Suchergebnisse

This paper addresses the question of regulatory rent seeking based on protests of proposed bank mergers & acquisitions submitted by community groups to bank regulators. Theories of CRA-related community group behavior based on benevolence & rent seeking, yield significantly different implications concerning the effect of a bank's CRA rating on protest probability, allowing for a clear test of the underlying motive for protest activity. The analysis shows (1) protests impose significant time cost on merger & acquisition applications & (2) the benevolent-based theory must be rejected in favor of the rent-seeking theory. 5 Tables, 9 References. Adapted from the source document.

Monetary historians have contended that Free Silver advocates were inflationists seeking debt reduction. We offer an alternative interpretation using a theory of money demand with differential returns on nominal units and a nonoptimum nominal money stock. Our explanation is more logically appealing and more consistent with contemporary evidence. The restrictive coinage laws of the period produced chronic shortages, and our empirical analysis provides clear evidence of these shortages. A shortage of coins valued at a half-day's wage and less, raised transactions costs, produced hardship and spawned protest.

Abstract.  This paper is an analysis of the demand for thoroughbred racetrack wagers, examining evidence that would support the existence of two types of bettors: the risk‐averse informed bettor versus the uninformed bettor. Looking at 12 major racetracks over the fall of 2002, we undertake an empirical examination of the determinants of bettors' preferences for particular wagers on specific races. The goal is to try to determine what individual aspects of a race (conditions, surface, participants, etc.) will encourage increased wagering dollars. With the advent of simulcasting, the competition for the wagering dollar is fierce, as the bettor can choose from more than 100 races daily, each race offering numerous betting options. We find for most wagers that higher quality participants, larger and more competitive fields, and turf races increase betting volume while higher pari‐mutuel takeout, poor track conditions, and other races run concurrently reduce volume. However, more competitive fields reduce betting volume in the show and trifecta pools. Optimal field size is determined to be between 10 and 12 betting interests. Overall, we find support for the existence of a significant share of risk‐averse informed bettors.