Search results

Nachkrisenzeit! Halten Sie sich fest: Nichts wird so, wie es einmal war und es wird auch nie wieder so sein. Werfen Sie alle gelernten Denkmuster schnell über Bord, gewöhnen Sie sich an ein neues Weltbild, die Kräfteverhältnisse haben sich über Nacht grundlegend verändert

This paper presents a simple, basic model to compute the welfare consequences of the introduction of a tariff on the CO2 content of imported goods in a country that already imposes a domestic carbon tax. The main finding is that the introduction of a carbon import tariff increases global welfare (and not just the welfare of the importing country) if there is no (or insufficient) pricing of carbon abroad. A higher domestic price of carbon justifies a higher import tariff. Moreover, a higher relative intensity of carbon abroad increases the desirability of high import tariff imposed by the home country because a border tax shifts production to the importing country, which in this case leads to lower environmental costs. If both instruments are used to maximise global welfare, the optimal domestic price for carbon should be higher than the external effects (assuming that there is no carbon pricing in the rest of the world) and the optimal tariff rate would be somewhat lower than the domestic carbon price. If the importing country has a fixed ceiling on emissions instead of a constant carbon price (as provided under the EU's Emissions Trading System), an import tariff is always beneficial from a global point of view and its imposition lowers the price of domestic allowances, but less than proportionally.

"This book, written by two experts in the field and based on research conducted at the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), addresses the considerable impact that the introduction of the euro is likely to have on capital markets in Europe." "The authors predict that the impact will be far-reaching, leading to a more liquid, mature and efficient capital market. The structure of capital markets in Europe and the behaviour of actors in these markets will be fundamentally affected, leading to a more integrated market. For monetary union to achieve its real objective, policy makers will need to address a wide variety of outstanding issues, in particular the taxation of savings income, accounting standards, capital market regulation and financial supervision."--Jacket

This paper shows that countries with weak banking system and fiscal institutions, should benefit from the presence of foreign banks, which can constitute a commitment and transparency device. Foreign banks can also reduce the probability of self-fulfilling speculative attacks. A strong presence of foreign banks can make a currency peg feasible in the first place by rendering it more resistant to speculative attacks. The European experience is instructive in this respect. In all the 10 countries from Central and Eastern Europe (CEEC) that will join the EU 2004/7 the banking system is now dominated by foreign banks.

This paper reviews the factors that will determine the shape of financial markets under EMU. It argues that financial markets will not be unified by the introduction of the euro. National central banks have a vested interest in preserving local idiosyncracies (e.g. the Wechsels in Germany) and they might be allowed to do so by promoting the use of so-called tier two assets under the common monetary policy. Moreover, a host of national regulations (prudential and fiscal) will make assets expressed in euro imperfect substitutes across borders. Prudential control will also continue to be handled differently from country to country. In the long run these national idiosyncracies cannot survive competitive pressures in the euro area. The year 1999 will thus see the beginning of a process of unification of financial markets that will be irresistible in the long run, but might still take some time to complete.