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This article offers a spatial theory to explain how a centrist third party gains votes via the ideological depolarization of its two main competitors towards the centre ground. Using the cases of British elections in 2001, 2005 and 2010, during which the two main parties, Labour and the Conservatives, were ideologically similar, the article reveals how perceived similarities between these parties led voters to turn to alternative issues and criteria - which benefited the third party, the Liberal Democrats - to decide their vote. Major parties therefore trade a proximity benefit of chasing the median voter against a separation benefit whereby votes can be lost due to voter indifference. The expectations are supported by analyses of vote choices using two measures of indifference, although the incentives do not apply equally in all three elections. The article reveals that indifference is not just relevant to voter abstention, as applied in existing spatial theories, but is also relevant to the basis of the vote choice and to votes for third parties. The implications are important for spatial models of party competition. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

This article offers a spatial theory to explain how a centrist third party gains votes via the ideological depolarization of its two main competitors towards the centre ground. Using the cases of British elections in 2001, 2005 and 2010, during which the two main parties, Labour and the Conservatives, were ideologically similar, the article reveals how perceived similarities between these parties led voters to turn to alternative issues and criteria – which benefited the third party, the Liberal Democrats – to decide their vote. Major parties therefore trade a proximity benefit of chasing the median voter against a separation benefit whereby votes can be lost due to voter indifference. The expectations are supported by analyses of vote choices using two measures of indifference, although the incentives do not apply equally in all three elections. The article reveals that indifference is not just relevant to voter abstention, as applied in existing spatial theories, but is also relevant to the basis of the vote choice and to votes for third parties. The implications are important for spatial models of party competition.

The British Conservative party during 1997–2005 appeared to support the view that parties react to defeat by energizing their core vote base. Using a series of spatial and salience-based definitions of the core vote, combined with elite interviews with William Hague, Iain Duncan Smith and Michael Howard, the three Conservative leaders between 1997 and 2005, empirical evidence in support and also refutation of the core vote critique is evaluated here. The analyses suggest that Conservative issue strategies between 1997 and 2005 were chosen on grounds of spatial proximity and public perceptions of issue ownership, and that an appeal to Conservative voters was consistent with a broader appeal. The implications of this evidence are important for conceptualizing and applying party base explanations in Britain and beyond.

The British Conservative party during 1997-2005 appeared to support the view that parties react to defeat by energizing their core vote base. Using a series of spatial and salience-based definitions of the core vote, combined with elite interviews with William Hague, Iain Duncan Smith and Michael Howard, the three Conservative leaders between 1997 and 2005, empirical evidence in support and also refutation of the core vote critique is evaluated here. The analyses suggest that Conservative issue strategies between 1997 and 2005 were chosen on grounds of spatial proximity and public perceptions of issue ownership, and that an appeal to Conservative voters was consistent with a broader appeal. The implications of this evidence are important for conceptualizing and applying party base explanations in Britain and beyond.

There are several contexts in which randomization in research design is not possible. Researchers may be interested in the effects of large-scale events or policy initiatives, or of complex causal processes that cannot be replicated. Threats to external validity in randomized experiments will lead to greater dividends for some research questions in a quasi-experimental design. Quasi-experiments can offer opportunities for testing causal theories, if they are carefully constructed to counter threats to internal validity. Furthermore, randomization is not a simple guarantee against threats to internal validity where few units of observation are used. An appreciation of the intersection of these approaches—between stronger quasi-experiments and weaker randomized experiments—can help guide our choice of experimental method. One can make the same argument about the benefits of pursuing good opportunities with quasi-experiments over scant opportunities with randomized experiments as is made more often in reverse.

There are several contexts in which randomization in research design is not possible. Researchers may be interested in the effects of large-scale events or policy initiatives, or of complex causal processes that cannot be replicated. Threats to external validity in randomized experiments will lead to greater dividends for some research questions in a quasi-experimental design. Quasi-experiments can offer opportunities for testing causal theories, if they are carefully constructed to counter threats to internal validity. Furthermore, randomization is not a simple guarantee against threats to internal validity where few units of observation are used. An appreciation of the intersection of these approaches-between stronger quasi-experiments and weaker randomized experiments-can help guide our choice of experimental method. One can make the same argument about the benefits of pursuing good opportunities with quasi-experiments over scant opportunities with randomized experiments as is made more often in reverse.