediction. Counterintuitively, I expect that presidents often sacrifice professional expertise to delegate important diplomatic assignments to relative amateurs, even accounting for the patronage value of the post. I find empirical support for the argument using a novel dataset on U.S. ambassadorial appointments from the Reagan through Trump administrations.

A wave of recent scholarship shows that the backgrounds of political leaders shape their behavior once in office. This paper shifts the literature in a new direction by investigating the conditions under which foreign observers think a leader's background is relevant. We argue that pre-tenure biographical attributes are most informative to outsiders during leadership transitions—unique periods where the new ruler does not yet have a track record—because a leader's background provides clues about how that leader might govern. But as time passes, foreign observers quickly discount the leader's biography and instead evaluate the leader's observable behavior. We test our theory by creating a systematic daily measure of attention to foreign leader backgrounds derived from the President's Daily Brief, a novel data source of 4991 recently declassified reports from the Central Intelligence Agency to the American president.

Existing research finds that leaders develop international reputations based on their past behavior on the international stage. We argue that leaders' domestic choices can also influence their international reputations, perhaps as much as their past foreign policy decisions do. Using formal theory and intuitive argumentation, we develop an overarching framework to predict how much any domestic choice will affect a leader's international reputation. We theorize that certain domestic choices can inform expectations about future international crisis behavior based on the extent to which (1) the costs at stake are similar to those of an international crisis and (2) the domestic issue is salient relative to foreign policy. We use conjoint experiments and other evidence to show that many domestic choices have significant international reputational effects. There is some evidence that the reputational effect of certain domestic choices may equal that of fighting in a previous international crisis.